



MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—FORGETFULNESS.

THE words 'forget' and 'forgetfulness' are used with more than one meaning. Dr. Noah Porter (*The Human Intellect*, p. 311) quotes the following from Stiedenroth:—

"Forgetting admits of several degrees or stadia. The first is a momentary displacement of an object apprehended, which is yet certain to spring back as soon as the object displacing it is withdrawn. The second is a comparative withdrawal of the attention, as when we divert our mind from a painful sensation, or as we say, forget it, in labour or play. The third is when an object will not present itself spontaneously, but we must bethink ourselves in order to recover it. The fourth is when we bethink ourselves in vain. The fifth is when it has vanished for so long a time that we question whether we can by any effort bring it back. The sixth, when we conclude that it is absolutely certain that we shall never recall it again."

To the above we may add that total forgetfulness occurs only when all record of the psychical phenomena thus forgotten has disappeared from the individual absolutely, not merely beyond all recovery, but so that there is nothing left to recover. Using a similitude, the invisible leaf of the book of memory has not become temporarily fastened to another leaf, nor been torn out and hidden with a possibility of recovery, but has been utterly burnt, so that its constituent parts have become scattered and have entered into new combinations with the neighbouring part of the universe. Without any similitude, if a man totally

forgets the contents of the leaf of a book which he has read, then there is no Disposition, Trace, or Record left with him in correspondence to the page thus forgotten. In giving this as an example of total forgetfulness, we do not mean, however, to imply that all effects of reading the contents of this leaf are forgotten or lost to the individual concerned.

Now a hypothesis has been mooted that total forgetfulness does not occur, and seems to have been simmering in the minds of many for some time; never yet proved, but often assumed. Once no one would have disputed that we forget, forget often, and forget totally. At present, it seems worth while to bring forward evidence that total forgetfulness is highly probable.

The difficulty of disproof is increased by the fact that we cannot distinguish between traces no longer remaining, and traces which remain and yet can neither affect our conduct nor be revived in any way. But we may bear in mind that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of those who have originated the hypothesis in point.

Sir William Hamilton is responsible for its introduction to English experience (see his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, V. II, p. 212). The whole passage, pp. 211-214, must be taken into account, in order to see how the author quoted is forced to his conclusion. "The act of knowledge is an energy of the self-active power of a subject one and indivisible; consequently a part of the Ego must be detached or annihilated if a cognition once existent be again extinguished. Hence it is that the problem most difficult of solution is not, how a mental activity endures, but how it ever vanishes,"—and so on. Solving the problem, as he thinks, by means of the "latent modifications" he is unable to go beyond irrecoverable latency, and the lowest ebb to which he can imagine a cognition retiring is that "it may be absolutely lost for us in this life, and destined only for our reminiscence in the life to come". With Hamilton, the approach to forgetfulness is as of the hyperbola to its asymptote. The content of memory is supposed to diminish indefinitely without absolutely vanishing.

In Dr. Carpenter's *Mental Physiology* (c. x., on Memory, p. 429, 1st edition) we find the following:—"It is now very generally accepted by psychologists as (to say the least) a probable doctrine, that any Idea which has once passed through the mind may be thus reproduced, at however long an interval, through the instrumentality of suggestive action". This sentence is modified by "very generally," "may be," "which has once passed through the mind," and "probable," and counter-modified by "to say the least". At p. 453 we find—"It seems then to admit of question, whether everything that

passes through our minds thus leaves its impression on their material instrument"—"thus" referring to the permanent traces. Here we find at best only qualified and quasi-venturous denials of what might thus seem to be generally accepted, namely, that we retain traces of the whole of our past lives in our normal states.

There is a marked indication of a similar current of thought in Dr. Maudsley's *Physiology and Pathology of Mind* (p. 183, ed. 1867):—"There can be no memory of what we have not had experience of in whole or in parts; and nothing of which we have had experience can be absolutely forgotten".

In *What am I?* (V. II., p. 439), by a final flight of imagination, Mr. Serjeant Cox extends the permanence of traces far beyond the mind as follows:—

"Suppose a man to be transported to different parts of space, with a knowledge of all distances, and provided with a telescope that would make all objects visible at any distance, such an observer would be omniscient." "Thus the universe contains an indestructible and incorruptible record of all the events of the past. They have been projected into the Ether, and are carried forward into space by the wings of light, actually existing in form and colour. The most secret deed that is done lives through Eternity. There is no act of virtue, no crime, that is not projected into heaven, painted upon space, and retained there for ever!"

It is but fair, on the other hand, to say that modern psychologists allow exceptions to this rule of permanent traces. Dr. Maudsley says of pain (p. 192)—"It is not the result of organisation but the token of disorganisation. How then should it be accurately remembered?" Before this he remarks that we cannot recall an emotion where the *form* has been almost lost in the commotion, quoting Shakespeare's "formless ruin of oblivion".

In fact no valid reason has ever been given why we should not recognise even in healthy individuals the existence of psychical storms of such a kind that traces of experience are destroyed wholesale during their continuance. During these storms, pleasures, pains and complex emotions connected with the memory of events may die out, not only beyond recall, but totally, leaving no trace behind.

The phrase "leaving no trace behind" is used with a purpose here. Hamilton introduced his hypothesis to English experience on metaphysical grounds which now would scarcely be accepted as valid. The hypothesis being successfully introduced, the grounds for its introduction are now forgotten, or at least it is not remembered that they would now be generally considered untenable.

On the other hand, the doctrine of Conservation of Energy

has become generally accepted by men of science, but unfortunately it has often become perverted to uses for which it was never intended. So again the notion of Continuity has been applied to discontinuous things, and above all, especially in psychology, the *effects* of events and the *records* of events have often become confused.

For a given event the record and the result need not be one and the same. A series of disturbances may combine to produce a certain result which is not their record, and such disturbances may be recorded by something which is not their result. If a person copy an extract out of a book, the extract is a record of what was in the book even though the book be lost, yet it is a result of the energy of the person writing and in no way depends on the quality of the energy of the book, potential or actual. On the other hand, if a book is condemned to be burnt, when there is no other copy like it or derived from it, the record perishes, yet the effect of the potential and actual forces of the book does not perish: far from it, the book becomes an agent in its own immolation.

To take another illustration: suppose two equal stones are thrown together into a pond, so as to fall into it at the same time but not quite close to one another; then the well-known waves increase in ever widening circles; where the two sets of waves intersect, the water at the wave crest is of double height, but where the crest of one wave meets the hollow of the corresponding wave from the other stone, the water remains at the original level. Of course this is only a very simple example of the interference of waves. Wherever waves interfere, then the record of the existence of the origins of these waves is necessarily imperfect at the time of interference. Yet in the case of the water the unaltered level, and in the case of interfering light the darkness, are results of the co-operation of the causes concerned. Had only one stone been thrown into the water, there would have been no interference until the waves became reflected from the bank, and then the record of the single event would have begun to destroy itself.

In the birth and destruction of relations there need be no violation of the Conservation of Energy; else, how could newspapers become printed? It is true that we can determine empirically the relation between the quantity of printed matter and the quantity of paper and ink used; but so also at some future time it may become possible to determine empirically the quantity of energy transferred in remembering and forgetting.

That every cause has an effect, and that all our actions have effects following through future ages of ages, has very little in

common with the supposition that all the records of our actions are preserved. They belong to different spheres of thought. If the records of particular actions are partially preserved through some results of these actions, so also they are destroyed in some measure through other results.

Taking Mr. Serjeant Cox's example of the indestructibility of the records of actions, it is sufficient to state that, although a book be full of printed matter, the mere fact of keeping it closed prevents any record of its contents escaping to the distance of a yard, much less therefore is it likely that the actions of Englishmen hidden by roofs and still more by clouds, can be seen by the most perfect human eye with all possible telescopic adjustments at the distance of the nearest fixed star.

Empirically it is found that the records of memory, like trees and fungi, are subject to growth and decay. And again, while admitting the probability that the law of Conservation of Energy is applicable to the records of memory, it has never yet been proved or attempted to be proved to be true of all the energies of human beings.

Some instances of forgetting where we bethink ourselves in vain, occur in Taine *On Intelligence*, Book II., c. ii., 'Laws of the Revival and Obliteration of Images' (where by Images are meant presentations or complex psychical phenomena corresponding to physical stimuli, not necessarily visual). In this chapter are given three conditions unfavourable to the Revival of Images:—(1) All that lessens the attention lessens the chance of revival: "a musket shot, the flash of a cannon, a painful wound, frequently escape attention in the heat of battle, and not having been observed cannot revive; a soldier suddenly finds he is bleeding without being able to recollect the blow he has received". (2) The want of repetition diminishes the chances of revival: we can seldom remember the pattern of the clothes of an individual with whom we have conversed only once, although we noticed it at the time. (3) Images grow dull by [varied] repetition: a man who could remember the image of a hen in a farm-yard well enough if he saw it alone, might not remember the image of any one hen if he saw a large number together, yet might easily remember an elephant or hippopotamus, because he has only seen one or two specimens, and has therefore a precise image.

Were perfect traces or dispositions corresponding with former experience to retain a place in the individual, we should find that where the original experience involved active use of the body, the revived experience would also be accompanied by active and passive elements in fair proportion of intensity between the revived and the original. Now this is not generally

the case. In remembering, the passive elements of experience are generally revived better than the active. If ever the active elements are revived in due proportion, we call the revival 'imitation' or 'acting' rather than remembering. (Of course all revival of the elements here called passive is active, but the activity in such cases is not the result of the traces of the original activity.) Even when the active elements have been restricted to attention, as in listening to a speaker or looking at a face, whenever these are duly revived the individual says no longer—'I remember hearing' or 'seeing,' but rather, 'The voice is ringing in my ears,' 'I see him before me in my imagination'.

There is little doubt that sometimes traces practically perfect remain for a time in the case of a good blindfold chess-player, as the American player mentioned by Taine (p. 311) who said, "I have never played a game without having played it over again four or five times in the night in bed with my head on the pillow"; or in an individual with good verbal memory like the young Corsican (quoted by Hamilton, V. II., p. 219, from Muretus), who could recite some thousand words in order, after once hearing them, and even give the first, third, and so on right through; or like the idiot mentioned by Mrs. Somerville, who could repeat a sermon *verbatim*, indicating also where the minister blew his nose or coughed during the performance.

Setting aside rare examples such as the above, which mostly concern the revival of visual or auditory phenomena taken separately, and which have become conspicuous for their rarity, we may hold in general that most of the traces or dispositions are deficient in elements ensuring adequately co-ordinated action, when they are stimulated so as to bring about a revival or reminiscence.

We proceed to notice other elements in which the traces or dispositions seem weak or deficient, so far as we can judge from normal states of the individual.

In the active lives of individuals, Selection plays an almost incessant part. For instance it occurs in finding the way, buying fish, obtaining the meaning of a word by aid of a dictionary, and in adopting a method of solving an equation. To select implies to reject and even to ignore. Of course we cannot be said to forget a circumstance which has never influenced our conscious existence even while we have ignored it—as a hidden mine near a footpath over sand-hills. Yet there have been circumstances, materials, words and selections of words, in correspondence with which we have experienced presentations, which nevertheless we have ignored and forgotten. With the increase of the extent and complexity of the relations implied in our knowledge, the extent and complexity of the

traces forgotten increases also. One who selects things, rejects, ignores and forgets things. One who selects ways of thought and action, rejects, ignores and forgets ways of thought and action, including the objects concerned therein. For example, if one orange seem the ripest in a basketful and so be chosen, the remainder probably become forgotten; in playing chess, crossing a large town, climbing rocks, or carving wood, men do not for the most part remember all the ways of action thought of tentatively, and then ignored. Using an old simile, the higher we climb the tree of learning the higher are the branches with twigs and leaves passed by, rejected and ignored. The larger the tree grows the greater is the number of branches thus rejected.

The power of selecting what seems useful, and ignoring what seems useless, is a most valuable aid to the advance of knowledge. We march to the battle with the unknown as little burdened by baggage as possible. In the process beginning with learning to read and continued until we understand Euclid, we first notice separate letters, then separate short words, then long words and short sentences, then we frame a symbolic method for ourselves by which we read the meanings of words rather than the sounds associated with them, the meanings of sentences and the meaning of a whole chain of related sentences. So that when we become familiar with Euclid's method, separate letters, words and even sentences are forgotten.

In writing out Euclid, the sentences become reconstructed in a way suggested by knowledge of the drift of the propositions and the style in which they are elaborated, rather than from any actual memory of the *ipsissima verba*. Also, in this way a word occurring in the original, *e.g.*, circle, need not result from the trace of the word circle originally read in the proposition now written out, but rather comes by association with the visual image known by that name.

In using the syllogism or reasoning in some similar way where two terms only are retained in the conclusion, the middle term is ignored for the time. If we did not thus ignore terms in using conclusions we should be compelled to remember all the terms of the syllogism, and worse still, all the terms of a sorites, and all the calculations in an arithmetical problem. This would be highly obstructive to the march of thought. Of course this process of ignoring for the time is no proof of utter forgetfulness, but it certainly aids any existing tendency that way.

Again, in the well-known process of selection from a classified arrangement, we find ourselves perpetually rejecting and

ignoring: thus Samuel elected Saul by rejecting tribes and families. With well-known classifications, the process of selection is often unconscious for the most part and so cannot be adduced here. Men do not consider whether a cuttle fish is a vertebrate, but begin by calling it a cephalopod. The process of looking out for a word in a large dictionary and then selecting the meaning apparently best suited for the passage in hand offers an example of selection from a classified arrangement, in which much is almost necessarily noticed and yet ignored.

The full verbal memory alluded to above as possessed by Dr. Leyden and others has its disadvantages. Thus, when Dr. Leyden wished to refer to a passage in anything he had heard or read (and remembered thus perfectly), he was obliged to go over a large part of the record in his mind before he came to the place required. So of the Corsican, Giulio Guidi, a passage is quoted in the note at the end of Hamilton's 30th Lecture to the effect that he produced nothing, for his unfortunate memory had killed all his creative faculty: "It is with the precious gift of Memory as with all other gifts—they are the curse of the gods when they give too much". The misfortune in these cases is not that the individuals remember, but that they remember what is of no use to them. They remember their experience rather than the conclusions they might have drawn from their experience. Nevertheless some of the most original minds have had gigantic memories—for example, Leibnitz, Euler, and Gauss.

Examples of good practical memory and therefore of good practical forgetfulness may be found in Galton's *English Men of Science* (p. 111):—

"Ex. 1. Next to no verbal memory but good for facts, small and great, which will fit into any chain of reasoning."

"Ex. 2. Of moderate verbal memory but strongly retentive of facts and figures, so far as they are related to any subject on or in which I am engaged."

"Ex. 6. Great memory for figures, can get up pages for examination before committees, and dismiss them from memory afterwards."

"Ex. 8. Never kept a diary. Can forget useless knowledge such as formulæ, rules, gossip, &c., very fast."

The evidence given by scientific men in this work seems to be in favour of what is called 'a good general memory'; but it ought to be noticed that, in its ordinary sense, this phrase does not refer to rejected middle terms, or rejected genera and species, rejected results of incipient comparisons, or names ignored or passed over in a long list; we do not think that we have forgotten them, for we do not think anything about them at all. Again, not many are aware that,

even though they are generally allowed to have good memories as a rule, such a good memory is of a special type in the midst of an ocean of forgetfulness. Suppose a classical scholar remembers words well, does he also remember pictures and strains of music? Or, again, supposing a musician remember what he has heard wonderfully well, as Mozart remembered the music of the Sistine Chapel, does he remember architecture, painting, poetry? Some remember the shapes of objects and yet have the greatest difficulty in remembering their colour, and so on. It is therefore easy to see that it is very likely for anyone to leave out of his reckoning the innumerable experiences forgotten by him, such as left only a slight trace on his mind at the time, while the only cases of forgetfulness which could leave a permanent impression, would be where he wished to remember and found that he had forgotten.

Forgetfulness occurs when there is a gap in the series of what we remember, as when a line of blank verse becomes missed out. Yet there are also two other distinct kinds: (1) When the disposition, trace, or record loses depth of meaning; (2) when it becomes distorted.

(1) Like a threadbare coat preserving its outward shape, and to some extent covering the body, but with a scantiness of thickness and consequently of warmth, or like a goodly apple rotten at the core, so there are words and sentences in habitual use having no longer their original depth of meaning; old associations, pleasures and pains have died out, the links between their traces and traces of other experiences have disappeared, yet the words remain and the individual is perhaps not even aware that they mean much less to him now than in former times.

In speaking or using words in thought, each sentence flows along accompanied by currents of deeper and deeper import. Isolate the words from the deeper currents of sense, the obvious meaning remains the same, or we may even use the words without noticing the meaning at all. It is when the obvious current of meaning remains that we may be most oblivious, that something may possibly be forgotten.

Sometimes we find ourselves reading words in this superficial way; especially when in a hurry, our eyes trace the words, and an accompanying sound seems to arise on our ears, yet the meaning is far from us. So men read words and phrases with the outward expression of deep emotion, although the depths of their feelings are not really stirred at all. The expression has survived the reality.

Sometimes, as in reading words apart from their meaning, we can forget for the moment without having anything like total

forgetfulness. So when approaching a perfectly familiar neighbourhood, we may cut off all old experience such as ought to be suggested by the view before us, and by imagining that we are going to a strange place put in appropriate accompaniments in accordance with our fancy.

Again, we may prevent ourselves from becoming unfit to discuss matters calmly by suppressing the accompaniments of recollections appealing to our feelings, although we may really act with full knowledge of the existence of these accompaniments. A surgeon while operating may suppress the memory of pain associated with a similar occasion, without in the least suppressing the knowledge of the relative painfulness of the parts concerned.

It will be found that we forget much that is convenient to forget by the simple process of not remembering when the opportunity occurs. A mass of recorded circumstance is connected with the record of an event which acts, so to speak, like a handle to the reminiscence. We know well that if we think about the event the recorded circumstance will become developed in reminiscence. We avoid thinking about the event, and the reminiscence does not follow, and so the traces lose one chance of renewed vitality. If, for instance, A knows that should he think of B who was in the same class with him at school he will also think of other class-mates, and then thinks no more of B, it follows that he has passed over one opportunity of thinking of his class-mates—of infusing life into the traces still preserved, and so has not made an attempt to arrest their natural decay.

Suppose, again, relations are better remembered than related characteristics, as the shapes of the boundaries on a map rather than the colours of the countries, or the time of an air rather than the timbre of the notes, or, *vice versâ*, the characteristics better than the relations as the colour of a patch of moss rather than its shape. We have the case of traces renewed unequally in normal conditions: it is still quite possible that such traces are revived equally well in abnormal conditions, yet it is not probable. It is much more likely that they have become decayed in some ways more than in others. This likelihood is made much stronger in the frequent cases where we wish for instance to remember the colour, and still only remember the shape with a colour supplied merely from imagination.

(2.) In forgetfulness by distortion we find the best proof of total forgetfulness. A schoolboy writing from dictation spells a word wrongly, his exercise is corrected in due course and the word is written rightly above the word written wrongly. But the boy, instead of forgetting the wrong spelling and re-

membering the right, or remembering both and distinguishing the right from the wrong, may remember the wrong spelling more firmly than ever under the mistaken impression that it is the right.

In endeavouring to remember odes of Horace learned years ago and repeated perfectly well some time after, we find that some seem entirely forgotten, some stanzas are forgotten, some transposed, some lines are transposed, some words missed out, and other words of equal length inserted. The more we try to remember the more clearly we notice that certain changes have taken place in the traces. Like names written on the bark of a tree they have become distorted by the change of years.

The transposition of traces of experience, especially of words and sounds, occurs so often that most of us can remember examples. The whole family of malapropisms is nurtured upon this peculiarity. One law is almost universally prevalent: if one of two words both occurring in one sentence is used for the other, it is supplanted by the other also in its own place, so that a transposition really occurs. Sometimes however the word inserted instead of the first becomes retained in its own place also and thus one word is lost from the record. This is like what occurs in the returns from a small town where the number of deaths is inserted instead of the number of births and retained for the deaths also. By transposition, as we find sometimes, a name has become attached to the wrong person, and a historical character is associated with the wrong date.

The third of M. Taine's causes of forgetfulness, where the images become confused through their number and variety, may be extended to images occurring without corresponding external phenomena, and thus be shown to be a most fruitful cause of practical forgetfulness. For instance, a hen may be remembered only vaguely, not because other hens are seen at the time or afterwards, but because other hens have been seen already, and so their traces have left their influence on the traces of this last observed animal.

If an old man try to recollect his own age of 76, it is quite possible that the traces of the adjacent numbers, 74, 75, 77, being already connected serially with 76, become so united that any one of them may be revived indifferently when he tries to think of his age. Again, one may forget the principal street of a village once visited not because the traces are really gone, but because there are other principal streets of other villages which present themselves equally readily to the memory.

Whenever the memory of an associated fact is as strong as the memory of the fact we wish to recover and the clue given by the

name affords no means of ascertaining which is which, we cannot possibly know which to adopt.

In illustration of the distortion of traces it is instructive to compare the visual phenomena (*Nachbilder*) derived from looking at bright objects somewhat steadily. Impressing the visual apparatus with the stimuli of light coming through a window divided into small panes and shutting our eyes, we can watch the after-image change in shape and fill up, gradually losing its original outline while the sensitive parts of the body concerned become renewed by the influence of the circulation. While the waning phantom changes slowly in shape the colours become complementary in turn, as first green, then red, then green again, and sometimes the shape becomes very different from the original.

Forgetfulness sometimes assumes the forms of exaggeration and multiplication of traces. Exaggeration is very common and by no means always voluntary. When the traces of our memory have not become adjusted to altered circumstances there is often virtual exaggeration, as, for instance, when the traces of what we have experienced in childhood survive, they are out of proportion with present experience. As a kettle seems longer in boiling to a child than to a man, it would be very pardonable if anyone were to say, "kettles used to take a longer time to boil when I was a boy"; and as of course a mile seems longer to a child than to a man, in revisiting old scenes, we think of a village as a long distance off, whereas anywhere else its distance would not seem great at all.

But apart from this natural want of adjustment there is a true exaggeration varying with different idiosyncrasies and different kinds of education: beginning with the appearance of bright objects and the loudness of sounds, it penetrates to the most important thoughts. It occurs in the mind of a child going to a pantomime, and forms a strong support to those who voluntarily submit their minds to the direction of others. Among half civilised people and among the insane, it occurs without restraint and leads to the wildest conclusions.

The multiplication of traces is not exaggeration although it may lead to it.* Thus the number of people in a room, of buttons on a coat, or of boots tried on in a shop, may become unduly increased in memory and hence exaggeration would follow. It would be an interesting investigation to ascertain how far and under what conditions this multiplication of traces

* Multiplication is of discontinuous, whereas exaggeration is of continuous, things. A drunkard who sees two moons multiplies, one who mistakes a haystack for a house exaggerates.

extends among men in ordinary health ; of course in insanity, multiplication like exaggeration becomes almost boundless.

Sometimes it is possible to observe presentations in process of multiplication. I remember once, while awake in bed, seeing a large number of letter S's appear as visual phantasies and increasing with extraordinary rapidity. Something like this can be brought to pass voluntarily ; for instance, a mathematician may imagine an equilateral triangle in one direction, and then another and then another and so on—in different apparent positions. This process is not very different from that by which a boy's after-image of the sun becomes multiplied through watching larks soaring on a fine day—the after-images occupying different positions because the eyes, and therefore the sun relatively to the eyes, have occupied different positions, and as they co-exist and occupy different positions, they are multiplied. So the S's mentioned above became assigned to different parts of space as the eyes were moved about, and the attention directed in different directions when the registering apparatus was in a peculiarly sensitive condition. Finally, wherever and whenever, as in comparison of visual sizes, we can transfer a psychical object by means of imagination from one part of space to another (psychically, of course) we run the risk of multiplying the traces of the object thus transformed, and often do multiply its traces in this way. In morbid states when the correctives of multiplication and exaggeration are in abeyance, the consequence is very marked in the conduct of the individual.

It is most probable that all untruthfulness even in imagination has an effect in distorting the traces of what has been experienced by the individual, so that one who deceives another *ipso facto* deceives his future self, that is, until the traces of the recorded consequent psychical effects have vanished.

We will now investigate Forgetfulness by another path. Individuals often remember clearly and well up to the time when they have to use their knowledge, and then when it is no further required, there follows a rapid and extensive decay of the traces. Many schoolboys forget their lessons after they have said them, many barristers forget details got up for a particular case. Thus a boy learns thirty lines of Homer, says them perfectly and then forgets them so that he could not say five consecutive lines the next morning, and a barrister may be one week learned in the mysteries of making cog-wheels, but in the next he may be well acquainted with the anatomy of the ribs instead. Sometimes the decay is retarded for some time after the use is over and then takes place. Practically we sometimes keep a matter in mind not exactly by attending to it but by keeping our attention referred to something connected

with it from time to time. Translating this into the language of physiology, we mean that, by referring attention to a part within or closely connected with the system of traces required to be remembered, we keep it well fed, so that the traces are preserved with the utmost delicacy. Of course, to do this we need not know how we do it any more than we know how thinking of appearances makes people blush, or thinking of a pain in some part of the body makes a pain seem to be there. If we think too much about a subject the parts concerned become too well fed; the traces improve certainly, but our recollection is consequently less like the original, although possibly of higher value except where the likeness is what is aimed at.

In illustration of the above remarks, we may compare the attention repeated from time to time in holding a glass of water in the hands for a short period: if we pay a moderate amount of attention we can hold the glass when it is almost full, but if we pay too much attention to our hands the tone of the muscles becomes altered, and the water runs over. None feel so restless as those who try to stand still.

Now when the use of a record is withdrawn, and attention is withdrawn from it and we think no more about it, we know that we experience a feeling of relief, and we thus may conclude that energy is in some way liberated. If the use is not withdrawn, and the attention is not withdrawn so that we keep the record in mind, we know that this feeling of relief does not take place, and we have no reason to suppose that any corresponding liberation of energy occurs. Also we are well aware not only that after this feeling of relief takes place the record does not seem conserved so well as before, but that we have real difficulty in attempting to remember it. Thus on the one hand there is liberation of energy to account for, and on the other the apparent degradation of the record. It is not rash, therefore, to suppose that the degradation is real, that the record is left to decay, and that the forces which would have tended to preserve it now become useful in some other way.

It is possible that there is great disproportion between the value of the thing forgotten and the direct value of the energy liberated, as great perhaps in some cases as between the value of the Alexandrine library and the value of the fire which burnt it. Still the fact that men forget knowledge they do not seem to require, and often forget it as quickly as possible, shows that the energy liberated is of some value.

In practical life where periodical forgetfulness and accumulation of memory occur, there is no improbability in supposing that an appreciable amount of energy can be locked up from

time to time with the memory, but within a tolerably definite limit, capable of increase to a certain degree by practice, so that the energy used to get up facts of one kind may be used to get up facts of another kind, provided the former become reduced to the level of the general stock of the individual's knowledge.

In different individuals the relative amount of this versatile energy must vary very much. This versatility of mind need not imply a larger energy than usual, but rather a larger amount disposable for the occasion of the moment and liberated again by speedy forgetfulness. So soon as it is liberated it seeks fresh fields and pastures new, and then, as men say, all is grist that comes to the mill. On the other hand, when knowledge is really assimilated so that it requires no direction of attention to keep it from rapid decay (such knowledge for example as is displayed in the ability to read and write or can be acquired at once on hearing of the death of a friend), there is little chance of forgetfulness liberating energy of use for further acquisition.

Putting together the results of common experience on this subject, we may suppose that, in analogy to the process of digestion, the process of assimilating knowledge calls forth an appreciable amount of force, and that we get into the habit of secreting or bringing into a suitable condition an adequate supply of force for the purpose. Suppose now the process of assimilation becomes arrested, the force still in process of secretion increases for a time, and so there is stored up a reserve in aid of future memory. So that it is not so much from the decay of the traces, as from the diversion of the forces used in strengthening the traces, that the power of making new traces is increased.

Further, using the same analogy, it is said that eating cheese helps digestion because it calls forth powers of digesting; so learning by rote improves the memory by calling forth powers of assimilation, which improve the general power of remembering when liberated.

Finally, our memories are like gardens, and the richer they are the more they require weeding. From this point of view forgetfulness is sometimes desirable. There are plenty of maxims current to help forgetfulness, for example, change of air. To these we may add the following general principle:—To forget an experience of any kind, fasten attention on the part giving least permanent interest—if this has present interest it is all the easier to do this: the temporary is remembered at the expense of the more permanent, and thereafter the latter is forgotten, while the temporary drops out from its own inherent want of interest.

We can aid forgetfulness artificially. Thus, in reading a

book, make an abstract, paying attention to the abstract: it gains in clearness but loses in colouring. The abstract is easier to remember at first, it is referred to and remembered, while the book is forgotten. But the abstract is really drier reading and less pleasant to remember than the book, and so having first pushed the book out of memory, it is totally forgotten sooner than the book would be. There is a parallel to the above, in the recipe how to ruin an artist. A picture dealer employs an artist to paint for him alone, then after paying well for some time and so depriving the latter of all his other connections, he lowers the scale of payment gradually until the artist is ruined.

For the present it seems unlikely that the constants of any equation of continuity for the different forces involved in memory are determinable (I mean such an equation as occurs in hydrodynamics between the influx, the contents, and the efflux). It therefore remains an unsolved problem how far the power of remembering may be cultivated without the judgment or the imagination suffering, or how much a general and a special memory may develop without hurting one another. Nor again, supposing a valid measure of the contents of memory found, do we know, beyond the fact that there is a possible maximum, at what time in life that maximum is reached, or how the time varies with individuals and races. And at any time the solution of the problem of the best possible memory ought not to be undertaken without a wide preliminary survey of the individual and social uses of human life. Without such survey, some plausible solution may urge the training of the memory in the wrong direction, the individual may be sacrificed to his memory, the memory of the general may be sacrificed to that of the special, and the memory enduring for years to the memory valid for a year, a week or a day. Thus, as has often happened already, the attempted training would do more harm than good.

R. VERDON.

II.—ETHICS AND POLITICS.

IN MIND, No. VI., I stated that Utilitarianism, so far from being provable from Ethical data, is not an Ethical principle at all but a Political; the Law of Health of the higher organism or polity, and not the Law of Conduct of the unit members. My present object is to justify this statement a little more fully by considering the relationship of these two laws, and to suggest a practical test whereby to distinguish their respective spheres of operation.

First I must avoid a misconception. There is a branch of Law, unwritten and unenacted, of which the sanction is custom and public opinion of the class or society which adopts it, and which is best known as the Law of Honour and Fashion. It is in fact Rudimentary Law; and while some parts of it, being difficult to formulate or otherwise unsuitable for positive enactment, remain always rudimentary, other parts of it only await legislative, or (as in the case of English 'common law') judicial, recognition, to become integrated into the political structure. As an instance of a law so made, I may quote Mr. Spencer's explanation of the so-called 'Law of Exogamy' from a fashion of having foreign wives; as an instance of such law in the making I may name International Law; and for other illustrations I may refer to Sir H. Maine's *Village Communities*. This unwritten law or Law of Opinion was most unhappily termed by Austin 'Positive Morality'; and though he explained that name to mean merely certain "human laws" "without regard to their goodness or badness," the misnomer has produced much confusion; for when men hear of morality, they naturally think it must have something to do with moral goodness and badness. For the purposes of this paper I have only to state that this 'Positive Morality' is a branch not of Ethics but of Politics, part of the Art of Praising not of the Art of Acting. With this precaution I may proceed to the main subject.

Historically the unit necessarily precedes the organism, and Ethical facts therefore come before Political. Given tissue endowed with sensibility, that is, with the property of reaction under stimulus, and we have the raw material of Morality. For the only tissue which can continue to exist is that of which the reactions are such as to secure self-preservation, or in other words, the 'good' of the reagent. Next it follows that as, in the progress of evolution, tissues become at once differentiated and integrated into an organism, each retaining its proper reaction, the resultant action of the whole, partly by the ordinary laws of the composition of forces, and partly by the

continued operation of the same law of Natural Selection, (which is really nothing more than the identical proposition that those tissues or organisms live best whose properties are most conducive to life) is productive of the resultant 'good' of the organism. Meanwhile there is an inner or subjective side of this law of self-preservation, and this can only be described as the attainment of pleasurable consciousness; for pleasure is simply the conscious state which accompanies the due performance of vital function. Finally, Morality proper begins when not only is pleasure attained by action but through habit the idea or feebler excitation of the pleasure reacts so as to produce the action; in other words, when pleasure is not only attained but aimed at. If an organism has reached this stage, so as to be capable of intentional action, it is a moral agent though alone in the universe.

Next let us see what happens when the spheres of action of two such agents overlap. Clearly the resultant action is, as before, and by the operation of the same laws, the resultant of the two individual actions; and the resultant 'end of action' is the resultant of the two individual ends, determined in proportion to their relative forces. Now where circumstances are similar, the resultant action will also be similar; and as certain circumstances often recur, the corresponding actions also recur and through habit become a custom. This, as I said, is the rudiment of Law; and just as Morality proper begins when a spontaneous action is intentionally repeated by a personal consciousness, so Law or Politics proper begins with the conscious enforcement of custom by a central authority. Thus we see how, by the same law which makes the end of Morality the pleasure of the individual agent, the end of Policy, whether of Family, Tribe, or State, is the resultant pleasure of all whose action is represented.

I have thus very briefly sketched what I consider to have been the Order of Nature, but as this may be considered problematical, I prefer to address myself rather to the Order of Knowledge, and to prove my theorem from the actual history of Ethical and Political speculation rather than from any hypothesis of prehistoric evolution. Now, the order of knowledge being a retracing of physical evolution, while Ethical facts preceded Political, Political Philosophy naturally preceded Ethical. When man began to reflect, or turn his thought backwards, social organisation was already considerably advanced; and his reflection naturally commenced from the point at which he stood. The latest products of evolution were accordingly the first objects of inquiry. Law and Politics were the earliest studies, and human life and duties seemed bounded

by the conceptions of the Family, or Tribe, or State. These were the lowest units; the individual was not yet self-conscious. Thus we find that in all early societies the individual has no rights, only status; no duties except those implied by his relation to the tribe, or (in the more organised societies where some system of marriage has been evolved) to the family. If he sins he entails a curse upon his kin or tribe; if he requires punishment his wives and children suffer with him. They are his appurtenances; his individuality extends to them; and he is punished in them just as he is also responsible for them. The unit agent is in fact the family or tribe and, by whatever part of itself it does the act, the whole must be punished. So, too, acts which a higher morality rejects, are applauded if done for the public good: the severity of Manlius, the treachery of Jael, and the cruelty and duplicity of David are models of heroism. The Public Good, or Utility, is the standard of virtue; Ethics is not yet differentiated from Politics.

This absence of the idea of individual or personal morality is common to all early nations. Mr. Darwin (*Descent of Man*, Vol. I., p. 96) says, "Actions are regarded by savages, and were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they affect in an obvious manner the welfare of the tribe,—not that of the species, nor that of man as an individual member of the tribe". Nor is this idea of morality confined to savages; it was common to the most civilised nations of antiquity.

In Greece it is well known how political life absorbed all intellectual interest. A good man meant a good citizen (it was even doubtful whether a slave could have virtues at all); and the Greek view of moral education was summed up in the Pythagorean advice, 'Make your child a citizen in a good state'. To the Athenian or Spartan, individuality was a sign of political decay; Plato was careful to exclude it from his ideal republic. So too his *Republic*, a professed treatise on Morality, can explain the individual only on the analogy of the State, the less known by the better. And even when the molecular politics of Greece had been dissolved in a single all-absorbing state, the conception of man as a 'political animal,' deriving all his rights and duties from the state, was suspended rather than destroyed, and was ready to reappear on a fitting opportunity. The later Greek Ethics recognised indeed Individualism, but only within certain real or assumed limits; it never attained the conception of an individual *human being*. Its final word was still addressed to citizens, though of a city whose empire was the world: to the Stoic Antonines 'Citizen of the World' still seemed a prouder title than 'Man'. Greek Ethics was never completely emanci-

pated from Politics; Individualism reached the limits of the State, but not the limits of Humanity.

In early Rome, the lowest unit recognised was the Family represented by its head, who, like the Hindoo and Jewish father, had absolute power not only over the property but over the life and persons of his wife and children. But above the family was a higher status, that of Citizenship; and from this flowed all the individual's rights and wrongs. And even when conquest and the need of political assimilation brought in the later doctrines of 'Equity,' it was the equality of citizens of different states in plied by the adoption of the '*jus gentium*,' not the equality of individual men, which was at the foundation of the later Roman Law. The life of a citizen was indeed sacred, but the life of a barbarian was valued only as so much machine-power, and for the pleasure which it gave a Roman to see him die in the arena. It was not to Rome any more than to Greece that we owe the Individualism of modern life.

Among the Jews again in their early history, all interests and duties were centred in the Family and the Tribe. Both Religion and Morality were purely patriarchal. Jehovah was 'the God of their fathers,' jealous of strange gods, their tribe's representative and protector in the unseen world against the gods of other nations. And this external exclusiveness had its other side in internal solidarity: the unit was also an atom. Of individual rights or responsibility there is thus at first little trace: the sins of the fathers are visited on the children; the priest offers atonement for the people; the whole human race is held to 'lie in sin' because of a trivial disobedience by its first parent. Is a man to be rewarded? "Behold, I have made thee a father of many nations; in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed." Is a crime to be punished? "Let the criminal perish with his wives and his little ones: let his children be desolate and beg their bread." Is a pledge of fidelity required? A man offers his family as hostages. Is a neighbouring tribe hostile or its territory wanted? "Slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass;" and forget not their gods—"burn their graven images also with fire"; "destroy their name from under heaven".

But after a while, as in Greece and Rome, the old patriarchal feeling gradually gave place to a vague consciousness of individual responsibility—the usual rule came to be, "The father shall not be put to death for the children, nor the children for the father" (Deut. xxiv. 16); though still on exceptional occasions the old spirit returned and justified itself as the direct command of God. Gradually, as Morality gained more hold, these exceptional outbursts became less frequent,

and even the prophets, who were always the mouthpieces of the old barbarous spirit against the new culture, began to say, "No man can deliver his brother, or make atonement unto God for him"; "The soul that sinneth it shall die"; "The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him".

In this conception of Individualism the first condition of a true morality was gained. But the conception was still deficient in two directions. In the first place it was wanting in thoroughness; for though responsibility was personal, the standard was still external, and morality consisted in act not in motive, in a ritual of outward observances not in holiness of heart. In the second place its sphere was limited; for it extended to the Jews alone. But at last, and it is this which distinguishes the Jews from all peoples as the first moralists, these further conceptions were also attained. So far other nations had reached, for individualism within the limits of the state had been ultimately recognised both in Greece and, under the empire, in Rome; but the final step was reserved for that singular race of exceptional moral earnestness, whose earliest legend of man represented him as rebelling against authority in matters of morality, and selling his happiness for an ethical inquiry.

Of these final discoveries the former was first made by the last and noblest of the Jewish prophets, the latter by his greatest follower. Together they complete the basis of morality. The great message of Christ was on the one hand the worth and responsibility of the individual, on the other hand the inwardness of virtue. Of these the former was already, as we have seen, partially recognised; but the latter was in flat contradiction to the dominant religious doctrines of the day. "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness." This was his message to the outward morality of action. Virtue is something more than obeying the letter of the law; it is in the heart, not in the act. The Sermon on the Mount was the Gospel of Inwardness.

Morality had become not only personal, but inward; Individualism was recognised as determining not only responsibility, but also the standard of action. It was thus made *thorough*. The only thing remaining was to make it *universal*, by eliminating from the conception of the individual all elements of race and nationality. This final truth, though foreshadowed by the teaching and the life of Christ, was first securely established by the great Apostle of the Gentiles. It

seems to me mere paradox to speak of St. Paul as the true founder of Christianity, and he himself would certainly have disclaimed such a title; but there can be no doubt that to him is principally due the spread of Christianity beyond the bounds of Judæa, and the widening of Individualism to the limits of Humanity. Thus it was St. Paul who finally emancipated Ethics from Politics, and for the old state-morality depending on particular social and political conditions substituted human morality, which depends on no conditions but those which are common to the whole human race. Christianity as preached by St. Paul was therefore the Gospel of Human Morality. Its maxims were universal, and thus at once human and potentially scientific; its standard was personal and inward, and therefore moral. The characteristic virtues of Christianity, forgiveness, repentance, modesty, humility, faith, hope, charity, are virtues of feeling, not of act; its greatest products—chivalry, the emancipation of women, the suppression of slavery, of suicide, of infanticide, and of the grosser forms of impurity—have been expressions of the right and dignity of the individual man.

The Christian Gospel was thus the starting point of Ethics. Henceforth there were two prolegomena to all possible systems of Ethics: (1) that the principles must be universal; (2) that the standard must be individual, and the intention, not the act, must be the object of moral judgment. In other words, Ethics must be entirely separated from Politics, must be founded on Psychology, and must result in some form of Individualism or Egoism. This, I believe, will hereafter be recognised as the true glory of Christianity, when much that now more peculiarly bears that name will have become obsolete and forgotten. No doubt the coarser forms of the appeal to Egoism in the fables of Heaven and Hell have been justly stigmatised as degrading to the moral ideal, but the significant fact is that such an appeal should be made at all as the foundation of a moral system. Christianity, as it has been too commonly taught, has no doubt been a low form of Egoism; but it has at least clearly recognised Egoism as the sole principle of action. Its error has been in forgetting the Hedonistic Paradox (if it be a paradox), the knowledge of which is a condition of rational Egoism, that Pleasure, like every other object of pursuit, cannot be attained directly but only through means; and that if a man is always thinking of the end, he is sure to think less of the means, and is thus likely to miss the object of his pursuit.

But although Morality was made self-conscious by Christianity, it was not at first systematised, much less explained. Moral Philosophy did not begin to exist till long after Moral Knowledge; not until Christendom had embraced the thinking

world, and men began to reflect on the maxims they had learnt. Even after reflection had begun, men were for long content with mere authority, and sought accuracy only in a multiplication of rules; but at last the need was felt for a *basis* of authority, an ultimate principle to be the court of final appeal. In the search for such an explanation of moral phenomena there came first an *a priori* attempt, like that of the pre-Socratic schools, premature and imperfect because unsupported by evidence, to explain the Moral Cosmos by a conjectural Atomism, or resolve it into a single element. Then came a Socratic era of inquiry into the nature of men's actual beliefs. These being found to be discordant, and the Introspective method being thus shown to be productive of no higher authority than Custom, the necessity was seen for psychological criticism, and this having shown that moral judgments are of the same nature as other judgments, Ethics became a portion of Ontology, affiliated to Psychology. Morality is of course still concerned with individuals, but it is seen that nothing can be known about the individual by self-interrogation; he and his morality must be studied through phenomena, and, like any other phenomena, from the outside and not from the inside. That there will be a Science of Ethics is a superfluous prediction; that it already exists I almost dare to assert.

Again, although I maintain that since the time of Christ the provinces of Ethics and Politics have been separated, I do not mean to say that this has been seen to be so, even by philosophers. On the contrary, the two have been greatly confused. Morality has been placed on a political basis, and asserted to depend solely on man's relations to his fellows, and to be determined by utilitarian consequences just as if Christ had never preached; and on the other hand an ethical justification has been sought for the State in a supposed social compact,* to the destruction of all political stability, and moral or equitable rules have been allowed to flow from the 'King's conscience' into judicial decisions and so into law, to the perversion of all legal consistency. Indeed I believe that the two sciences have never been accurately distinguished, and to that I attribute much of the uncertainty which exists in each.

This confusion I believe to be mainly due to the following facts. In the first place, Political like Moral actions are done through individuals, and it requires powers of analysis beyond those generally used to separate the different capacities in

* This is not only a fiction of political theorists but has been adopted in the ordinary legal text books. For instance, Blackstone (Book VI., Ch. I.) appeals to it as the foundation of that part of the penal law which deals with *mala prohibita*.

which a man is called upon to act. Hence those principles are welcomed and adopted which seem to offer a guide to all actions alike; and the consequence is a sort of compromise between Ethics and Politics. Like Pascal's Jesuits, men "contentent le monde en permettant les actions et ils satisfont à l'Évangile en purifiant les intentions". Secondly, this is increased by the fact that the official exponents of morality are the paid servants of society. "You ought to do this," men are told, and while the duty has often reference to the good of society rather than of the individual agent, it is enforced by an appeal to self-interest, multiplied indefinitely by the threats and promises of a future life. Thus moral sanctions are used to further social interests, and men are too idle to test the reality of the connection between them. Public education and a state-religion are useful political engines to extend to secret acts the observance of the penal law; but they are so by the very fact that they tend to obscure the distinction between the principles of Ethics and Politics. Thirdly, the very existence of a Science of Ethics (and its existence is assumed by common sense) implies not only inwardness but knowableness, that is, certainty. Now at first sight these two conditions seem inconsistent. If Morality be inward or subjective, and Science be concerned only with objective facts, it seems that the two can be combined only by the covert withdrawal of one of them. If Ethics looks only at motive, and Science only at phenomenon, how can there be a Science of Ethics? Accordingly the great division between modern ethical systems has been between the non-Ethical and the non-Scientific. On the one hand there has been the Intuitionist school, which while plainly Ethical is as plainly exclusive of Science, shuddering at the least suggestion of 'materialism': on the other hand the Utilitarian, which while in a sense scientific, as professing to give a definite standard of measurement, is, I maintain, clearly non-Ethical, hiding itself in Politics to escape the difficulty of motives, and bartering its birthright for a table of statistics.

Is it then impossible to combine the inwardness of Ethics with the objectivity of Science? I believe that this is possible, but only in one way. I believe that the Physical System of Ethics is a true Science, and truly Ethical, for it rests on the physical law of motive. It is 'objective' because it formulates a universal relation between impressed and expressed force; the result in each case varying with the machine through which the force is passed, but depending on a constant law, so that if the particular values were known the result could in theory always be predicted. It is 'inward' because it places morality in the motive or intention, and not in the act.

It is another question to determine *which* of these two, Motive or Intention, is the ultimate object of moral judgments. If (as seems the correct definition) Intention be the act willed and the sum of its foreseen consequences regarded objectively,* and Motive be the desire of or shrinking from each of those intended consequences, or, in other words, the intended consequences considered as pleasures and pains, and if Volition be the resultant motive issuing in act, or, as Hobbes says, "the last appetite in deliberating," then Intention is nothing but the sum of Volition and Motives regarded objectively, and the question is only between Motives and what I have called Volition. As to this, it would seem the more correct course to value the elements, and from them calculate the value of their resultant; but inasmuch as motives or consequences are good and bad only relatively to each other, and in due proportion, and as this due proportion is hard to determine except by consideration of the effects of the combination of different proportions, that is, of the nature of the resulting acts, it looks as if it might turn out the more practicable course to commence at the Volition and work back to the Motives. Still the consideration that the same Volition may result from different Motives, and have in each case a different moral value, according to the ends to which it is intended as a means, seems conclusive that its moral value depends on its constituent Motives, and that subtracted Motives do not balance one another so as to vanish in the calculation of the moral value of the resultant. We value an action according to its farsighted-

* I use Intention as meaning the intended act and its consequences, desired or the reverse, *so far as foreseen*, not as an act which would have involved consequences beyond those intended. In the latter sense Intention and Motive are very different, and the Intention may be good though both Motive and Act are bad and *vice versa*. 'Intention' in this sense (which is that in which it is used in the penal law), is not an internal standard at all, and its use implies the application of an external standard to an internal act. It is therefore a chimæra, a mixed offspring of Morality and Policy; produced, as I shall explain, by the fact that voluntary action is the material on which Policy has to work. But to *Ethics*, Intention covers only the consequences actually intended; and in this sense it is the sum of Motives. For I deny that a man can intend a consequence without taking it into account as a motive for or against the action, though of course the resultant motive respecting any consequence may be nil, so as to make it an object of indifference to the will, and thus to make the contemplation of it inoperative as an end either for pursuit or avoidance. But the fact that opposing ends or motives balance, does not make them absent from the calculation, and they are represented not only in the arithmetical sum or Intention, but in the geometrical resultant, Volition, just as faithfully as physical forces are represented in the Will of Nature, which is Physical Law.

ness, that is, its extent and clearness of vision; but the same Volition might have resulted from a narrower view, in which case it would clearly have been less moral.* From the direction of motion we cannot discover the acting forces, but if we know the active forces we can infer the resultant motion. Hence the forces are the ultimate factors of the problem; and we may perhaps conclude that the morality of an act depends on the sum of its motives in their respective proportions, and is measured by the happiness to the agent which such motives acting in such respective proportions would normally produce in similar cases. This is, however, an irrelevant question: what here wants emphasis is the distinction between intended and actual result. The latter being independent of the agent altogether is no more moral than gravitation: where there is no Consciousness there is clearly no Morality.

It may perhaps appear that if Morality be founded on Evolution (which is the doctrine of the Physical System) it must contain many things besides motives, because Evolution proceeds in other ways, and good motives often retard it. To this I answer that Ethics is not the whole of Evolution, but that branch of it which is comprehended in the conscious action of individual men. An act or thing may no doubt in a sense be 'good' that is not the result of good motives; but not *morally* good or *right*. In one sense gravitation or any other natural fact is 'good'; but no one would contend that such facts are ethically or morally right. That seems to me to be the fallacy of a well-known argument of Natural Religion. It is no doubt true that 'whatever is, is good,' because the course of the universe is a course of evolution, which is what we consider 'good,' because it has produced us and tends on the whole to our happiness; but it is not true that 'whatever is, is

* Mr. Sidgwick (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 179) quotes against this the common sense maxim that "we must not do a bad action from a good motive". I do not see how this touches the question. The maxim must mean by 'a bad action' either 'one which we know to be bad,' or 'one which is really bad whether we know it or not'. If the former, it only says that an act which we know will bring more harm than good cannot be good, however small the surplus as compared with the subtracted quantities; if the latter, it is not a maxim of Ethics at all or warranted by common sense as such, (for if I have a good motive and do not know that the action to which it is leading me is bad, clearly it is my duty to follow it), but a maxim of Penal Law or Policy. It may be a necessity of police-law to punish pernicious actions though the agent be ignorant of their pernicious nature, just as it may be *politic* for the state to reward useful acts (as for instance in the case of informers) however mean be the motives which prompt them. If a man will *pay* either for reward or punishment, politically he deserves it: morally his desert may be very different.

right,' (if by right is meant morally right), unless it be assumed that all natural facts are self-conscious to some mind which understands and follows the distinctions of Human Morality. Morality means the conscious following of nature; an unconscious virtue is a contradiction or a metaphor, and by such metaphors Science is greatly retarded. Ethics may clearly be founded on Physical Law without being co-extensive with it; and is, as I define it and as commonly understood, the Science of the conscious or voluntary action of men considered as individuals in a medium of external relations—or, as I have otherwise called it, the Law of Conduct of Individuals. Similarly by Politics I mean the Science of the *voluntary* action of individual States considered either in their relation to their component members (Domestic Politics or Jurisprudence) or in their external relation (which from its most important branch may be called International Politics). So that Politics is a wider term in respect of States than Ethics is of Individuals, comprising not only their Law of Conduct which corresponds to Ethics but their Law of Health also. In the present paper 'Politics' and 'Policy' refer to the latter branch, which while it deals with individual men deals with them not as units but as constituent members of the unit state.

But it may be said that if confessedly both instrument and material as well of Politics as of Ethics lie in the actions of individuals, and if Ethical and Political maxims are not practically kept separate either by philosophers or in ordinary life, is it worth while to separate them at all, and if so, how is it to be done? To the first question I answer that unless they are separated it is difficult to get any consistent view of either Ethics or Politics, and clearly impossible to place either of them on anything like a scientific basis. To the second question I answer that there is a very simple and infallible diagnosis whereby we may at once test whether a maxim has an Ethical or Political origin. It has been suggested by what I have already said, and may be called the 'Test of Inwardness'. I suppose that a maxim is propounded dealing with the relations of a man to his fellows: then we know that this comes either from Ethics or Politics. To determine *which*, ask this question: Is it concerned with Acts or Motives?—(of course, I am speaking not of its grammatical expression, but of its inner meaning); if the former, the standard is external to the agent, or Political; if the latter, it is internal, or Ethical. For any motive or intention not expressed in act is politically indifferent, any part of the act not intended is ethically 'accidental'. The question of Ethics is 'Good or Bad,' the question of Politics is 'Guilty or Not Guilty?' Let us examine this a little more closely.

Crime is defined by Blackstone as "an act in violation of a public law"; by Sir J. Stephen as "an act punished by law"; and by Professor Amos as "an act which the State, for purposes of its own, resolves absolutely to prevent". Certain acts are judged injurious to the community and the doer is punished, whatever his motive, in order that they may not be done. But these are clearly not the same as immoral acts, as is evident from the well-known distinction between *mala prohibita* and *mala in se*; acts morally indifferent or even good are often penal,* while acts of monstrous immorality are not illegal. Nor are 'crimes' classed for punishment in order of moral wickedness. It is the harmfulness of an offence not its immorality which measures the price which it is worth while to pay for immunity. For instance, Treason is always placed at the head, and Treason may sometimes be morally right; if unsuccessful, however, it is held to be rightly punished, although clearly its moral value cannot depend upon success. Other instances will readily occur: the following is taken from Stephen's *Commentaries* (Vol. IV., p. 103):—"In the Island of Man this rule was formerly carried so far, that to take away an ox or an ass was there no felony, but a trespass; because of the difficulty in the little territory to conceal them or carry them off; but to steal a pig or a fowl (which is easily done) was a capital crime, and the offender punishable with death". No doubt there are certain ambiguous acts which vary in harmfulness according to what would have been their issue if completed; for instance, an assault may be either an attempt to murder or to rob; and in order to classify these inchoate acts, their meaning or 'intent' must be ascertained, an attempt to murder being clearly much more *dangerous* to the community than an attempt to rob, though it may not have done more actual harm. Hence it comes that in the penal law several classes of offences involve 'intent'.

But it may be urged that at least *our* criminal law goes further than that, for it makes guilty knowledge essential to a criminal act: "*actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea*". Now I am clearly not bound to admit the policy of this rule because it is in our law: it came there not on philosophical grounds but partly from the old retributive notion of justice, and partly

* I do not mean that it may be sometimes our duty to break a bad law; but that a law may be good (*i.e.*, in *politics*) and yet punish acts which, at least without it, might be virtuous. The law against treason is a good law, though it may be in a bad State, and though rebellion may be a duty. Or take the prohibition against misprision of felony, which one can easily conceive it to be a man's duty to break, and which may still be a good law.

because the law has to be carried out by individual men who naturally import into it their rules of Morality and Religion, not having ever been instructed that the rules of Politics have any different foundation. How far this maxim may be in fact justifiable on true political principles seems to me a somewhat difficult question. On the one hand, it may be said that since it is on intention alone that punishment can operate there can be no punishable offence without unlawful intention. This is no doubt valid as respects acts which no additional motive in the agent would have prevented, such as acts forcibly compelled or where the agent is of defective understanding; but as to acts done in ignorance or carelessness, the answer is that punishment is to prevent *future* unlawful acts, and if punishing unintentional acts would prevent the occurrence of similar unintentional acts in the future, and clearly it would do so to some extent by making men more careful, that is exactly as proper an object to aim at as preventing intentional acts: for the acts however done are in their direct results equally injurious to the community. I do not see how this can be disproved. The question then comes to be one of *expense* merely. Would not the price we should have to pay for the small additional security be too great? for clearly the same punishment would produce a much smaller result in preventing unintentional acts than in modifying intentions, seeing that it is more difficult to alter a character than to prevent a single act. To this must be added the danger of depriving the criminal law of the moral sanction; for if morality and policy do not work together the practical weight of both is lessened.

But taking the maxim as it is, and as interpreted by English law, I would remark in the first place that it is a maxim only of *penal* law. Secondly, it is very far from meaning that even for penal purposes criminality is to be estimated according to moral wickedness, (for even *mens rea*, or *guilty* intention, by itself is not penal, much less an *immoral* intention); or that there can be no guilt *without* moral turpitude. All that it means is that a man is not to be punished unless he intended to do an unlawful act; punishment having for its object to prevent unlawful acts and operating upon intention. Nay it does not mean even this; for a man may be punished for acts which in no ordinary sense of the word he ever intended at all. Acts caused by heedlessness or negligence, which is the very absence of intention, are criminally punishable; and unforeseen consequences are held imputable on the ground that they were 'constructively' intended. For it is well settled law that if a man intend an unlawful act, but the result goes beyond his intention, he must take the consequences; if a thief fire at a

fowl and kill the farmer, that is murder. Nor is ignorance of facts an excuse; if a man set fire to a cow-house, not knowing that a cow was in it, he may be convicted of 'maliciously burning' the cow. In some cases, actual *mistake* as to facts has been held immaterial; for instance, in a late case before the Court of Criminal Appeal composed of 16 judges,* it was decided that a man was rightly convicted of abducting a girl under the age of sixteen, though it was proved that he *bond fide* believed, and had reasonable ground for believing, that she was over that age. Nor again is ignorance or mistake as to law any excuse; if the intended act was in fact illegal, the doer is criminal and punishable. Nor finally does drunkenness exculpate in the law courts, though clearly, if not designed for an ulterior wicked purpose, it takes away the moral responsibility for any act beyond itself.

The result of English Common Law seems to be, that if there be an act both intended and committed which is in fact illegal (whether to the agent's knowledge or not), or reasonably likely (as in the case of drunkenness) to lead to acts in fact illegal, then the agent is criminally responsible not only for the act committed so far as intended, but for all acts or consequences which naturally flow therefrom, however unintentionally or even contrary to intention; but that if the intended act be wholly legal, the agent is unpunishable for any involuntary results. Whether this state of law be or be not defensible on principles of Policy or 'Police,' is, as I have shown, a delicate question; I believe that on the whole it is; but it is at least evident that in the actual law of crime which obtains in this country, "the moral nature of the act," as Sir J. Stephen says,† "has nothing to do with the question". The question is clearly one of Politics, in which the only thing considered is the *event*; although it is no use trying to prevent an event by *punishment*, unless it is an *act*, and so far intentional that the knowledge that such an act would be punished might possibly, if present, have operated to prevent it. In other cases, punishment is not the proper remedy, and some other mode of treatment must be devised: but if there be intention, punishment is not restricted to the intention in the Ethical sense, but extends to all the

* *Reg. v. Prince*, Law Rep., C. C. R. 154. As to the amount of knowledge necessary in a person labouring under insane delusions, see *M'Naghten's Case*, 10 Cl. and Fin. 200. If he knows he is doing a wrong act, that is sufficient.

† *Criminal Law of England*, p. 5. I may add that formerly (until 9 Geo. IV. c. 31) accidental homicide without any illegal intention was punishable by English law; and this was common to most ancient laws. See *Blackstone*, Book VI., Ch. 4.

actual consequences of the intended act. So that even for *penal* purposes it is not that the outward act is judged by its inward 'Intention' as is the case in moral judgments, but that the inward act or intent is judged by its outward consequences. The standard of judgment remains external.

But further in the question of criminality, although the Intention has to be examined so far as to discover some illegality, when this is once found the rest is immaterial; for while the illegal intent may take colour, as we have seen, from unintended accidents, it cannot be cured or atoned for by the remaining intentions with which it was bound up. Or, to use words less strictly accurate but perhaps more generally understood, whatever be the importance of Intention, Motive is clearly immaterial. Is the act harmful? If so, it must be prevented. Was it in this instance actually or 'constructively' intended? If so, punishment is the proper remedy. That is the whole question of 'Guilty or Not Guilty,' and on that question, as juries are continually told, Motive is irrelevant. An act of heroic virtue may be a crime: and though the law tries to make itself look moral by means of an 'irrebuttable presumption' of malice, that is clearly only a legal fiction, just as the law calls 'fraud,' what common sense thinks only an error of judgment.

The only remaining question then is as to the *degree* of punishment. Now in determining this, a consideration of motives necessarily comes in, because motives are at once the material and the instruments with which punishment has to deal. An apt illustration of this was given by the late conviction of Mr. Bradlaugh. The indictment was "that the defendants unlawfully and wickedly devising and intending to vitiate and corrupt the morals of youth and of others did publish a certain book," and the Lord Chief Justice directed the jury in these words—"If you are of opinion that this work will have an effect (however it may have been intended) subversive of the morals of society it is your duty to find the defendants guilty". The verdict was—"We find that the book is calculated to deprave public morals, but we entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motives in publishing it". Thereupon the Lord Chief Justice directed them as follows—"Upon that finding you must find the defendants guilty, for I have already explained to you that if such was the effect of the book, as the intention of the defendants certainly was to publish it as it is, if you found that it was in fact calculated to deprave public morals, even though the defendants have no intention to do so, it would be your duty to find a verdict of guilty, though your exonerating them from any bad intent would be considered in

the sentence";* a direction which was afterwards upheld by the Court of Queen's Bench.

On this last point, namely, quantum of punishment, it hardly needs remark that if the motive be good and also gentle, there is no need to counteract but only to direct it into a new channel. But there are more difficult cases where the motive is of overpowering strength and cannot be easily directed. Now the motive which punishment is designed to supply must clearly be proportional to the normal motives which it is intended to counteract. The punishment should therefore be greater in proportion as the motives prompting to the injurious act are greater, unless, as for instance in some cases of monomania and insanity, the preponderance of the latter is so great that it would be hopeless or too costly to outbid them. In the last case there should be no punishment at all, for useless expenditure of pain is not only cruel but clearly wasteful and impolitic. The two elements of harmfulness and temptation come in to determine the price to be paid for immunity much in the same way as the two elements of demand and cost of production determine the price of an article of commerce. Free trade in Punishment is a first principle of what I may call Penal Economy, because if the punishment be inadequate the crime will be committed: unless the state is willing to give the market-price, it will not effect its purchase. So that in considering the quantum of punishment motives do come in, but with a result *contrary* to that which they have in Morals, where great stress of motive is generally held to *diminish* guilt. Nay the very goodness of a motive may require severer punishment, as being more seductive of imitation; an illustration of which I may quote from a Scotch judgment referred to by Sir J. Stephen (*Criminal Law of England*, p. 102): "We have heard a good deal of the innocence of his intentions, but supposing he has acted from principle and that his motives are pure, I do say that he becomes a more dangerous member of society than if his conduct was really criminal and he was acting from criminal motives."

It may perhaps be objected that this refusal of Law to look at Motive comes not from principle but from its practical inability to get at the facts. No doubt in order to form any judgment, Ethical or Political, we must in *practice* stop somewhere and say that beyond this line the consequences, intended or actual as the case may be, are too remote. To settle the question therefore as to the nature of the judgment we are led back to the classification of crimes, that is, to consider whether up to the point to which Law confessedly goes it proceeds on

* *Times*, June 22nd, 1877.

Ethical or non-Ethical principles. This question I have already answered, but I will here give a further illustration of the statement that criminality depends not on immorality but on danger to the state, namely, the Law of Conspiracy, by which an act, which if done separately by individuals would be harmless and so permitted, when done in concert and thus becoming a possible source of danger to the state, is punished as criminal.

To sum up:—Politics is primarily concerned with acts and considers motives only as a means of producing acts: Ethics on the other hand is primarily concerned with motives, and looks at acts only as evidence of motives. The same act has always the same political value, whatever the motive of the agent; but ethically it may be good on one occasion and bad on another. Hypocrisy may be politically a virtue, if a man's acts be better than his heart, but ethically it is a vice, for the intention is to deceive. If a judgment therefore be of Motives it is (or may be) a moral judgment; but if it be of Acts it cannot be moral, but must be a judgment of some other judicature.

I contend therefore that I have established this Test of Inwardness as a true method of distinguishing a sample of Morality from a sample of Policy. Let me now apply it to Utilitarianism. Are Acts or Motives the subject-matter of Utilitarian principles? Surely there can be but one answer.

Suppose a living being and an automaton doing exactly the same acts, the latter would be evidently just as useful, and would therefore on consistent utilitarian principles be just as virtuous as the former. This indeed seems virtually admitted by Utilitarians. "Utilitarian moralists," according to J. S. Mill (*Utilitarianism*, p. 26), "have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble: he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations." This is the true *political* view, but surely the casuistical doctrine that if the outward act be in itself not necessarily bad (*e.g.*, inserting your hand into another's pocket, closing your fingers and withdrawing it), the commission of it is venial whatever the motive (*e.g.*, the appropriation of the other man's purse), has long been branded as supremely *immoral*. In a note to the passage above quoted Mill draws a distinction between Intention and Motive, and says that the morality of an act depends on the former but not on the latter. But his instance of Intention as distinct from Motive, a man

rescuing another from drowning in order to kill him by torture afterwards, seems to me indistinguishable from his instance of Motive, a man rescuing another in order to receive pay, or betraying one friend in order to serve another. Surely the receiving pay or serving the second friend is just as much part of the Intention as the inflicting torture. In ordinary language Motive is perhaps distinguished from Intention as involving the remoter instead of the more immediate consequences, but it is impossible to distinguish them strictly, for, as I have said, Intention is nothing but the Act and the sum of its Motives looked upon objectively, and there is clearly no line to be drawn between the nearer and remoter consequences when both are equally foreseen. But what Mill seems (judging from a reference to Bentham) really to mean by Intention is the intended act with all its consequences whether intended or not. If so, his doctrine seems to me both *immoral*, for the morality of an action is clearly unaffected by its turning out contrary to intention; and also *impolitic*, for an act is just as useful to the community whether it be intended or not. It is an attempt to compromise between Morality and Policy, characteristic of an English thinker, but totally unphilosophical. However Mill at least confesses that morality lies in the act and not in the agent, although he seems to place it in a hypothetical act which neither happens nor was intended. This is in itself a sufficient admission that Utilitarianism is a principle of Policy, not of Ethics.

The political nature of Utilitarianism is still more apparent in Bentham, who may be called in a sense its founder. Private Ethics comes in only as a cheaper kind of Penal code where legislative influence would be unprofitable. If Ethics is regarded as independent of Politics, as Bentham could not help seeing that it might be regarded (*e.g.*, *Principles of Morals*, Ch. XIX., § 1, Par. 20) it then ceases to be Utilitarian; for it teaches "how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness," while it is the "art of legislation" which pursues "the happiness of the whole community". So that if Ethics be separated from Politics, Bentham admits that Utilitarianism is a maxim of the latter and not of the former. The object of Politics, he says, is Greatest Happiness; that of Ethics is well understood Interest: I agree. But he added (at least as interpreted by Bowring) that the two are identical: this I deny, except in an ideal society. In the present universe they are widely separate.

So far as I know, it is true of all Utilitarians except Mr. Sidgwick that they start from Politics and arrive at Morality through Law. Mr. Sidgwick starts from popular moral maxims many of which, as I have said, though they may be

called 'Morality,' are in effect rudimentary Law. Nobody has ever reached Utilitarianism through Psychology. Beginning with Helvetius, who thought virtue a political product not only as depending on the social constitution (which was the Greek view) but as being capable of artificial manufacture by legislative means, the same tendency ending in the same result runs through Bentham, Austin, Mill, and cannot be more definitely stated than in an article on 'Metaphysical Study' in the *Contemporary Review* for April last by Professor Bain. "Through Sociology," he says, "is the way to the great field of Ethics;" again "Ethics is an important supplement to social or political law, but it is still a department of law"; and he compares the relation of Ethics to Politics with that of Physics to Mathematics. No wonder then if the child is like the parent, and if Morality which is made out of Policy remain mere Policy still. The moralist is thus merely a state-functionary, and his only practical duty is to guide the distribution of praise and blame.

It would not be difficult to illustrate this also *a posteriori* by showing how maxims to which Utilitarianism leads, are clearly at variance with the first principles of Ethics. I will merely refer in passing to Mr. Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 451, 452. One does not wonder that he admits that "in some points Utilitarianism is manifestly at issue with common sense"; I add 'and with Morality'.

But it may perhaps be objected—'In rejecting Utilitarianism from Ethics because it deals with acts and not with motives, you are forgetting the distinction on which Utilitarians so much rely between Motive and Criterion. We agree that Virtue consists not in the usefulness of acts, but in obeying the best motive; only we add, the best motive is the wish to do useful acts. Utility may thus be the test of virtue, and yet the motive be internal.' To this I answer: Granting your assumption of the existence of such a wish, the motive is gratifying the wish, and therefore ethically Utilitarianism can come in only as a method of Egoism; and clearly not as the whole of it—for no one can assert that the wish for Utility is his *only* wish, so that there must be some portion of Ethics which is outside the wish for Utility and superior to it. Utilitarianism, to establish its claim to be the ruling principle of Ethics, has to *assume* not only a wish for Utility but that no human being ever had any other wish, which is absurd.

Besides a man is not omniscient, and does not know what is really useful. There must therefore be many cases where the wish for Utility leads to injurious acts, and also where selfish motives lead to useful acts. Are the former ethically better or

worse than the latter? I cannot conceive any ground on which the Utilitarian can say they are better, unless he makes his standard or 'test' not Utility but our love of it, in which case he becomes an Egoist. Unless therefore he acknowledges Egoism, he must either assert that Morality is independent of Intention or Motive, which is his natural position, but which is a doctrine not of Ethics but of Politics, or he must deny the dilemma by assuming not only that every man wishes only Utility but that he knows exactly what is useful and what is not, which is again absurd.

The foregoing criticism is applicable to that doctrine of Mr. Darwin's (generally taken as the Evolutionist theory) which traces the origin of the Moral Faculty to the Social Instinct alone, and thereby makes Utility the criterion or measure though no longer the conscious motive of Morality. This hypothesis I conceive to be not only unsupported by evidence but in direct contradiction to the facts which it professes to explain. If Morality be social only, whence comes the belief that there is something higher than Honour,—nay that there is an end more worthy of attainment than the united applause of humanity? Is it not true that Honour is often opposed to Virtue,—nay is it not then strongest when it knows itself to be immoral? The social environment is in my view only one, although in some respects the most important, of the circumstances which have constituted human experience, and built up man's moral and intellectual faculties; and has contributed no more than its due share to the formation of Conscience. A man's Duty to his Neighbour is no doubt an important part of Morality; but is there no such thing as his Duty to Himself, to Nature, or to God? and if there are such Duties, how could they possibly arise from any 'Social Instinct'?

Again, if the Moral Faculty is only an organised 'Social Instinct,' whence comes the meaning of 'ought' and the authority of Conscience? Why should the Social Instinct have any preference over other instincts? To say that it is 'more permanent' seems to me both untrue (for to take an example from Mr. Darwin himself "the wish for another man's property is as persistent a desire as any that can be named") and of no avail for the argument. For why should permanence imply authority? Mr. Darwin seems to rely on experience of the disagreeable *consequences* of preferring a lower to a higher instinct, but surely if that be so, it is those consequences which constitute the immorality, and the authority of conscience depends on the pleasure or pain it can promise. To put the argument in a slightly different form, I contend that if the moral faculty be evolved from a part only of the emotional or motive part of

man's nature and be not the resultant of the whole of such motive nature, then it is impossible to account for the authority of conscience over motives which lie outside it. The only true source of the authority of conscience is in universal representation; if it is the resultant or representative of every motive it has clear 'right' and 'authority' over individual motives, but if there is any not represented in it, then if it be victorious it is the victory of might, not of right, and we have no reason to wish for its victory rather than defeat.

This difficulty of supplying a motive has been felt by all Utilitarians, and it will be found, if I mistake not, that all of them when brought to the test are obliged to have recourse more or less openly to the doctrine of Egoism, and thus to give up their principle altogether. I will give a few examples. Austin (*Jurisprudence*, Vol. I., p. 112) says:—"The theory" (of Utilitarianism) "be it always remembered, is this: Our motives to obey the laws which God has given us are paramount to all others. For the transient pleasures which we may snatch, or the transient pains which we may shun, by violating the duties which they impose, are nothing in comparison with the pains by which those duties are sanctioned. The greatest possible happiness of all His sentient creatures is the purpose and effect of those laws." Thus Utility is reached from Egoism through the will of God. Paley, as is well known, explicitly adopts the same view. J. S. Mill (*Utilitarianism*, p. 53) says:—"No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness"; and (*Ib.*, p. 56) "Virtue according to the Utilitarian conception is a good of this description. There was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself." Bentham commences his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* in these words—"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain and pleasure*. . . . On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. . . . The *principle of utility* recognises the subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hand of reason and law." Mr. Darwin's reference to consequences I have already noticed. Also when seeking the origin of the social instinct to which he refers morality, he appeals first to the experience that aid to others brings aid in return, and secondly to the love of praise and the dread of infamy—purely self-regarding motives (*Descent of Man*, Vol. I., p. 163). Mr. Sidgwick's attempt to

prove Utility by the "suppression of Egoism" I dealt with in my former paper. From his short reply in the last number of MIND it seems that he never really meant to "confute" (or, I suppose, "suppress") Egoism at all, but only to "contradict" it by an appeal to "the common moral consciousness of mankind" which he exemplifies by the popular belief as to "the design of the Creator of the world". I admit that I took his arguments as seriously intended to "suppress," which I thought meant to "confute" Egoism, and that I did not at all realise that they were only meant to serve as a cover for the introduction of the *deus ex machina*. Even now I cannot quite see how, if the reasoning is bad, it is of more avail in contradicting than in confuting; nor do I see either how Mr. Sidgwick reconciles the "Dualism of the Practical Reason" in which this contradiction leaves him with the "postulate of the Practical Reason" which he mentions (p. 10), "that two conflicting rules of action cannot both be reasonable". However it is now at any rate clear that Egoism is NOT "suppressed"; and as for contradiction, it will not much care for that, until backed by some more tangible argument than any "common belief" about "the design of the Creator of the world".

I have now offered some justification of my statement that Utilitarianism was a principle not of Ethics but of Politics, and I have done so chiefly by a consideration of the course of Political and Ethical inquiry. In conclusion, I would briefly summarise my view of the scientific relation of Ethical and Political facts. I have already sketched their historical sequence; I now refer to their co-existence. Each man follows what at the moment of action seems to him his greatest pleasure; in other words, he does as he likes. This is an absolute physical law, and so far do I assert the 'Freedom of the Will,' that I contend that a man can no more do what he does *not* like than he can disobey the Law of Gravity. A man therefore is good or bad according to the number and quality of his likes and dislikes, namely, as these serve to extend the correspondence of his actions to his medium in time and space; and in the same man an action is good or bad for the same reason, that is, according to the likes and dislikes which it represents. Now the most important medium is the social; no wonder therefore if a man's actions be mostly regulated by his relations to others. Moreover society is not only a 'medium,' but a higher organism of which the individual is a part. Now families, and associations, and nations, nay even universes (for the principle is universal), which have no 'Utilitarian' habits, die; being organisms whose actions do not tend to self-preservation: and if they die, their members perish with them.

Hence a certain amount of Utilitarianism is a necessary component of Egoism. But these higher organisms are also consciously active, and for their own purposes modify the actions of individuals by attaching to them certain consequences which the agent is sure to like or dislike. In these various ways, different Utilitarianisms corresponding to the different organisms of which a man is member become parts of his Egoism; but it remains true that they enter into his Morality only as methods of Egoism, and that man is the best who is best in correspondence with his whole medium. To any particular society forming part of that medium his correspondence may be that of antagonism, just as it is to excessive cold or heat. The expression of this antagonism is 'moral courage'; for, as has been well said, Law brings fear from without, but Morality makes men brave from within.

Finally, I would repeat that I have used the word Politics to mean internal and not external or international Politics, the Law of Health and not the Law of Conduct of the Political organism. With regard to the latter I would only say that it is exactly analogous to Ethics, states being substituted for individuals as units. Motives therefore are its subject-matter, its characteristic is Inwardness, its principle Egoism. The duty of a nation to its fellows is in my opinion exactly similar to that of an individual in a similar state of society. The last qualification is no doubt important, because a more perfect altruism is possible and justifiable in a highly organised than in a rudimentary state of society. There can however be little doubt that international organisation has in Europe reached such a degree, that a nation sufficiently strong to protect its own individuality will find its own best interests in altruistic policy, in being willing to further the happiness of mankind by a temporary disadvantage to itself, and to spend money and trouble for objects that bring in no immediate return. For my part, I cannot understand how men who think so highly of selfishness and generosity in individuals should have nothing but ridicule for the same qualities in nations. At any rate it seems to me as certain as anything can well be that if they are not virtues in the one case they are not in the other. If a man will not stretch forth his country's hand to succour the oppressed and disable the tyrant, why should he lift his own to rescue his neighbour from murder or his daughter from outrage? Yet this seems the stage which our national conscience has at present reached. The British 'Ego' has attained only to that lower egoism of 'British interests,' which for morality is content with the Pharisaic observance of treaties and a due payment of the mint, anise and cumin of diplomacy, and cannot rise to that

higher Egoism whose standard is self-approbation and which finds the best realisation of self in the happiness and well-being of others. International Morality is yet unborn. May the Christ of Politics soon come, who shall give it life, by preaching to nations that Gospel of Inwardness which Christ of Nazareth once preached to men!

ALFRED BARRATT.

III.—RECENT HEGELIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY.*

ONE of the most prominent of philosophical facts of late has been the existence in England of a small but energetic Hegelian school. Hegel, banished from Germany, has found refuge in England and America, and his influence seems to be decidedly on the increase. There were Hegelians among us before Dr. Hutchison Stirling published his *Secret of Hegel*, but undoubtedly that strange, uncouth, but wonderfully suggestive book has had more to do in propagating Hegelianism among us than anything else; while Mr. Wallace's translation of Hegel's *Logic* with the notes and prolegomena added by the translator did much to familiarise us with the system of the great German philosopher. But with the exception of a few essays and critiques we have not had until lately any real expression of the thought and work of English Hegelianism; we have not had the opportunity of seeing how an English thinker who has made the method and principles of Hegel his own is moved to describe and discuss ordinary philosophical themes which are already familiar to us. It is otherwise now however. The authors of the works whose titles are given at the beginning of this paper are two of the recognised leaders of the English Hegelian school, and the works themselves go over ground familiar enough to all students of philosophy. They contain a history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, in which the principles of Hegelian criticism are brought to bear upon preceding metaphysical theories. In his article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*,

* 1. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed. Article "*Descartes*". Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1876.

2. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, by David Hume. Edited, with preliminary dissertations and notes, by T. H. GREEN, and T. H. GROSE. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1874.

3. *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, with an historical introduction, by EDWARD CAIRD, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, late Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. Glasgow: MacLehose, 1877.

Prof. Caird discusses Descartes and the Cartesian Philosophy, while his book on the Philosophy of Kant has for introduction a rapid summary of earlier metaphysic, dwelling at greatest length on Leibnitz and Wolff. Mr. Green's Introduction to his Critical Edition of Hume describes and criticises the theories of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume with a thoroughness which leaves nothing to be desired. What then is the value of these contributions, and what do they really add to the solution of the problems of philosophy? I do not propose to criticise them, but merely to point out what seem to me to be the real nature and value of these new elements in English philosophy.

It is worth observing that all the three treatises are historical and critical, and this accident of form really expresses what is at bottom a permanent characteristic, which distinguishes these writings from most other English works on philosophy. For, in spite of our practical character, English speculation has commonly found vent in the creation of a system or in the invention of theories rather than in the patient contemplation and description of a course of history. The fact that our English Hegelians write upon the history of philosophy rather than propound metaphysical theories for discussion may be an accident, but it reveals very clearly that in their eyes philosophy is not philosophy simply but something more, that it is related to poetry, politics, history and science in a way that our earlier English thinkers scarcely dreamed of. This relatedness of knowledge is coming to be a common-place, and men far removed from Hegelian modes of thought are ready to declare that philosophy cannot be isolated as it was when Hamilton and Mill ruled over rival systems. Mr. Herbert Spencer's books are an elaborate protest against the isolation of philosophical thought, and Mr. Lewes in his own way follows in his wake; but these distinguished thinkers do not seem to have such a thorough appreciation of the fact as their Hegelian contemporaries. The books I am now speaking of do not reveal this fact so openly as Dr. Hutchison Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, where every now and then a side allusion, or a rapid paragraph, or a page of kaleidoscope, showed how philosophy was to the writer the one foundation of all the arts and sciences of human life. There is more sustained philosophical analysis, and therefore less suggestiveness, but still there is enough revealed to show that with both writers philosophy is the *rationale* of life, and that what we call a system of metaphysic is nothing but the supreme scientific formula of the age that produced it, to be read by the light of the history of the period, and to serve to light up the dark parts of the time for later students.

The two really important contributions to the method of philosophy in England made by these treatises seem to be:—(1) That all philosophy worthy of the name must stand fast by the past, and only make advance when it has thoroughly assimilated the treasures of the past: there is an historical method in philosophy as in other departments of knowledge. (2) The philosopher must not isolate his problem, or at all events if he does he must not ignore the isolation, and then complain of the unconnectedness of human knowledge. The present is simply the past revealing itself, therefore beware of isolating the present—that is the one maxim. Beware of isolating your problem—that is the other maxim. The two maxims are perhaps at bottom one, but we may as well keep them separate. The one describes the nature of philosophy, and the other shows how to discuss individual problems presented by philosophy.

The two conceptions permeate Mr. Green's Introduction and Mr. Caird's book on Kant. Mr. Caird regards Kant as *the* critical philosopher and therefore looks on him as the chief thinker in an age which is *par excellence* the age of criticism. He cannot explain Kant's ideas without a careful study of the preceding philosophies and of Kant's own philosophical education. He traces the origin, growth, and outburst of the critical spirit in a somewhat lengthy introduction. Mr. Green, in the pregnant sentence with which he begins his analysis of Locke and Hume, shows how thoroughly he is imbued with the historical method in philosophy:—

"There is a view of the history of mankind by this time familiarised to Englishmen, which detaches from the chaos of events a connected series of ruling actions and beliefs—the achievement of great men and great epochs, and assigns to these in a special sense the term historical. According to this theory . . . the mass of nations must be regarded as left in swamps and shallows outside the main stream of human development. They have either never come within the influence of the hopes and institutions which make history a progress instead of a cycle, or they have stiffened these into a dead body of ceremony and caste, or at some great epoch they have failed to discern the sign of the times and rejected the counsel of God against themselves. Thus permanently or for generations, with no principle of motion but unsatisfied want, without assimilative ideas which from the strife of passions elicit moral results, they have trodden the old round of war, trade and faction, adding nothing to the spiritual heritage of man. It would seem that the historian need not trouble himself with them, except so far as relation to them determines the activity of progressive nations. A corresponding theory may with some confidence be applied to simplify the history of philosophical opinion."

He then shows how the usual plan of seeking the history of philosophy in the compendia of systems of great thinkers, without duly discriminating between what is of universal and permanent and what is of merely individual value, never reveals

the true progress which exists in real philosophy. He shows that in philosophy there are epochs, each of which is occupied by a master-mind who is the brain of the period. The time between is filled up, he says, by commentators and amplifiers, who really count for nothing in the true advance of thought. And then, giving practical point to his statements, he maintains that Hume was the last great English thinker, Leibnitz the last great German before Kant, and that Kant is greater than either because he transcended both. He read Hume with the eyes of Leibnitz, and Leibnitz with the eyes of Hume, and rid himself in this way of the presuppositions of both, and so surpassed them.

In a similar fashion the second conception appears at every step. It is the main concern both of Mr. Green and of Mr. Caird to expose that isolation of philosophical problems which produces the false individualism which both think the bane of modern philosophy. Mr. Green is chiefly concerned to give instances of it in Locke and to trace them to their legitimate end in Hume. Mr. Caird's whole book is a protest against the tendency which was recognised as evil by Kant, but from which Kant never wholly freed himself.

However we may be disposed to treat the individual opinions of the writers, it will scarcely be denied that the two principles to which I have now called attention are a valuable contribution, if not to the philosophy, at least to the philosophical method of this country, and it may be of advantage to describe them at somewhat greater length.

In science, politics, law, and even in poetry the historical method of investigation is almost omnipotent in these days. Let us take an example from jurisprudence. When Grotius and Puffendorf lived, jurists could only find an explanation for certain principles of public law by means of legal fictions, which presupposed that men and nations had met together and consented to forego individual rights for the sake of security and the common weal. Now jurists explain opinions and institutions by tracing them from their first obscure beginnings to their completed forms. Sir Henry Maine's works are examples of what I mean. It is the same in science. What is the Darwinian theory, for example, but an attempt to explain animated nature by a reference to the whole history of the matter?

The impulse to such historical investigation was first given by Kant, and it has greatly extended its sphere and influence since his time. Kant's own idea was that the history of any thing was just the record of its nature written by itself: to know a thing, know its history: the history of any thing is

just the thing itself taking its own time to reveal itself. Kant in short was the earliest to exalt the common saying 'the child is father of the man' into the fundamental principle of all scientific inquiry. The principle once stated soon became influential, and was laid hold of and applied in all directions, often with reckless haste, often in a ludicrously absurd fashion, but in the end generally in a sober earnest way, until one science after another began to be cultivated according to the historical method. Kant's thoughts were not of the useless, unprofitable kind which are to be found in the systems of third-rate metaphysicians. His ideas have still power and place far beyond the ordinary sphere of metaphysic. His influence has been greater than that of any philosopher since the time of Aristotle. We all owe something to him, and are forced by fine spiritual influences which are not to be measured or gauged in ordinary ways to think in some measure in the way in which he would have us think; and this just because of the kingly intellect of the man.

First the notion was applied to history itself, and the era of critical history arose. History was no longer a medley of petty dramas displaying themselves in confusion before the eyes of the puzzled spectators; it became a unity; and the history of any one people or of any one period became the story of the life and life-work of the people or time. The unity of history became a scientific fact. Then the idea was applied in various ways to science, which has of late been taking huge strides onward in consequence; and the circle of the sciences, and the unity of science, are now axioms in all scientific investigations. In the end, philosophy consciously applied to herself the method which she had discovered, and with results. The *history* of philosophy was studied. The unity of philosophy became an axiom, and philosophy was raised, just as history had been raised, from a chaos of jarring systems, into the scientific record of the progress of human thought, the key to the history of the mind of the human race in the various stages of its development. The same mind has been at work all along, throwing out the same yet constantly changing ideas, and thus we must assimilate the past if we are to make any advance in the present. No philosopher need ever think that he will do good work by sitting down and attempting to spin theories out of his own individual brain; he must be sympathetically conscious of the past; he must stand on the heights already reached if he is to climb higher.

There is another use of history which both our authors seem aware of, and which can scarcely too often be impressed upon English thinkers. The sharp individualism of our insular

philosophy prevents us from making full use of history in our philosophical investigations. Time softens all things: it subdues individual eccentricities, removes prejudices, separates what is transitory from what is lasting. And just as one's own past life is softened in the moonlight of memory, and past actions are set in a gentle haze which robs them of their harshness, so time universalises opinions and theories. If they do not stand the test of time they are not worth much. History winnows the wheat from the chaff for us, and we should hear less about the difficulty of creating universals if we let history make them for us as it is always doing.

So much for the first conception which insists that, in order to know a thing, what goes before and what comes after must be known. We go on to the other maxim, which declares that the knowledge of any one thing is dependent on our knowledge of what is round about it. There is nothing Hegelian thinkers are more earnest in denouncing than the habit common in philosophy of isolating the problem under discussion. This habit they call abstract or analytic thinking, and they insist that ordinary psychology, to its own hurt, is full of it. The "altogetherness of everything," the solidarity of all problems, is an axiom with which they are wont to weary their hearers, and it is one whose practical application deserves some attention.

It is a common maxim in homiletics—If you read nothing but the Bible you will not understand *it* rightly. It is a common maxim in ethics—If you do nothing but seek to gain pleasure, you will not get *it*. These homely maxims may serve to explain what is meant by the second idea which I wish to describe. There are many ways in which the principle may be ignored. For example, philosophy when it is studied exclusively and by itself, apart from what may be called the human interest in it, is singularly barren. I have already said that the books under discussion are perhaps somewhat abstract and analytic in this respect; but there are indications that the writers are fully alive to the importance of what is now insisted upon. Philosophical maxims, principles, and propositions are not merely philosophical in the strictly technical sense of the term. They are the overflowings of mind which is also manifesting itself in many other ways; in art, for example, in science, in politics, and so on. The maxim is philosophical, if it be really so, because it is enunciated in a particular way, and also because it is the concentration, the essence as it were, of the same thought which may appear in art or poetry, science or politics.

The philosopher therefore loses much if he attempts to confine his philosophical observations either to the working of his own

mind, or to an examination of the writings of previous or contemporary thinkers. It is his duty to measure the pulse of human thought, to note its movements, its expressions, to understand its nature, and to describe it. His task is to reduce thought and its movements to scientific formulæ. But if he isolates the problem, if he examines mind only by the introspective method, if he measures its movements in some narrow technical fashion, if he overlooks the upheavals of mind in art, poetry and science, or its crystallisation in political and ecclesiastical institutions, he has wantonly and arbitrarily limited the sphere of his observation, and his attempt must be abortive. A caricature is produced by attention and abstraction—by picking out and intensifying certain features and by neglecting others. The professional metaphysician who keeps within merely technical limits is liable to make a caricature, not the living reproduction of thought.

According to Mr. Green, however, the ordinary psychology as represented by Locke has been guilty of this isolation of the problem in another and more mischievous way. Ordinary psychology wishes to know what is the machinery by which the mind works, and it attempts to find this out by simply looking into the mind to see how it works. There is, however, an additional idea which complicates the matter. The mind, it is supposed, has come to be a mind from being something else, and the consequences of this supposition are never very clearly calculated. "According to Locke," says Mr. Green (and empirical psychology has never substantially varied the position) "the matter to be observed consists for each man, firstly, in certain impressions of his own individual mind, by which this mind from being a mere blank has become furnished—by which, in other words, his mind has become a mind; and, secondly, in certain operations, which the mind thus constituted performs upon the materials which constitute it. The observer all the while is the constituted mind itself. The question at once arises how the developed man can observe in himself that primitive state in which his mind was a *tabula rasa*." I need not follow Mr. Green in his very acute criticism; all that is necessary is to point out the isolation which is protested against. In the first place, the minds of different men are regarded as different things; they are isolated and become individuals, and the isolated individual is the subject of observation. If you first isolate your object, can you wonder that you fail to discover that connection and relation which philosophy demands? In the second place, the mind thus isolated and individualised is dissected, is divided into two parts which are first of all arbitrarily separated, and then illegitimately brought together

again. The mind before it was a mind, and the mind when it has become a mind, are set over against each other and isolated. If this isolation is made merely for the purposes of observation, with the express implication that it is simply hypothetical, and if the observer carefully remembers the fact, then perhaps no great harm is done; but these precautions are not taken, we fear, in ordinary psychology. The problem is wrongly stated from the first, and it is scarcely to be wondered at that psychology is becoming more and more helpless, and that it is fain to take refuge in physiological investigations. Physiology links psychology to material nature, and to that extent at least frees it from the hopeless isolation which makes scientific progress impossible.

I am not attempting anything like an adequate criticism of the books which are placed at the head of this article. I merely wish to point out what new elements they introduce into English psychology and philosophy. It is beyond my purpose therefore to follow Mr. Green through his very acute criticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—to describe how he traces to the forced isolation which I have described and then to the illegitimate efforts to overcome the practical consequences of this false start, the metaphysical principles which lie at the root of Hume's denial of the possibility of metaphysic; or to state how Mr. Caird with greater historical sweep of illustration enforces his conclusions. Let me simply give some practical illustration of the way in which this isolation works.

There is an isolation of mind from mind in the ordinary psychology. The observer does not look into mind, but into *a* mind, into his own mind, and sees what is going on there. He starts by separating his own mind from mind, by isolating his own mind from every other mind, and that not so much for the purpose of discovering what his own mind is, as in order to know what mind is. For psychology is not the natural history of a single mind, it claims that its statements are to have the value of general truths; otherwise they would be useless. But it starts by shutting one single mind up within itself, and, having built a hedge about it to begin with, finds considerable difficulty in transcending the boundaries it has set up. It is this *fictitious* individualism in modern psychology which our authors protest against, and which it seems to me has thrown psychology into the arms of physiology. There is of course a profound truth in the individualism of modern philosophy. When Christianity taught the world the infinite value of a single human soul, there was implanted in modern thought a principle of individualism which can never be eradicated; and when the great Reformation, as Mr. Caird shows, vindicated

this principle with startling energy, it was to be expected that modern philosophy should embody it and place it in the forefront of its metaphysical principles. It was only to be expected that with Descartes and his immediate followers 'I' and 'my mind' should take the most important place, and that individualism should be the watchword in their systems. But Descartes and his followers were like men who put new wine into old bottles. Their individualism, their one new truth, was actually stifled within a system which in all its logical and metaphysical principles was scholastic and Aristotelian. Their individualism was not allowed to live its own way and form itself according to its own fashion: it was distorted and bent all out of shape to suit a system of logic and psychology which came into being before this new principle was heard of. Seventeenth Century philosophy resembles Seventeenth Century theology: both brought in Aristotle and Scholasticism with the intention of consolidating, and with the effect of rendering mis-shapen, the new intellectual and religious life of the time. The effects of this fictitious individualism are very manifest. It is essential to knowledge that the mind should pass beyond itself, and if men are to know things in common, if mankind is to have that community of knowledge which is necessary for them to transact business together, to say nothing of a higher common intellectual life, their minds must pass beyond themselves in the same way and with mutual action and co-operation. It is undoubted that as a matter of fact this does take place. Some philosophers tell us that no two men agree in any one thing, that each man sees and knows with his own mind, which because it is his own must be different from those of other people, and therefore must see and know in its own different way. Mark the assumptions involved! But, in point of fact, men do agree in more things than they differ in, and psychology must explain the agreement as well as the differing. Heine in his *Reisebilder* makes one of his wicked suggestions about the money-grubbing but inoffensive citizens of a German mercantile town—Bremen, I think. He pictures their monotonous life spent at a desk exhausting itself in 'two and two make four and five nine'. What madness would seize the quiet community, he says, if one of these burghers got it into his head that 'two and two made five and five eleven'! The man's whole life would have been a mistake; he would feel separated from himself, and would certainly be in a state of lively separation from his neighbours. In point of fact such an idea would never occur at all; yet the fictitious individualism of ordinary psychology does seem to suggest the possibility. By isolating the individual mind at the beginning, it expressly

suggests the want of common action and common knowledge. Of course such an idea is impossible: a consistent sceptic like Hume accepts his position, but few metaphysicians and psychologists are consistent sceptics. From the beginning of modern psychology the main endeavour has been to bring together again what the psychologist started with separating. The Cartesian 'innate idea' and the whole series of elaborate mechanical contrivances down to the latest modification of the 'inseparable association' theory, all bear witness that when the psychologist has once sundered what is really inseparable in the nature of things, he cannot rest till he has contrived some way of bringing them together again, even though his links of connection are as fictitious as his earlier method of separation.

The great evil of the whole matter lies in the influence which this arbitrary isolation has upon the general view of the possibility of a common knowledge and of a philosophy founded thereon. When 'my own mind' is separated from 'mind' to begin with, and elaborate contrivances have to be created to bring them together again, the tendency is generated to look at intellectual discord as the rule in knowledge, and to regard the harmonies in human experience as anomalies which require explanation. The business of philosophy is just turned upside down. It is not to expound the agreement which is the rule, and the differences which are the exception; but to expound the differences which are the rule and to explain the harmonies which are the exception.

While Mr. Green shows how the fictitious individualism in modern philosophy found its legitimate outcome in the scepticism of Hume, Mr. Caird in his *Philosophy of Kant* shows how it may be counteracted by a judicious return to a more natural way of philosophising. In Kant we see the practical illustration of the working of the principles which our authors are introducing into English philosophy. Kant is by pre-eminence the critical philosopher; he recognises more fully than any other that all things whatsoever must be brought to the test, and his thoroughness in exposing the philosophical fallacies of his predecessors has caused him to be known as the iconoclast.

Mr. Caird's book is a careful analysis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* accompanied by suggestive commentary and criticism. It is the best book on Kant's philosophy that I am acquainted with either in our own language or in German, and cannot fail to be the standard work upon the subject for a long time to come. In this volume Mr. Caird has confined himself to a strictly technical exposition of Kant's metaphysical principles, and has for this reason failed to give his readers any insight into the marvellous suggestiveness of the great German's ideas

and principles. The book is the work of a professed metaphysician sternly confining himself to technical questions. Kant's relations to science, to mathematics, to history, to ethics, and to theology are passed over almost unheeded. The author has a strictly metaphysical problem to solve, and solves it without digression. This would be unfortunate if it were not that we are promised another volume in which the practical and popular sides of Kant's ideas are to be expounded. As it is, we can see clearly how Mr. Caird would have us look at metaphysical and psychological problems.

In opposition to the separative individualism of modern philosophy, Mr. Caird points out that the main idea in Kant's metaphysic and psychology is synthesis; other philosophies have been analytic or separative, Kant's is synthetic. It strives to explain the unity which we actually see in all things. It justifies this unity against criticism. There is the unity of thought in the history of philosophy, the unity of the mind, the solidarity of mind, the coherence of the universe. Unity is everywhere, and Kant justifies it; his philosophy is synthetic, his watchword is *synthesis*. There is a oneness in human experience, a oneness in human thought, a oneness in human aspiration. Unity or harmony or universality is the rule, difference and discord the exceptions.

But while Mr. Caird shows how all these are fundamental principles with Kant, he also points out that Kant is not quite true to his principles, and that at times he is barely conscious of them. The criticism when adverse is almost entirely a statement that Kant is not synthetic enough, that, while he repudiates the separatism of Locke and Leibnitz, he could not quite emancipate himself from the ideas in which he had been brought up, and that his invariable tendency is to fall back into analysis in the very places in which synthesis is most required.

From Mr. Caird's book we see clearly that Kant was the great philosopher which he is universally allowed to be, not because he invented a new theory of knowing and being and of their relations, but because he understood as no one else did the currents of previous speculation, because he had felt all of them, sympathised with all of them, and felt able to gather all together. He was a great philosopher, because he assimilated to himself all that was really good in all the opposing theories of previous generations and so could make a fresh start. He was the embodiment of the philosophical aspirations of his time—and was therefore the philosopher of the age. Hegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, has in his usual powerfully graphic way pictured the European nations throwing themselves horde after horde upon the shores of Palestine, hoping to find the realisation

of Christendom and to live in the spirit of Christ by living where the Master lived, treading the roads He travelled, and everywhere erecting the cross where the crescent had waved on holy ground; and, when driven back in disappointment and despair, finding a truer realisation of that life and spirit in the cultivation of the sciences, in the revival of letters and art, and in the outburst of the spirit of religious liberty in the Reformation. In the same way we can see the spirit of modern Europe eager to find that free individual life which Christianity had taught it to prize, striving eagerly to gain it amidst materialist psychology, sceptical metaphysic, and necessitarian and utilitarian ethics, at last after many wanderings coming to it in the synthetic philosophy and grand moral ideas of the Kantian Philosophy. Europe did not lose by the Crusades. The road was a round-about one, but it reached its end after all, and the East enriched the West; and so philosophy did not lose by Locke and Hume, by Leibnitz and Wolff: they were the road to truer principles which contained what truth they had and taught.

I know of no finer piece of psychological analysis than Mr. Caird's chapter entitled 'the Pre-Critical Period,' in which he shows Kant gradually awakening to one after another of the elements which were to make his system yet lying in the future. It is interesting biographically, but it has special interest because it shows how Kant was really the sum of previous metaphysics. He attached to himself what was permanent in them, and so transcended them. This biographical sketch has enabled us to see clearly for the first time how it was that Kant created an era in philosophy. He absolutely swept away what had gone before, not so much by refuting his opponents as by appropriating whatever was really valuable out of opposing systems, and so destroying them.

Kant's principles did not come to him all at once, as Hume's did. He did not make a system which was to set the world right all at once, as Berkeley had done. He slowly accumulated his materials, and in doing so sucked previous philosophy dry; and when he had got what he wanted he put it all down in the *Critique* very much as it came to him, and we find there distinctly traceable the psychological struggle which Mr. Caird has explained at length. Kant is not a skilful expositor. He has a lumbering style, uses uncouth phrases, and besides it seems as if he was always repeating himself. One result of this is that he takes his readers the whole weary road that he himself travelled. He does not use his own experience in order to take his readers by a short and swift passage to his conclusions, he makes them trudge backwards and forwards by the same turnings and twistings which he made while finding out the path for

himself. This defect of style lets us see how thoroughly Kant linked himself to history. His repetitions and apparent contradictions are made simple, when we remember that he has both Leibnitz and Hume in his mind, and endeavours to answer both at the same time. Before Kant's time, to oppose Leibnitz was to defend Locke and Hume, and to oppose Locke and Hume was to defend Leibnitz and Wolff; but Kant was a partisan of neither. He took from both and he opposed both, and he does so in his writings, and especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason* without much warning. This is one of the great causes of the obscurity of the book, but it is also a proof of the thorough way in which Kant identified himself with the past, and endeavoured to assimilate all that was permanent in it. Mr. Green says that Kant read Hume with the eyes of Leibnitz, and Leibnitz with the eyes of Hume, and so was able to a great extent to rid himself of the presuppositions of both; and this is what we find in the *Critique*. In one paragraph he may be speaking of Wolff or Leibnitz; in the next he is speaking of Locke and Leibnitz; and he so interweaves the principles, or refutation of the principles, of these philosophers with his own statements, that it is often difficult to disentangle the whole. But the main thing to be noticed both in the account of Kant's philosophical education and in the way in which he treats the ideas of previous thinkers, is his refusal to isolate the present from the past, and his assured resolve to establish himself on the basis of previous philosophic work. His aim is to conserve the past while he constructs for the present.

It is more important however to observe how Kant opposed and denied the isolating or separative principles of the earlier metaphysic. He did not take the mind to pieces in order to put it together again, and he did not separate the mind from what it knows in such a fashion as to render it a hopeless task to prove that the mind can ever know anything at all. Kant holds that all these abstractions of the ordinary psychology are false and mischievous, and he believes that the true use of mental philosophy is not to dissect the mind, but to describe it and its workings as truly and as naturally as is possible;—to detect and reveal the latent process by which the mind perceives, knows, and builds up its knowledge; and as knowledge comes from putting things together, the process which can reveal the nature of knowledge must be synthetic and not analytic, constructive and not separative. Kant's general idea about knowledge may be roughly put in this way: the acquisition of knowledge is the filling up of a plan which is already in the mind; understanding gives the plan and sense fills it in. Here is synthesis at the very outset, and Kant's whole argument suggests connection instead

of division. Knowledge is a synthesis, the object of knowledge is a synthesis, there is a synthesis of 'my own mind' with 'mind' and so on. But there is a twofold difficulty in understanding Kant's action in this matter because his style and method of exposition are obscure and misleading, and he does not rigidly follow out his principles to their just issue.

The difficulty in style and method of exposition is that Kant to all appearance does isolate the various problems connected with the acquisition of knowledge, and that the appearance of isolation is made the more complete by the fact that Kant works backwards. He divides his *Critique of Pure Reason* into three parts, discussing in order, one after another, the problem of sense, the problem of understanding, and the problem of reason. The acquisition of knowledge, its elaborate arrangement, and its subsumption under ideals, are all discussed separately and without much apparent connection, just as in ordinary psychology sense, memory, and thought make separate heads of exposition. This isolation is more apparent than real. Kant is himself aware that the problem of the æsthetic cannot be solved apart from the understanding, and that the solution of the problem of the understanding in the last resort lies in the reason. But he isolates the problem with which he is dealing even though he knows that the true solution can only be fully given when its relations to other problems are fully recognised and discussed. Kant's first problem cannot be solved unless the second is known, and the second is really insoluble until the third is known; but while Kant is working at the first we never get a hint that there is a second, and while he is busy with the second we are not told anything about a third. He works backwards, and it is only when we get to the end and turn back again with the knowledge we have got after all our labour, that we begin to see what the author had in view the whole time. In short, as I have said, Kant takes his readers by the same laborious road which he himself travelled, and leads them along dim paths, so that they do not see where they are going till they get to the very end of the journey.

His method of exposition seems to make Kant more untrue to his idea of synthesis than he really is, because he isolates sense from understanding and both from reason, while he discusses the difficulties under each. But he really does fall far short of his ideal, even when due allowance is made for his habit of mind and manner of statement. Synthesis is organic unity, and when Kant declared that the possibility of synthetic propositions was the problem of knowledge, he really meant that the business of philosophy was to show this organic unity. But organic unity or synthesis is not produced by laying down

two or more elements side by side with each other; synthesis is not mere position. To take the matter in Kant's way, synthesis in knowledge is not proved by showing that there is an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* element in all knowledge, and that these two subsist side by side with each other. It must be shown that they make an amalgam, that they combine in an organic unity which is neither the one nor the other nor merely both together, but is a distinct thing by itself. To take an illustration: the object 'ship' is an organic unity of sense, memory, and thought; all contribute their parts, but the object is not a juxtaposition of the three elements. It is impossible to take one away and then say what is left; take one away, there is no object; it may be broken up into a variety of objects each by itself an organic unity of sense, memory, and thought, but the one object 'ship' has gone out of existence. Dr. Hutchison Stirling, in his *Secret of Hegel*, puts this well when he declares that the Santa Maria must have been an unknown blur in the eyes of the Indians who thronged round Columbus when he first landed in America. It was not an object to them, but several objects as their memory and thought taught them. If they took it all in at once it was in a side way—'floating house,' 'winged creature,' and so on. An aspect of the ship was an object to them, and parts of the ship were objects to them, but the whole was not one object, because at first, while vision worked as usual, thought and memory lagged behind, and they were as blind to the whole object 'ship' as if they had had no vision. But suppose a ship-wrecked Spanish sailor had been among the islanders, how easily spars, rigging, sails, and hull would have gone together into the one 'ship'—for with him thought and memory did not lag behind. In short, to make an object of knowledge there must be the organic unity of sense, thought, and what Kant calls imagination. That this is what was in Kant's mind is evident not merely from what he says in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but from the whole course of his statements in the *Critique of Judgment*; still he does not make this clear, at least in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The chief value of Mr. Caird's book is the admirable way in which all this has been put. He disentangles the appearance of isolation or of the absence of synthesis which comes from the method of exposition, from the real isolation or failure to carry out fully the synthetic idea which is the real fault in Kant's philosophy.

In the *Æsthetic*, Kant isolates the problem of sense-knowledge, but only for the sake of exposition, from the understanding and from the reason. His main object is to show that sense alone cannot give knowledge, and yet that there can be no knowledge without sense. This implies, as we see

further on, that knowledge is the filling up of a plan already in the mind, while other elements give the plan, but in the *Æsthetic*, Kant contents himself with showing that there is an *a priori* element in sense-knowledge—Space and Time—and that it is this *a priori* element which enables and compels men to know the same things in the same way, to have a common knowledge in things of sense. All men can distinguish a plane surface from that which has depth as well as height and breadth. Whatever differences there may be in human knowledge, what is a square to one man is a square to all men, what is a cube to one man is a cube to all men. Every one recognises the difference between a picture and a statue. I need not dwell on this, as Kant's doctrine of Space and Time and the use he makes of it are familiar enough to every one; but it is well to notice how here as elsewhere Kant makes his own idea less intelligible than it might be by his faults of exposition and by his refusal to carry out his own fundamental principle. To take the latter first—It is in accordance with Kant's idea of the organic unity of knowledge that the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements in sense should form an amalgam; but this is not brought out clearly, it rather seems as if Kant were not prepared to say this. The *a priori* element is an element which combines but does not amalgamate, or at least is not said to amalgamate with the *a posteriori*. Kant seems to bring in the *a priori* element and let it rest side by side with the sensuous; he does not insist on the organic oneness of the two in knowledge. And then by his isolation of the problem of sense he seems to imply that there is a sense-knowledge which is a kind of knowledge by itself and not an element in *all* knowledge—he seems to say that there is one kind of knowledge which is sense-knowledge and another kind which is thought-knowledge; while his own opinion is that there is no knowledge whatever without sense and none whatever without thought. While we read the *Æsthetic*, it appears as if the objects of sense formed by the combination of the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements in perception were sufficient to give us an object without the aid of conception or of any other of the so-called faculties of the mind. But as Mr. Caird points out, when we enter on the study of the *Analytic* we have to strip perception of its borrowed attributes: we find that in perception we have not an object, we are only on the way to it; or, as Mr. Caird puts it, in the *Analytic* we have to consider *in the doing* that which the *Æsthetic* generally considers *as done*. "We have to ask how the fleeting sensations can be arrested in their flux, and connected together so as to become perceptions of objects, whether in the inner or outer experience. . . . In the

Æsthetic all this was simply supposed to be given in sense. The perception was there regarded as setting us face to face with the individual in its complete not to say infinite determination, which no conception can ever fully represent. Now, however, we have to recognise that the idea of the individual is the result of a process which is ever going on in experience, and that the infinity which is attributed to it merely means that we know the process can never be completed." And thus we begin to recognise that all that we have in the so-called sense-knowledge is not knowledge at all, but an endless process of specification towards an object, and that this process comes to an end when the object is perfectly individualised, *i.e.*, when it is at once distinguished from and related to the whole universe. As soon then as we recognise that in Kant's view sense-knowledge is not knowledge at all but a process in knowledge, that there is no object of sense but only an aiming after an object, and that—such is the organic unity of knowledge—the object can never be an object thoroughly until it is set in relation to the universe of objects, we see how Kant's isolation of the problem of sense is simply provisional. Perception can only be understood when taken along with what is more than perception, and so the problems of the Analytic and of the Dialectic surround the problem of the Æsthetic and must be solved ere it can be unravelled. If sensations are but an unconnected manifold caught up into a process working onwards towards the perfect individualisation of an object, we must know something of the actual process itself, of its principles and rules of procedure, and we must also know something of the universe—of the totality of things, of the end of the process which we are compelled to look forward to and yet never attain. It is difficult to see why Kant should have gone so much out of his way to perplex his readers, but Mr. Caird's suggestion seems to be the right one. "The Æsthetic," he says, "represents, at least in its main outlines, the ideas of a time when Kant did not yet doubt that sense of itself enables us, and that it alone enables us, to acquire and increase our knowledge of objects." The *Critique*, in short, is a biography as well as an exposition.

I need scarcely go on to show how there is the same isolation of the problem in the Analytic and the same failure to realise to the full the meaning of his own principle of synthesis in the two remaining portions of Kant. These have been brought out in a masterly way by Mr. Caird, and I am not so much concerned with the contributions to our knowledge of Kant which he makes, as with the solid additions he has made to English philosophy and psychology.

The common English idea of Hegel and Hegelians, men who

tranquilly spin theories without regard to facts, is rapidly disappearing. There is every appearance of hard work in the books we have thus shortly considered, and very little appearance of undue theorising and classification. But their principal value to English philosophy, apart from the special knowledge they give us of the men and ideas they discuss and criticise, is that they bring home to our mind the solidarity of human thought as that is revealed to us in the history of philosophy, and that they insist upon the synthetic unity, the organic oneness, of the mind and of knowledge.

T. M. LINDSAY.

IV.—PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.

It was not without hesitation that I agreed, at the request of the Editor of *MIND*, to give an account of the present state of philosophy in Germany, and I did so only in the hope that the reader would not expect from me anything like a complete review of our latest philosophical literature. All I shall attempt is a short description of the principal currents composing the present philosophical movement in Germany. I shall of course refer to some of the most striking productions in which it finds expression, but I cannot touch on everything that may lay claim to philosophical significance. Should, therefore, this article be read by German philosophical writers, many will doubtless find their names passed over, while perhaps some less important works than theirs are mentioned. I can only hope that I shall be pardoned for the omission, partly on the ground of the declared object of the paper, and partly because (as I think no philosophical writer studying the works of others will deny) our time is so fruitful in literary production that it is impossible even for the most active reader to take account of everything of value that appears. This might not, indeed, be so difficult in itself, were it not necessary to wade through so much that is mediocre; unfortunately, the worth of books does not stand written on their fronts. Then it is just that which does *not* possess permanent scientific value, that may be most specially characteristic of the time; for a very inadequate picture of the history of science would be given if the history of errors were excluded. And I have besides to direct attention not only to our philosophical literature, but also to the state of philosophical instruction, of which perhaps still less is known.

In undertaking to describe the main currents of German philosophy at the present day, we must first of all be prepared for an objection, that will make the attempt seem a very

questionable one. "Are there then," the expert will ask, "any such main currents? Is there not rather merely a number of little streams, each one taking its own course?" At first sight this may well seem to be so. Our philosophical literature is not more bulky than it is many-sided in its views and tendencies. In this, it appears to me, our present development differs essentially from the condition of German philosophy in the first half of this century. Then well-defined schools, some one being dominant, stood opposed to each other, and to one or other of them every student of philosophy belonged. Now it almost seems as if every writer on philosophical subjects had his own system; and if any one follows the earlier philosophers, such as Kant, Herbart or Schopenhauer, it is done with all kinds of reservations emphatically stated, so that no one may think of questioning the originality of the author. A philosophical writer came forward some years ago, with a proposal, seriously intended and on many sides seriously discussed, for eternal peace in philosophy, and one could not help thinking how, also in the political sphere, utopian dreams of peace are never more rare than in times of war. The natural result of his well-meant proposal was a hot controversy which left everything as it was.*

The break-up of opinions is evidently connected with two well-marked features in our later philosophical development—on the one hand, the decline of the speculative systems so long prevailing, followed by the rise of no new theory of the universe obtaining a similar general acceptance, and, on the other hand, the transfer of philosophical production from the Universities to the wider circle of cultivated men. This last phenomenon especially is too characteristic for us not to examine it somewhat more closely.

At the beginning of this century it was in the lecture-rooms of our Universities that metaphysical systems first saw the light, and they gained enthusiastic adherents among students before they sought a larger public in the printed form. Thus Fichte first unfolded the various aspects of his *Wissenschaftslehre* before an academic audience; also the successive phases of Schelling's system originated as college-lectures, and at last did not get beyond this stage, so that we know his later views only from the papers he left. In like manner Hegel's philosophical lectures were all either summaries of his whole system or parts of it, for this most systematic of thinkers knew how to force even the history of philosophy within the frame of his dialectic. Finally we know that Herbart's favourite subject for academic

* A Spir, "Zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie," in *Philos. Monatshefte*, XI. p. 273. For the controversy, see pp. 362, 422, and XII., pp. 133, 207. (Cf. *MIND*, No. III., p. 420.)

prelection was his metaphysical system, which he also made the basis of his psychology. The disciples naturally followed the example of their masters, and thus Metaphysic was at that time the principal subject of instruction in the German universities. It had taken Psychology, Ethic, Æsthetic and Philosophy of Nature into its service, while Logic also was either absorbed by it or treated merely as a propædæutic. History of Philosophy was little regarded. What is the use of historical knowledge, when all truth is believed to lie within the four corners of a single system? It was chiefly through Hegel's masterly, if one-sided, treatment that this department acquired a standing in the academic discipline.

How different it now is in our Universities! Perhaps the following table describes more eloquently than any detailed statement the present condition of our Academic Philosophy. In this table, with the help of Ascherson and Seelmann's *Calendar of German Universities* (Berlin), which appears every session, I give the statistics, for the last few years, of such lectures as will best show what has been doing in philosophy. As such I have selected those on History of Philosophy, Logic, Psychology, Metaphysic and Ethics. My statistics extend to all universities speaking the German language (German, Austrian, Swiss, and the Russian University of Dorpat), but only to the lectures in the philosophical faculty; thus, for instance, theological ethics is not taken account of, as this is a subject confined to theologians, and therefore gives no indication of the general philosophical interest. Further only those lectures are noticed that treat of a whole department or the greater part of one (as for instance the History of Ancient, Modern, or the Latest Philosophy). The total number of lectures is as follows:—

	Hist. of Phil.	Logic.	Psych.	Metaph.	Ethics.
Winter 1874-5 . .	34	21	17	7	6
Summer 1875 . .	39	22	23	5	3
Winter 1875-6 . .	37	27	18	8	9
Summer 1876 . .	35	17	23	6	3
Winter 1876-7 . .	39	24	22	8	9
Summer 1877 . .	32	20	17	5	2
	<hr/> 216	<hr/> 131	<hr/> 120	<hr/> 39	<hr/> 32

As we see, History of Philosophy is throughout predominant. The number of lectures on it is little less than those on Logic and Psychology together. The two last are pretty evenly balanced, with a slight preponderance in favour of Logic. The predominance of History is the more significant when we consider that where there are exercise-classes (*Seminare* und *Uebungen*), these really form a supplement to the historical

lectures, since they are almost invariably occupied with the interpretation of particular philosophical writers. Also it must not be forgotten that more lectures—four or five hours a week—are always devoted to History of Philosophy (whether General or Ancient or Modern), whilst not a few academical teachers are satisfied with from two to three hours for Psychology and Logic.

The number of lectures on Metaphysic and Ethics is very small; at the same time Ethics is perceptibly behind Metaphysic. According to our table, indeed, they are about equal, but this is due to the prominence given to practical philosophy in the Austrian universities. Thus, for instance, out of the nine courses on Ethics delivered in the two winter sessions of 1875-6 and 1876-7, six were given in the four Austrian universities, whilst the remaining three were furnished by the twenty-four universities of the German Empire and Switzerland. It might thus seem as if Austria were animated by a far more living interest in Ethics than the rest of Germany; but the fact has a much less exalted reason. In Austria a course of lectures on Ethics must be attended by every one desirous of passing the state-examination in law. However, if in Germany proper Metaphysic in some degree prevails over Ethics, it must always be remembered that, out of the six to eight courses on the subject given in every session, at least half treat of Logic at the same time; while the rest either are delivered by older men, the last surviving pillars of the once prevailing metaphysical systems, or consist of lectures which might perhaps be better described as *against* Metaphysic.

Now what is the meaning of these statistics? First manifestly this, that a complete revolution has taken place in the course of our philosophical instruction. Formerly Metaphysic had the upper hand, and if the academic teacher had no system of his own he attached himself to a particular school, into which he introduced his students. Now History of Philosophy prevails; that is, Metaphysic is treated historically and critically in the succession of philosophical systems, as a science, so to speak, that has passed away. At the same time a moderate interest is bestowed on those bodies of doctrine which, to a certain degree at least, are placed above the strife of systems by the possession of a small number of generally recognised principles and facts, and which at the same time possess practical importance—Logic and Psychology. Significantly enough, of these two Logic is the more ardently cultivated, being treated for the most part, as the greater number of our manuals show, in the traditional formalistic way, in which it can be taught entirely without reference to metaphysical views—which cannot be the case to the same degree with Psychology. That both subjects

are much less cultivated at the Universities than History of Philosophy is, however, partly due to the circumstance that some hours are given to Logic and Psychology in the highest classes of our Gymnasiums. Not, by any means, that students enter the university as perfect logicians and psychologists; on the contrary, their knowledge of these subjects is extremely small. Indeed, the dry and tedious manner in which the subjects are treated at school by the philologists to whom they have in general to be confided, is quite sufficient to drive out of young heads any liking for them or for philosophy either. Our more intelligent schoolmasters are now agreed that philosophy belongs to the work of the university; but who does not know that *vis inertiae* is nowhere so powerful as in school-matters? I shall never forget a school-examination in Psychology at which I had to be present some years ago. The master, otherwise an excellent man, had brewed his own psychology, and had imparted it to the schoolboys by means of dictations learnt by heart. The answer was always forthcoming; hardly once was there any mistake. The nature of soul, life, mind, and body—all this, with much besides, was explained with the utmost exactness. "Are not our pupils well up in Psychology?" I was asked by another master. "Yes, indeed," I replied; "out of all these questions I could not have answered one."

The philosophical knowledge of our students, when they pass to the University, in those favourable cases where there is not left a general impression of utter weariness, consists of a few scholastic definitions and logical rules learnt by heart. That young men who fancy such things to be philosophy do not enthusiastically flock to philosophical lectures is intelligible enough. The German student does not, like his English compeer, reside at the University simply with the object of general scientific culture, but first and foremost he pursues a *Brodstudium*. He has chosen a profession which is to procure him a future living as doctor, practising lawyer, clergyman, master in one of the higher schools or the like, and for which he must establish his fitness in an examination at the close of his university-career. But how enormously have the subjects of instruction increased in the majority of these professions, owing to the progress of the special sciences! It needs therefore either compulsion or a specially lively interest to bring our doctors, lawyers, and philologists to the philosophical lectures. But of late compulsion has for the most part ceased, partly in consideration of the large demands of professional subjects, partly in just deference to the principle of freedom of study. Even for the examination that precedes the granting of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, most German universities do not absolutely

require philosophical knowledge, so that the very title that takes its name from the subject, is often granted to those who practically know nothing of Philosophy.

These facts are very significant as to the present state of our Philosophy, yet it would be rash to conclude from them that the subject is on the decline. For in the first place it cannot be overlooked that of late years the interest in Philosophy has again increased even in the universities, a symptom all the more valuable that, by the present academic regulations, the attendance at philosophical lectures depends more than it formerly did on the option of the students. But secondly, and this is the main point, the state of philosophical instruction is the less to be confounded with that of Philosophy in general, because philosophical study is nowadays pursued in far wider circles than formerly. In this as in other respects we have become a more practical nation. We no longer consider it indispensable that the doctor who would heal the sick, or the advocate who would help his clients to their rights, should be familiar with speculations on metaphysic or on the philosophy of nature and law. We leave it more than we did to the voluntary interest of students, whether they should pursue philosophical studies or not, and certainly, in consequence of this absence of constraint, the quality not only of the hearers but in the end also of the lectures is improved. It also not seldom happens that men who till their entrance on practical life are wholly engaged in preparation for it, devote themselves later with all the more interest to philosophical work, or that those standing altogether aloof from academic professional learning take part in it. This is most of all matter of congratulation, because it has brought about a freer expression of opinions than was always attained when philosophical discussion was confined within the limits of our academic bodies. The philosopher, who knew himself watched in his political and religious utterances by the authorities in whose hands his promotion lay, was too easily led, even when otherwise an honourable man, to accommodate his views in some measure to the external circumstances upon which he saw himself dependent. The private inquirer, on the contrary, is perfectly free in this respect, great liberty of expression in scientific matters having been long enjoyed in Germany. But the gradually acquired independence of philosophy and the emancipation of many of its representatives from the injurious influence of the learned bodies, have necessarily reacted favourably, if slowly, even on these. In the universities, Philosophy now reckons numerous representatives, who do not feel in the least constrained in the expression of their scientific views by the position they occupy, partly no doubt because

of the greater strength and liberality of public opinion. Against the preponderating advantages of wider circles sharing in philosophical work, must on the other hand be set a dilettantism which shows itself more in Philosophy than in any other branch of scientific literature, and which often threatens to destroy its credit in the eyes of the representatives of the more exact sciences, as much as the metaphysical aberrations of a Schelling or a Hegel. As dilettantism always prefers to attack the highest and most difficult problems, our popular philosophical literature takes up especially with metaphysic; and in this it is strikingly opposed to our Academic Philosophy. At the universities those lecturers are principally run after whose tendency, whether historical or critical, is towards agreement with the experiential sciences; our learned education seems in fact to have passed, in conformity with Auguste Comte's stages of the development of knowledge, from the metaphysical to the positive stage. Far other is the aspect of our Popular Philosophy, of which Schopenhauer, with his great contempt for university-philosophy, may be considered the head and type. It is still deep in the metaphysical stage. If the statistics could be given of our philosophical literature, so largely contributed to by non-academic writers, the result (omitting works of an historical nature which are rather philological than philosophical) would probably be the exact opposite to that of the statistics of our university-lectures. The engrossing subject would prove to be Metaphysic, having in conjunction with it Ethics, and the proportion of works devoted to Logic, Theory of Knowledge and Psychology (after the deduction of school-manuals, mostly of no independent scientific value) would be small.

In now passing to give a short description of the main currents of philosophical thought in Germany, it will perhaps be best to keep separate the Non-Academic and the Academic Philosophies, in each of which again various currents are perceptible. At the same time the division must not be conceived as a perfectly strict one. The inter-action between the universities and the outer world is so manifold that the academic movements often operate in wider circles, and on the other hand the non-academic currents sometimes overflow into the universities, though generally affecting only the non-professional representatives of Philosophy.

I.

The Non-Academic Philosophy, which we will take first, began its course about the middle of the century, with a series of *materialistic* books of a popular cast. Materialism here, as in

France in the previous century, was partly a symptom of the decay of the metaphysical systems, and partly depended on the social and political movements of the time. One important thinker, himself issuing from the school of Hegel and still in some measure conforming to its spirit in his manner of dialectic, had great influence on the emancipation of cultivated people from the prevailing systems, namely, Ludwig Feuerbach. He cannot be ranked with materialists in the proper sense of the word, and yet no other philosopher has stimulated so strongly as he the development of modern German materialism. Man is to him the measure of things, both as regards theoretic knowledge and moral endeavour. Thus he arrives theoretically at a Sensualism which everywhere considers perceptibility as the criterion of truth, and ethically at a Humanism, which is strenuously turned against the egoistic aberrations of human nature. His thoughts on the development of knowledge, on religion, and on morals often come wonderfully near to those of Auguste Comte, although he certainly knew nothing of him. But Feuerbach never got so far as to work up his thoughts into a finished system, for which reason the present generation scarcely knows more of him than his name. It was therefore an opportune undertaking when Carl Grün, some years after the philosopher's death, determined to exhibit at length his import for German philosophy.* Feuerbach worked most powerfully upon Jakob Moleschott, perhaps the most thoughtful and certainly the most suggestive of our materialist writers. Although his *Kreislauf des Lebens* only went through four editions, whilst Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* has already reached its thirteenth or fourteenth, yet it is easy to see that it was mainly from Moleschott that Vogt, Büchner, and Czolbe, the chief representatives of scientific materialism between 1850 and 1860, received their impulse. In Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*, the third edition of which has now appeared after the lamented death of its author, we possess such an excellent account and criticism of modern German Materialism, that we may content ourselves with this short mention of it, all the more that the development of that tendency, which proceeded partly from the decline of the speculative systems and partly from the rapid advance of the natural sciences, especially physiology, belongs already to the past rather than the present. The last of the above-named writers, Heinrich Czolbe, struck out the most original path. His latest work,

* Ludwig Feuerbach, in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass, so wie in seiner philosophischen Characterentwicklung, dargestellt von Carl Grün. Leipzig und Heidelberg, 1874. 2 Bände.

recently published after his death,* shows, in a very instructive way, how extreme Naturalism is brought almost irresistibly to a point of view not very unlike Berkeley's Idealism. Thus, according to Czolbe, the real essence of the universe consists of sensations which must have in and for themselves a spatial character, and are thus extended in three dimensions, or rather in four, since time may be considered the fourth dimension of all that is real. Czolbe retained to the last an opinion to which, about the middle of the present century, our scientific materialism was generally inclined: he believed, namely, not only in the eternity of the universe, but also in its essential unchangeableness, and sought in this simple way to evade the difficulties of the question as to the origin of organic species. How much these theories are opposed to all scientific experience is clear, though they are evidently a consistent development of sensualism. It may here be remarked that amongst academic philosophers Ueberweg, a writer highly valued for his excellent philosophical manuals, inclined to similar opinions, at least in reference to the spatial and real existence of sensations, and thence was led in his last years to a materialistic view of the universe.† The older scientific materialism, as appears most clearly in Czolbe, had no notion of Evolution, which now forms an integral part of every naturalistic theory of the world. Whilst the other writers belonging to it for the most part acquired the notion later,‡ Czolbe remained true to the philosophical tradition in which he was trained, and to the last would have nothing to do with it. On the other hand, Darwinism has of late years had the effect on not a few thinkers of leading them from other speculative systems to materialistic views. This was the case with Ueberweg, in whom Darwin's development-theory helped to overthrow the Aristotelian teleology. But the most striking example of this is David Friedrich Strauss, the celebrated theological critic, who set out from Hegel's philosophy and ended with a confession of faith that unreservedly recognised the results of natural science as alone giving the measure of our theoretic knowledge.§ The

* *Grundzüge einer extensionalen Erkenntnistheorie*, herausgegeben von Dr. Johnson, Plauen, 1875. An extremely good summary of Czolbe's views and their development is given by Dr. Hans Vaihinger in the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, Bd. xii., s. 1.

† Compare the account of Ueberweg in the 2nd edition of Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (1875), Bd. II., s. 515.

‡ Compare the description that Carl Vogt gives of his changes of opinion, *Vorlesungen über den Menschen*, Giessen (1863), Bd. II., s. 256.

§ *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, Leipzig, 1872; see also the postscript to the 2nd edition, Bonn, 1873.

edition of the collected works of Strauss, now appearing under the direction of Ed. Zeller, will place us for the first time in a position to survey the interesting development which gradually led this eminent critic to his final point of view.* For the rest it is very doubtful whether Strauss's last confession of faith, which is as radical in point of theory as its tendency is conservative in practical and social questions, is properly denoted by the often misused name of Materialism. One of the ablest and boldest representatives of Darwinism in Germany, Ernst Hæckel, has, certainly not without reason, repudiated the name, because it implies an immoral tendency, from which the present representatives of Materialism know themselves to be perfectly free. But even on the theoretical side the name is perhaps ill applied. In his *Geschichte des Materialismus* Lange has clearly shown how little the views of Büchner and others agree with the strict notion of Materialism. But if among these older representatives of materialistic doctrine there was a confusion of ideas, and Scepticism, Sensualism, Empirism, nay even bits of sheer Idealism were mixed up with genuine materialistic notions, the views of our present evolutionists no longer correspond in the least with Materialism. In them a strictly mechanical and atomistic theory of the universe is connected with the idea that the atoms possess internal states, and that these internal states in combination constitute what we call psychical phenomena. Such a theory is evidently not Materialism, but may be fitly designated 'Monism,' as by Hæckel, to distinguish it from the Dualism in vogue. But it should be understood that in this Monism, represented by many men of science besides Hæckel, the material element predominates, in so far as the necessity is recognised of giving a mechanical explanation of the phenomena of matter from atomistic assumptions; whilst for psychical phenomena resort is had to the general phrase—that they proceed from the internal states of atoms. As soon as greater attention is paid to the psychological side of this parallelism of inner and outer experience, the point of view imperceptibly becomes quite different. A striking example of this has been lately afforded by Fr. Zöllner, a writer who likewise began with scientific studies but turned his attention to the problems of knowledge. He too seeks to add a new property to atoms, "by bringing the simplest and most elementary processes of nature into determinate connection with a process of sensation".† Here we see

* Dav. Fr. Strauss, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bde. I., II., Bonn, 1877.

† *Ueber die Natur der Kometen*, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntniss* (Leipzig, 1872), s. 322.

the psychical taken as the primary—as involving the deeper reason of material processes. And in fact Zöllner holds that what in our inner experience we call Will proceeds from this sensation in matter. But Will also is with him a universal function of matter: it is Will that is everywhere the cause of motion. Here he attaches himself to the philosophy of Schopenhauer, for whose services in regard to the physiology of the senses he has also sought to win acknowledgment in his attacks on Helmholtz. This blending of scientific Monism with Schopenhauer's philosophical doctrine is not peculiar to Zöllner, but is indeed a feature of the time, other writers having been led independently to similar views. Passing over the like ideas expressed by Rokitsansky,* Ewald Hering,† and others, we may here mention especially Hæckel's latest work, in which he employs the hypothesis of a memory inherent in the organic molecules to explain the phenomena of development.‡ We thus come upon the second main current of our present Non-Academic Philosophy, which may be described as idealistic in comparison with the more materialistic current we have hitherto depicted. But as it is specially characteristic of this second movement to be dominated by the influence of Schopenhauer, our last great metaphysician, it may not be quite exact to describe it as idealistic, since Schopenhauer himself comes very near to materialism in many of his views, despite the idealistic foundation of his philosophy.

Schopenhauer is the born leader of Non-Academic Philosophy in Germany. The "professorial philosophy of philosophy-professors" is the constant object of his attacks. He declares it unworthy to live *by* instead of *for* philosophy. He deeply deplures that Kant, whom after Plato and Goethe he venerates most highly, should have been a professor, and he ascribes to his academical position all the defects he finds in him. The followers of Kant he treats with studied coarseness. He calls Fichte a wind-bag, Hegel a charlatan, and Herbart's understanding, he says, was wholly distorted. In his judgments he gives the freest rein to caprice. However clear and acute his thinking, at the critical moment logical consistency gives way to brilliant sallies and gusts of temper. His native gifts and his education are of the most varied sort; his artistic sense, in particular, is extremely fine, as in fact his æsthetic doctrines are among the best things he has produced. From such a man

* Rokitsansky, *Der selbstständige Werth des Wissens*, Vienna, 1869.

† E. Hering, *Das Gedächtniss, eine Function der organisirten Materie*, Vienna, 1870.

‡ Hæckel, *Die Perigenesis der Plastidule*, Berlin, 1876.

we must not expect a consistent system. But where he fails as a philosopher, he succeeds as a writer, who keeps hold of his readers the more his personality comes to the front. Schopenhauer is perhaps the most brilliant, certainly the clearest and most entertaining of our philosophical writers, and he has made it easy for the reader to master his whole system. No other of our foremost writers has laid so wise a restraint upon himself. Although he spent his whole time in philosophical reflection, free from all professional cares and enjoying the most vigorous health till the age of 72, yet all his works together, in the second collected edition now just published, come to no more than six volumes of moderate size.* It would however be a great mistake to ascribe to his manner of writing the reputation that Schopenhauer has acquired after a long period of neglect. The deeper and true reason of his influence must rather be sought in the peculiar nature of his philosophy, which gave expression to the thoughts and feelings of the time. His ethical more than his theoretic views have gained him the sympathies of great numbers of cultivated people. In fact the chief attraction of Schopenhauer's philosophy has not been any of his characteristic doctrines—not his doctrine of the Will as cosmical principle, still less that of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as the ground of our knowledge, but simply his Pessimism, which stands in no necessary relation with his other views. How completely he has here fallen in with the current of his time appears in the affinity of sentiment between him and certain contemporary systems otherwise as far as possible alien from his philosophy, such as Schelling's later doctrines (set forth in his posthumous lectures) and Franz Baader's theosophy. It is remarkable enough that Schopenhauer too betrays a great sympathy with mediæval asceticism. The philosophy of Romanticism, which Schelling and Baader represented in the form of religious enthusiasm, appears in Schopenhauer in a secular guise. His metaphysic is not on that account the less mystical, but it is one of the many contradictions of his intellect that in him mysticism and clear understanding are mixed in an odd fashion, and that he manages to combine such a metaphysic with a comparatively lucid theory of cognition. This combination, too, goes far to explain the success he has achieved. Pure and unadulterated Mysticism is not to the taste of the present age; it must be, as far as possible, reconciled at least in appearance, with scientific knowledge. Now Schopenhauer, in spite of many wayward outbreaks (as against Newton's colour-theory), was yet on the whole not ill-acquainted with the natural

* Arthur Schopenhauer's *Sämmtliche Werke*, herausgegeben von Julius Frauenstädt, 1te Aufl., Leipzig, 1873; 2te Aufl., 1876.

sciences, especially physiology, and he took very good care to avoid the arbitrary constructions of a Schelling or a Hegel in this field.

For twenty years Schopenhauer's philosophy was almost totally neglected. Two disciples of Hegel, the philosopher against whom he launched his most envenomed darts, have the merit of first directing attention to him, namely, J. E. Erdmann in his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (1853) and Julius Frauenstädt, who passed over to him and became his most faithful apostle. From the year 1844, when the second edition of his *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* appeared, Schopenhauer began to find adherents among journalists and novel writers, than whom none could more effectually help in the diffusion of a philosophy. His varied culture, his refined æsthetic views, his elegant style, soon made him the favourite philosopher of a class which is naturally more attracted by such qualities than by depth of thought, and in which moreover Romanticism had not yet lost all its power. It certainly was men of this class who did most for the rapid extension of the Non-Academic Philosophy. The writers whom Eduard von Hartmann, its most distinguished representative at the present time, gratefully enumerates in the preface to the seventh edition of his *Philosophie des Unbewussten* as the chief promoters of his philosophy—Rudolf Gottschalk, David Asher, Hieronymus Lorm and others—are all influential journalists. Theirs is undoubtedly the credit of having made the philosophy of Schopenhauer and his successors more popular than was ever philosophy in Germany before. For since the invention of printing no philosophical work of the size has ever had such a success in Germany as the *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, which ran through edition after edition from the year 1868 till finally the seventh was stereotyped in 1876. Something indeed (as Hartmann himself allows in his last edition) may be due to the advertising arts of the publisher, who, I doubt not, if the sentence I have just written should come under his eye, will not fail to set it forth in leaded type in the advertisement-sheet of his next edition, though everything else I may have to say about the work should be as unfavourable as possible. It is, however, a great mistake to ascribe, as some do, the success of the whole philosophical movement to such external circumstances. The patronage of of the men of the press is itself a sign that the pessimistic philosophy accorded with a state of feeling widely diffused.

Eduard von Hartmann is the first who sought to introduce serious changes into Schopenhauer's system; and that the time was come for most of these changes is shown not only by his external success but by the fact of his quickly finding followers

who arrived at like conclusions in somewhat altered form. The Metaphysic of the Unconscious had predecessors also. Hartmann himself has given an account of these in his work, and although he lays hold of many occasional observations the authors of which would by no means agree with him in the main, yet it is not to be denied that especially in the physiology of the senses there has been a considerable tendency to explain certain processes by unconscious mental activities. Perhaps, indeed, the impulses that Hartmann received from physiologists have not been less powerful than those that came to him from the doctrine of Schopenhauer. He certainly had as his aim at starting to reconcile Schopenhauer's metaphysic with the results of natural science. This appeared in the motto of his first edition—"Speculative results according to the inductive method of natural science," and we may safely ascribe to this peculiar conjunction no small part of the applause with which his philosophy has been received. The Schopenhauerian doctrine was a powerful attraction to many, but at the present day the exact sciences play so great a part that everybody desires to be on a good footing with them. Even our spiritualistic performers claim the support of 'scientific authorities' for their manifestations. What then could be more opportune than a philosophy that professed to reconcile speculation and natural science?

Hartmann's metaphysical system is an attempt to overcome the dualism of Will and Knowledge in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Schopenhauer regards unconscious Will as the transcendent cosmical principle that first of all objectifies itself for our subjective cognition in the human body, and then, through the brain-processes there arising, produces the world that we know. On the other hand, according to Hartmann, Will and Knowledge form an inseparable unity in the Unconscious. Hartmann passes under review the most diverse functions of body and mind in order to show that there always remains an unknowable something, which cannot be deduced from the conditions supplied by conscious experience, and which therefore must be referred to an unconscious mental principle. This principle on one side is to be conceived as Will because it passes forth into definite activities, and on the other side as Knowledge, since it may be credited with some apprehension of the results that are to follow. In support of his thesis, Hartmann brings forward in the first part of his work nerve-functions, instinct, *vis medicatrix*, organic development, æsthetic feeling, sexual love, speech, mysticism, history—showing no doubt great width of reading but unfortunately without the least critical scrutiny of the sources whence he drew his facts. He places side by side, without the least hesitation, the careful experiments of scientific

inquirers and the reports of spiritualistic enthusiasts or mesmerising charlatans. This utter want of critical sense is very apparent even in the introduction to his work where he sets forth its scope. Here he seeks to justify the assumption of final causes in nature by maintaining that, where known causes do not suffice for the explanation of a phenomenon, unknown conditions may be supposed; and, as in his opinion there is a number of natural phenomena that cannot be accounted for by material causes, there is no help but in assuming spiritual causes, that is to say, *ends*. The argument is set out in the mathematical guise of a theory of probability, which is enough to make Laplace turn in his grave; but there is no doubt that here as elsewhere when he refers to his scientific "sponsors" for facts, he succeeds in imposing on weak minds by this show of exactness.

Consciousness, according to Hartmann, is a higher stage of development of the Unconscious. It is not, as in Schopenhauer, produced by the Will, but it arises through Knowledge breaking loose from Will and then falling into wonder over its independence. With this deduction of consciousness is connected Hartmann's doctrine of Pessimism. The Unconscious stands above all negation, it suffers not, is never weary, doubts not, nor errs. With consciousness there first arises want, and thus a state of discontent and unhappiness, increasing in proportion as illusion vanishes with growing intelligence. Schopenhauer tried to give his pessimism a metaphysical foundation: the creative power of Will, he said, was ever being repressed, and thus it spent itself in restless unsatisfied struggling. Hartmann is determined here also to follow the method of inductive science. He tries to show that, when statistics of pleasure and pain are carefully set off against each other, the sum of pain in human existence is far the greater. That his figures are not very trustworthy need hardly be said. A single glance at his authorities suffices to show how utterly subjective such statistics must necessarily be, and that not the least objective support is thereby got for his preconceived opinion.

Hartmann is one of the most prolific philosophical writers of the time. He is a contributor to various journals, and besides his chief work has published many smaller writings; amongst these his *Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums** and his book against Darwinism† have excited most attention. Although Hartmann in the first of these took ground against our reforming theo-

* *Die Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft*, 2te Aufl., Berlin, 1875.

† *Wahrheit und Irrthum in Darwinismus*, 1875.

logians, yet he has not failed of encouragement from these, any philosophical movement that has something of an anti-materialistic character being sure to be welcomed with a certain sympathy. Hartmann can also with reason point to the affinity which many of the philosophic views that have lately proceeded from this circle (especially A. E. Biedermann's *Christliche Dogmatik*) show with his own. With men of science the Philosophy of the Unconscious has not fared so well. If they paid little heed to Hartmann's main work, their attention was all the more excited by his attack on Darwinism. In particular, Oscar Schmidt, the distinguished Strasburg zoologist, has subjected the scientific foundations of the Philosophy of the Unconscious to a merciless and yet, it must be confessed, a thoroughly fair criticism.* It must not be supposed, however, that Hartmann himself is not very well aware of many of his own weaknesses. A number of years ago there appeared a critical examination of the Philosophy of the Unconscious from the point of view of the mechanical philosophy, the best perhaps of all the writings directed against it before Schmidt's.† A rumour has long been current that this criticism was the work of the philosopher himself, and in his latest book he has in fact confessed himself the author of it.‡ Hartmann thus is not one of the infallible philosophers who cannot bear to be contradicted; and, otherwise, the perfectly civil and even polite tone which he assumes towards his opponents contrasts very favourably with the unsurpassable coarseness of his pessimistic predecessor.

From the philosophical side, Hartmann's doctrine has been subjected to formal criticism chiefly by R. Haym § and J. H. von Kirchmann, || but a work that has drawn so much attention, while itself so vulnerable, could not fail to call forth a multitude of polemical writings, not always conceived in the style of grave scientific discussion. On the whole however the literature evoked by Hartmann's work has been friendly, especially when account is taken of those productions that have not been merely critical but have sought to bring forward independent metaphysical views. It is impossible here to give even a list of those

* *Die naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Leipzig, 1876.

† *Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkte der Physiologie und Descendenztheorie*, Berlin, 1872.

‡ *Neukantianismus, Schopenhauerianismus und Hegelianismus*, 2te erweit. Aufl. der *Erläuterungen zur Metaphysik des Unbewussten*, Berlin, 1877. Cf. the publisher's advertisement of this work.

§ *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Bd. 31; the critique is also published separately, Berlin, 1873.

|| *Ueber das Princip des Realismus*, Berlin, 1875.

that have found a considerable circle of readers. I must be content to indicate the chief streams of thought in relation with the Philosophy of the Unconscious. They are, I think, three: the first accepting Hartmann's main ideas without modification; the second seeking to combine the Philosophy of the Unconscious with other speculative elements, especially with Hegel; and a third which gratefully recognises Hartmann's affinity with Schopenhauer, but labours to bring back the philosophy of the disciple to that of the master. Among the champions wholly devoted to Hartmann, A. Taubert* and C. du Prel† are the most prominent. Moritz Venetianer‡ has endeavoured to carry farther the panlogism in Hartmann's philosophy, besides engaging in a sharp polemic against Kant and Schopenhauer; and still more decidedly the attempt has been made by Johannes Volkelt§ to reconcile Hartmann's principle with Hegel's Philosophy. With these also may be ranked Ludwig Noiré|| who aims at combining Schopenhauer's philosophy with scientific monism and the doctrine of evolution. On the other hand Julius Bahnsen,¶ who has recently been reviewed at length by Hartmann himself, harks back to the position of Schopenhauer. The philosophy of Schopenhauer has still indeed numerous adherents, who give expression to their views in writings not always of a strictly philosophical character, while they accept as much as suits them from Hartmann or other pessimists. A prominent representative of this pessimistic strain in our literature is Prof. Friedrich Nietzsche of Basel, the successive parts of whose *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*** have drawn much notice. In the writings of Nietzsche and others of the same stamp, the pessimistic mood is combined in a very peculiar way with an enthusiastic devotion to certain ideas closely related to religious mysticism. Richard Wagner and his music are ardently worshipped by this sect of pessimists. The great composer himself was won over to Schopenhauer by the philosopher's profound views of the nature of music, and his enthusiastic admirers declare that the Will has been revealed as

* *Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner*, Berlin, 1873.

† *Der gesunde Menschenverstand vor den Problemen der Wissenschaft*, Berlin, 1872.

‡ *Der Allgeist: Grundzüge des Panpsychismus im Anschluss an die Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Berlin, 1877.

§ *Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus*, Berlin, 1873.

|| *Der monistische Gedanke. Eine Concordanz der Philosophie Schopenhauers, Darwins, E. Mayers und L. Geigers*, Leipzig, 1875.

¶ *Beiträge zur Characterologie*, 2 Bde., Leipzig, 1867. *Zur Philosophie der Geschichte*, Berlin, 1872.

** *Zweites bis viertes Stück*, Leipzig, 1874-76—*Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie, Schopenhauer als Erzieher, Wagner in Bayreuth*,

cosmical principle in the *Nibelungen*. The most remarkable product of this revival of Schopenhauer's philosophy is the *Philosophie der Erlösung* by P. H. Mainländer (probably a pseudonym), published at Berlin in 1876. A gloomy melancholy pervades this work, which shows clearly how short a step it is from Schopenhauer's Will-manifestations to a system of mystical emanation. God, it is here set forth, was the original Unity of the world, but he is so no longer, since the world broke up into a multiplicity of particular things. God willed that *nought* should be, but his essence prevented the immediate coming to pass of nothingness; the world meanwhile behaved to fall asunder into a multiplicity, whose separate entities are all clashing with one another as they struggle to arrive at the state of nothingness. It is not therefore the Will-to-live, as Schopenhauer said, that maintains the change of phenomena, but the Will-to-die, and this is coming ever nearer to its fulfilment, since in the mutual struggle of all things the sum total of force grows ever less. In the view of this author, the highest moral duty is that negation of existence which would cut short the unlimited continuance of individual life in the future by the cessation of all sexual connection.

With the mention of this book, which is only a somewhat exaggerated specimen of the sort of phantastic speculation, guided more by feeling and temperament than by scientific method, that is rife in our Non-Academic Philosophy, we may now turn to cast a glance on our Academic Philosophy.

II.

In the Academic Philosophy also, we have to distinguish a variety of movements, proceeding mostly from the schools formed by the philosophers of an earlier generation. Kant, Hegel, and Herbart are again the thinkers of greatest influence, but Schleiermacher, Krause, and Beneke have also their adherents. Schleiermacher's philosophy, especially since his death, has drawn no small amount of attention outside of as well as within the circle of the theologians. As men grew dissatisfied with the speculative method of Hegel, there were some who readily turned to a philosophy that mediated between Idealism and Realism by ascribing a properly objective reality to the subjective forms of intuition and thought. Schleiermacher's philosophical works were indeed too aphoristic in character to form the basis of a regular school, but his point of view has been adopted by H. Ritter, the historian of philosophy, and by Fr. Harms, as it has also found expression in the well-known logical treatise of Ueberweg. Krause, by reason of his works on the philosophy of law, is most in repute with jurists; Beneke's

following is mostly of practical educationists, attracted by his psychological and paedagogical writings. But besides the various sets of philosophical disciples, there has been for a considerable time a class of independent thinkers busily engaged in the task of working out a philosophy in harmony with the present state of scientific knowledge. Our best course will be to notice, first, the main currents of the School-philosophy departing from Hegel, Herbart, and Kant, and then some of these other philosophers with eclectic or independent systems.

Curiously enough, among all past systems the one that has the most rigid and compacted form, namely Hegel's, has at the present day the fewest thoroughgoing adherents. Wide as is the circle of thinkers who have come under the influence of Hegel, the venerable C. L. Michelet (who has just published the two first volumes of a system of philosophy*) is perhaps the one man in Germany who can still be called an orthodox Hegelian. The foremost representatives of the Hegelian school, when they have not, like Ludwig Feuerbach and David Strauss, taken up new positions, have turned by preference to the History of Philosophy. The chief historians of philosophy at the present day have proceeded from the school of Hegel. The comprehensive historic sense that distinguished Hegel himself remains the birthright of his school. Nevertheless it may be said that our historians of philosophy have done their work better according as they have cut themselves free from the formalism of the system. J. E. Erdmann has gradually emancipated himself in the course of his exposition of the History of Modern Philosophy. Kuno Fischer and Eduard Zeller took up from the first a more independent position. Fischer's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, now brought down to Schelling, with his complementary work, *Bacon und die Erfahrungsphilosophie*, and Zeller's *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, as well as his shorter *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz*, are models of historical exposition. The two historians however have a very different notion of their task. Kuno Fischer tries to think himself wholly into the spirit of his author, and then give a free reproduction of his doctrines. Zeller, on the other hand, endeavours to get to the bottom of his subject with a philologist's exactness, and to give his reader the truest possible picture of it.

It is hardly possible to conceive a greater intellectual difference than between Hegel and Herbart. Both indeed accept the fundamental position of ontological metaphysic—that experience must be constructed from speculative conceptions instead of these being wrought out with the aid of experience, but while in

* *Logik und Naturphilosophie*, Berlin, 1876-7.

Hegel we see the daring speculator transgressing all the bounds of knowledge, Herbart, burying himself in a laborious scrutiny of notions and exposing their inherent contradictions, seems as if he would hinder rather than further the solution of philosophical problems. The difference is again manifested in their schools. While the Hegelians have shown a power of comprehending the whole development of philosophical thought, the Herbartians have shown a total want of historical sense: not a single historian of philosophy of any importance has appeared in their ranks. On the other hand their strength has lain in Psychology, where the Hegelians have been weakest; for here again it can be said that the Herbartians have been better psychologists the more they have thrown off the trammels of Herbart's metaphysic. Thus Drobisch's *Empirische Psychologie*, just because it comes to the investigation of internal experience without metaphysical assumptions yet in the spirit of Herbart's rigid criticism, is still an excellent manual, though of course, as it appeared as far back as 1842, it does not represent the present state of the science. Two of the most important psychologists of our time also base, but with greater independence, upon Herbart: Hermann Lotze, whose *Medicinische Psychologie* was the forerunner of our present physiological psychology, while his *Mikrokosmos* has stimulated a wider circle of philosophical readers; and Theodor Waitz who, still more than by his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, achieved distinction by his *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*.* The lately deceased W. Volkmann adhered more closely to Herbart's point of view, and his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, in the second edition, which includes very full historical references, has become a most useful book. From Herbart also came the original impulse to those investigations, first designated as *Völkerpsychologie* by M. Lazarus, which are concerned about the psychological phenomena of human society, such as language, manners and customs, myths, &c. Lazarus himself, in his *Leben der Seele* (2d Ed., Vol. I., 1876), has published a series of brilliant essays dealing for the most part with this class of subjects. He has besides, in conjunction with H. Steinthal, founded an organ for such inquiries, the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which is already in its ninth volume and includes a great quantity of valuable matter. Steinthal, who takes the greater share in the management of the journal, is at the same its most active contributor, publishing in its pages most important researches in the psychology of language and in mythology. These contributions and his formal works, *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, *Ueber die Typen des Sprachbaus*, *Ueber die Manden-Negersprache*, with

* A second edition supervised by George Gerland, has just appeared.

his *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, mark Steinthal out as one of the foremost psychologists of the present time. In addition to Psychology, the Theory of Education has been much cultivated by the Herbartian school, and it numbers among its adherents many practical instructors. On the other hand, R. Zimmermann has made the solitary attempt to treat *Æsthetics* from the Herbartian point of view, and the importance of his work lies more in its historical information than in its doctrine.* Lotze, who followed Herbart (however independently) in psychology and metaphysic, severed himself wholly from the school in regard to the foundations of *Æsthetics*.† Yet even on this field it is not to be denied that the ideas of Herbart have had a stimulative influence, though outside the circle of his immediate adherents. If Fechner, in his *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (1876), makes it his chief object to determine by observation and experiment the simplest relations that are æsthetically pleasing or displeasing, his idea is one that may be traced back to Herbart's doctrine of elemental æsthetic relations, though it may have been excited in him more immediately by Adolf Zeising, who, in a series of works,‡ sought to prove the Golden Section to be the fundamental law of *Æsthetics*. Zeising himself cannot be said to have borrowed from Herbart, being one of those minds, not rare in our midst, who work out philosophical views of their own under the influence mainly of poetic or religious feeling and with little regard to logical system.

In the course of its development Philosophy has not seldom appeared to move backwards, and thus it happened, on the decline of Hegel's system and Herbart's metaphysic, that a return was made to the views of earlier philosophers. First of all there was an Aristotelian revival. The leader of this eclectic movement was Adolf Trendelenburg of Berlin, who both in the way of academic instruction and by his *Logische Untersuchungen* exercised a remarkable influence. As was to be expected at a time when original thinking had come to a standstill, Trendelenburg and his followers occupied themselves chiefly with philological criticism of philosophical works. The movement became of greater account for the development of scientific philosophy when more modern thinkers became the subject of study, and no subject could be equal to Kant, from whom had proceeded Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, as well as

* *Ästhetik*, 2 Bde., Wien, 1865. *Studien und Kritiken zur Philosophie und Ästhetik*, Wien, 1870.

† *Geschichte der Ästhetik*, München, 1868.

‡ *Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers*, Leipzig, 1864. *Ästhetische Forschungen*, Frankfurt, 1855.

Herbart and Schopenhauer, and in whom therefore all the different directions of later philosophy are implied. The Aristotelian philology thus passed into a "Kant-philology". The object first sought was to arrive again at a true understanding of the great thinker of Königsberg; but in this way there also gradually arose a "Kant-philosophy"—a Neo-Kantian school which adhered more or less closely to the Critical Philosophy and sought to develop it. "Back to Kant" was the war-cry in which many especially of the younger philosophers loudly joined. Otto Liebmann in his work *Kant und die Epigonen* (1865) was one of those who led the way; but the scholar who has done most for the interpretation of Kant is Professor Hermann Cohen of Marburg.* Cohen indeed is not free from the tendency, pervading the whole movement of Neo-Kantianism, to force the later developments of science by hook or by crook into the language of Kantian formulas; still it must be allowed that he often understands Kant's thoughts and can develop them more lucidly than Kant himself, whose expressions were not seldom so careless and obscure. It has been Cohen's great concern to overcome the apparent or real contradictions that are found in Kant, and his expositions will seem very cogent to those who are without firm convictions of their own, as unquestionably the skilfulness of his interpretations has much helped forward the spread of Neo-Kantianism. Nevertheless I cannot but think the whole movement, so long as its cry is "Back to Kant" not "Beyond Kant," an unhistoric one and destined to have no future, because not seeing the necessity of a continuous development. Orthodox Neo-Kantianism must inevitably lead to reactionary courses, as in the case of Jürgen Bona Meyer, who in his work on *Kant's Psychologie*, however meritorious it is from the historico-critical point of view, would fain rehabilitate the theory of mental faculties so happily expelled by Herbart, for no other reason than because Kant was entangled in it. Some of these Neo-Kantians have coined the word "Criticistic" to designate their aims in philosophy, and the distinction is most significant. Whoever would make a Criticistic Philosophy out of the Critical shows clearly that for him the Critical Philosophy has become dogma, and in becoming criticistic he ceases to be critical. No doubt, even within the orthodox Neo-Kantian school, there has been some attempt to carry farther the Kantian system by applying it to different regions of experience. Thus, quite lately, A. Krause has undertaken a development of the doctrine of the Categories, in trying to bring within them the most varied forms of perception and

* *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1871. *Die systematischen Begriffe in Kant's vorkritischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1873.

feeling;* and A. Classen has followed with an attempt to bring even the whole body of physiological optics within their frame.† The diligence and acuteness shown in these works are worthy of acknowledgment, but it is impossible not to feel that they are sadly wasted. For what at the best could come from such efforts except an artificial classification, instead of the explanation that is wanted?

Already however a counter-current has begun to set in against this Kantianism which has been running so strong. Even within the school the attempt to reconcile Kant's theory of cognition with the results of the later psychology and natural science has led to broad-minded interpretations and far-reaching concessions. For example, A. Stadler, who previously had tried to accommodate Kant's teleology to the present position of biological science,‡ has now in his latest work§ surrendered one of the main supports of the Kantian theory of knowledge—the deduction of the Categories from the forms of judgment, though he would still uphold their metaphysical validity. The disposition to freer criticism of the Critical Philosophy appears also in the publication of a number of works which, expressly leaving aside the question of the truth of the Kantian doctrines, are directed solely to the task of historically explaining their origin, as is done by Dr. Fr. Paulsen|| in regard to the theory of cognition, and by Fritz Schultze¶ and Konrad Dieterich** in regard to Kant's scientific writings. At the same time a number of our "Kant-philologists" have made a special study of various predecessors and contemporaries of the philosopher. Thus J. B. Meyer made the discovery that Tetens was the particular Wolfian from whom Kant borrowed his classification of the mental faculties.†† More recently B. Erdmann has given us a monograph on Kant's teacher, Martin Knutzen,‡‡ and J. H. Witte a sketch of the life and philosophical development of one

* *Die Gesetze des menschlichen Herzens wissenschaftlich dargestellt als die Formale Logik des reinen Gefühls*, Lahr, 1876.

† *Physiologie des Gesichtssinns*, Braunschweig, 1876.

‡ *Kant's Teleologie und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung*, Berlin, 1874.

§ *Die Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnistheorie in der Kantischen Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1876.

|| *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie*, Leipzig, 1875.

¶ *Kant und Darwin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entwicklungslehre*, Jena, 1875.

** *Kant und Newton*, Tübingen, 1877.

†† *Kant's Psychologie*, Berlin, 1870.

‡‡ *Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1876.

of the earliest of Kant's critics, the remarkable Jew, Salomon Maimon.* Some years earlier, E. Pfeleiderer made an elaborate exposition of Hume's philosophy, which had so great an influence on Kant's critical undertaking;† and here we reach the stage in our Kantian literature at which the cry "Beyond Kant" begins to rise above the other. In the last years a series of important books have appeared which, partly working upon Kant and partly amending his doctrines, aim at laying anew the foundations of the theory of cognition. Of these *Der philosophische Kriticismus* by A. Riehl‡ stands nearest to Kant, but the author takes the greatest pains to do justice also to later philosophers. C. Göring comes nearer to the point of view of Hume and Stuart Mill in his *System der kritischen Philosophie* (Bd. I. 1874, II. 1876) which might better perhaps be entitled *Kritik der philosophischen Systeme*, the second volume being devoted to Kant. The most trenchant critic of the Kantian philosophy is, however, Ernest Laas, who has very happily selected for special consideration that part of the *Kritik d. r. V.* which is of greatest importance both for the theory of knowledge in general and the various sciences in particular, namely, the section on "The Analogies of Experience"§

We are thus brought in the course of our review to the consideration of the various attempts to found a new philosophy, more or less independently of the past. Two directions can again be distinguished, an idealistic and a realistic. The *idealistic* is related chiefly to Kant and the Kantian movement we have now sketched. Albert Lange, one of the ablest representatives of this idealistic philosophy, acknowledges, in the second edition of his *Geschichte des Materialismus*, the influence that Cohen's interpretations of Kant had upon him. Lange does not think of standing by all the doctrines of Kant: he allows that the Transcendental Æsthetic needs to have a foundation laid in psychology, and the Analytic to be thoroughly overhauled in the light of the later results of the sciences. Still he is essentially at Kant's point of view, and holds that it is absolutely exclusive both of materialism and dogmatic metaphysic. At the same time he refuses for ethical reasons to be content with this negative result. We must erect an ideal world behind the world of phenomena, and regard it as the true reality of things. The metaphysic that does this is a

* Salomon Maimon, Berlin, 1876.

† *Empirismus und Skepsis in David Hume's Philosophie*, Berlin, 1874.

‡ *Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft*, Bd. I., Leipzig, 1876.

§ *Kant's Analogien der Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1876.]

dream ; its constructions are a deception ; but the deception is a necessity. Straining after the ideal, man has always felt the need of metaphysical invention, and for ever must feel it.* Metaphysic and poetry are thus to Lange closely allied, and amongst all past thinkers he feels himself drawn most to Schiller, who was at once Kantian and poet. Kant himself indeed would little relish such a view, having declared that poetry has as little to do with philosophy as with book-keeping. But, so far as Lange is concerned, we can understand how his view is connected with the predominant interest now taken in History of Philosophy. When Metaphysic is recognised only in the historic succession of past metaphysical systems, the metaphysic of the future inevitably becomes some such idealism as Lange's. The same thought in a somewhat different shape has been urged not less forcibly as the historic justification of Metaphysic by Dr. R. Avenarius in a small but weighty treatise,† where he maintains that every philosophical system tries to meet the requirement of comprehending the universe in the simplest possible manner.

The *realistic* movement in our academic philosophy connects itself much less closely than the idealistic movement with Kant, joining on rather to Locke and Hume or Auguste Comte (who has become known in Germany later than in England) in as far as it is not independent. J. H. von Kirchmann has set forth a realistic theory of knowledge‡ which reminds one of Czolbe's in ascribing objective existence to sensations, yet is otherwise far removed from sensualism, since it assumes original forms of thought co-operating with perception in the production of knowledge. Much nearer to sensualism and materialism stands Eugen Dühring's "Philosophy of Reality,"§ intended thus in its very name to be a counterblast to the Kantian doctrine of subjective forms. According to Dühring, space and time are forms of our sense-perception only because they are at the same time objectively real, and in like manner all such universal relations as causality have not only a conceptual but also a real existence. His criticism of certain ontological aberrations of thought in his *Natürliche Dialektik* (1865) is most excellent ; he shows in his

* An elaborate criticism of Lange's philosophical point of view, by M. Heinze, is to be found in No. II. of the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wiss. Philosophie* ; and a sympathetic comparison of his philosophy with that of Dühring and of Hartmann in Dr. Hans Vaihinger's *Hartmann, Dühring und Lange* (1876).

† *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses*, Leipzig, 1876.

‡ *Die Philosophie des Wissens*, Berlin, 1864.

§ *Cursus der Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1875.

works rare familiarity with the exact sciences ; and besides his philosophical writings he has published a very superior *Geschichte der Principien der Mechanik* (1873, 2nd ed., 1876), as also several sociological works, especially his *Cursus der National- und Socialökonomie* (1873). But whatever the extent of Dühring's performance, the majority of realistic thinkers hold that the time has by no means yet come for the construction of a definite philosophy ; and indeed this opinion is shared also by those idealists who look upon a development of Kant's doctrine as the immediate work of the future.

Thus from different sides it is coming to be more and more seen that for the present there can be no question of setting up comprehensive metaphysical systems which, like those that have just gone down, must seem to the next generation phantastic illusions rather than works of science. The recent foundation of a journal (edited by Dr. R. Avenarius) with the advancement of "Scientific Philosophy" for its aim, shows plainly that the time is past when philosophy can hope to live apart from the other sciences. We see accordingly, at the present time, all interest turned on those two departments of philosophy that are of most account for the building up of a universal science, namely, Psychology and the Theory of Cognition. As regards the former, we have already taken note of the works of the Herbartian school in anthropology and comparative psychology ; and now the new science of "Physiological Psychology" is busily concerned with the mental life of the individual. The Theory of Knowledge, besides being separately treated, is included in all the newest expositions of Logic, dominated as these no longer are by the old formalistic conception. The most remarkable of recent logical works are those of Lotze* and Sigwart,† to which should be added various memoirs by C. Prantl,‡ the able historian of the science, and Albert Lange's posthumous *Logische Studien* (1877). The philosophical movement in Germany presents everywhere the spectacle of preparation for a step to be taken forward. New weapons are being sought in the arsenal of experience and of the human mind wherewith to carry on the old struggle round the eternal problems of thought and existence.

W. WUNDT.

* *Logik: Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen*, Leipzig, 1874.

† *Logik*, Bd. I., Tübingen, 1873.

‡ *In Verhandlungen der kgl. bairischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*.

V.—THE LIFE OF JAMES MILL. (III. CONCLUSION).

In the previous paper (*MIND*, No. IV., p. 509), the end of the year 1808 was reached, and from this point we now make our start. One purposed omission, however, must first be supplied.

The numerous local traditions respecting his father's family are tinged with dissatisfaction, not to say censure, of James Mill's conduct towards his relatives. Many years ago I heard from a native of Montrose that he had allowed his only sister to sink into absolute poverty without rendering her any assistance. My recent inquiries have revealed a similar strain of disapproval. He is commonly styled "a hard unfeeling man". There is a confidently received tradition, that he was in vain applied to for a contribution to purchase a cow for his father in place of one that had died; another version putting his sister in place of his father. Fortunately, the letters to Mr. Barclay make us aware of the true state of his relations with his family, and are calculated to produce an impression considerably at variance with the popular view.

At the time of Mill's going to London (Feb., 1802) his family may be said to have been a wreck. His mother was dead. The precise date is unknown; but she listened to her son's sermon, formerly described, sitting not in a pew of her own but out of sight behind the stair. She had then a consumptive cough, and was in a state of great debility. The father had become paralysed, and was unfit for work. As if this was not enough, the only brother, William, who worked with his father, and should have been the stay of the house, was also disabled (said to be from some accident), and soon after died. The one active person was the sister, May, and she was not equal to the burdens thrown upon her. A journeyman, named William Greig, had worked with the father for some time, and on him devolved the carrying on of the business. Soon after James Mill went to London, Greig married May, and so became the head of the house, with its invalid charge.

The picture is not yet at its darkest. The old man was bankrupt. The explanation is casually furnished by his son, in a letter written long after. He had been asked on one occasion to give his name as a security, and in answer wrote as follows:—"You will not wonder that the risks of being security for others should appear to me terrible, when I tell you, as I think you must know already, that my own father ruined himself by that means and, instead of being (for his station) a man of opulence, lived and died a poor one; and that the horror of being liable to risks in this way was therefore one of the earliest and deepest

of my impressions." No farther light is gained as to the circumstances referred to; and the fact was entirely unknown to all my informants in the locality. Indeed, the surviving relations are not disposed to credit the circumstance.

This complicated situation of distress was what Mill had to deal with while he was commencing his career in London. Every one of his letters to Barclay contains some reference to the subject; and, indeed, most of them are written expressly on that account, although other matters are thrown in by the way. In the first communication, April 17 (the letter where he describes his journey and first impressions in London), there is a thankful acknowledgment of a letter from Barclay respecting the family, but no particulars stated, except in a postscript anxiously desiring another letter of information, in case his brother William should not be well enough to write. The next letter, June 2, implies that Barclay has written very fully about the family, and taken much pains with their affairs, and it is emphatic in thanks, while disclosing the depths of their misery: "By long distress they are less able to manage their affairs than I could wish, and their affairs are more difficult than they have been"; "I shall never forget the friendship of you and of a very few more"; "you understand their circumstances better than any other body"; "I shall look upon it as a very particular act of friendship, if you will pay them some attentions, and not let them be in want of anything, and whatever assistance they receive from you, I shall be most happy to repay". The third letter, three months later, states that he has not heard from the family in the interval, which he attributes to William's inability to write, and desires to hear again from Barclay soon, not, however, exclusively with regard to his own relations. The next letter is at an interval of five months, Feb. 11, 1803, and makes the first reference to his father's bankruptcy; Barclay being still his indefatigable deputy. The creditors are soon to be called together. Mill is impatient to hear that they have met, and announces his own intentions. "I want them to get fairly divided among them all that is to divide. Peter Laing, of course too, must get his share, for that for which I became security to him. And as to that particular at which you hinted in your last letter, I cannot but be obliged to you, for your desire to ease me of my burden, which I am not obliged to bear—but I am resolved to pay every farthing of debt which my father owes to every creature, with all the haste that I possibly can; and he and I both must try to live as moderately as possible, till that be accomplished. I wish you to let his creditors know that this is my intention." He then adverts to the arrangements of the household, and

gives us the truth in the story of the cow. Approving of Barclay's advice that his father and May should have the 'ben' house, and W. Greig and his sister the other (the marriage had not yet taken place), he thinks they will do better to part with the cow, which had hitherto been a part of the family *ménage*; milk, &c., they could get from Barclay's farm, and May would be able to turn her time to profitable work, probably in shoe-binding. The next allusion is to William's death; and the letter expresses pleasure at Barclay's information that he was "perfectly happy till his death, his spirits not sunk, nor had he lost hopes of recovery"; circumstances strongly suggestive of consumption. At an interval of three months we have another letter charged with troubles. William Greig, who has just become May's husband, has written to his brother-in-law complaining that he is not communicated with respecting the state of the family; he has further detailed some very unpleasant interference with him and his wife, on the part of the neighbours, who are indignant at their neglect of the old man. Mill is very much distressed at all this. He exculpates his sister from any cruelty to her father, but dilates upon her youth, her inexperience, and her being a spoiled child; on this last head, he had often remonstrated with her father, with the usual amount of thanks for his pains. He laments that he is thwarted in his attempts to make his father happy in his last years. At the same time, he strongly censures the neighbours for their interference, and trusts to Barclay to give him "a true and sensible account"; reiterating his thanks for the management of his father's affairs. In less than a month he writes again. He has received a satisfactory explanation of the disagreeable incident, and is well pleased with the advice given to his sister by Barclay and Barclay's mother. "She (May) has now, poor creature, but few friends about her, to whom she can look either for advice or for protection; and though her conduct has often vexed me, and still more the conduct of both her parents with regard to her, I cannot forget that now she is not in a very happy situation." He ends by desiring Barclay to ask his mother to give "some idea of what will be necessary in the year to maintain my father". Six weeks afterwards, we have a letter chiefly occupied with the settlement of his father's affairs. One of the creditors had been raising an action, on his own account, before the business could be wound up. He reiterates his "sincere and unalterable resolution" to pay off the whole of the debts, as he is able; but refuses to be bullied by any individual creditor, or to give a pledge as to time. He is at this date (Aug. 15, 1803), "oppressed with business". No further communication, till the new year. In the intervening months, his father's affairs had

been advanced towards a settlement through Barclay and Mr. Peters, who had both written to him. He is full of gratitude for their friendship. He returns to the point of his father's maintenance. William Greig declined to mention a sum although putting in strong terms the trouble of keeping him. Mill wished to give as much as any other creditable family would think reasonable. We are left to infer that an arrangement speedily followed this letter. There is no other till August, when he writes to clear up some misapprehensions about the payment of the money to Greig. He apologises for writing few letters, "from the necessity of writing so much every day, that I am glad to take a little rest when my necessary task is done". There is now a gap in the correspondence of nearly two years. On April 4, 1806, he writes from Rodney Street, seemingly with no other object than to get some personal news of his old friends. He had had, as usual, from Sir John Stuart, a pretty full history of the recent doings in the neighbourhood, but he wants other particulars still. The same frank enclosed a letter to Mr. Peters about his father. On the 7th Feb. following, there is a letter on another unpleasant incident in the bankruptcy. One creditor, Laing, a tanner in Brechin, had been harrassing his father, before he left Scotland, and he had stopped his mouth by a written promise to pay the debt as soon as he was able. Laing is now bankrupt, and has given up Mill's letter to a London creditor, who bases on it a sudden demand for £50. Mill writes for information, as the immediate payment of this sum will not a little distress him. The interval separating this from the only other letter that has been preserved is thirteen years. Before mentioning its purport, I may state what is known of the circumstances of his family in the meantime. His father appears to have died in 1808. His sister has given birth to three children, a daughter and two sons. All accounts represent her as extremely poor in the early years of her wedded life. Very strong expressions on this head were used in my hearing, by those that remembered her well. There was no good reason for such a state of things; and it is attributed to the want of business steadiness of her husband, who carried on the father's occupation. When her two sons were old enough to enter the shop, they, by their industry, redeemed the fortunes of the family, and strove, with ultimate success, to better their position. In October, 1820, when the eldest son was fifteen, and the second about nine, Mill writes once more to Barclay. A friend named M'Conachie had said that it was both his and Barclay's opinion, that "it would be a good thing for my sister and her family if they were enabled to open a little shop". He now asks what is the sum that it would be necessary for him to

advance; "much cannot be expected, both because my income is small, and because my own family is large"; "however, I am anxious to be of use to them according to my means". What was the result of this application, I cannot tell; but probably nothing came of it. Mill had now been a year in the India House, but his salary was as yet only £800, and we do not know what liabilities may have survived from previous years; he certainly would have been as good as his word. May's family remained in the cottage long after this date; she herself died in 1837, in the bed where she was born. Some time later, her sons went to Montrose, and set up business as drapers, which the elder (James) still carries on. Their father died in Montrose, at an advanced age.

These are the facts as given in Mill's own letters. I have now to add that there is in the minds of his sister's family a strong conviction that their mother was unjustly treated in consequence of the large sums spent by the father in the education of his eldest son; they hold that there was even some express stipulation whereby May was to be repaid her share of this money, which she never was. There is no collateral testimony bearing upon this point: and the statement being *ex parte*, I cannot give an opinion upon it. If the claim has no other foundation than the fact that Mill's parents expended much more money upon him than upon the other children, I suspect that neither in the higher nor in the lower ranks would usage support it. Moreover, as Mill cleared off his father's debts, he did much more than make up for all that had been done in bringing himself forward. He also took upon himself the exclusive burden of his father's declining years; and we see that he was ready to listen to any proposal for helping his sister. It is evident, too, that, from the moment of May's marriage, her husband took up a hostile position towards him, such as to repel whatever good offices he might be disposed to render to her family.

The only other matter that I will notice in this painful part of the biography is that among some members of the Barclay family there is a tone of disparagement for the want of gratitude on Mill's part for all the kindness he had received from them. The feeling has not been expressed to me by those that I have conversed with. I cannot learn that it is borne out by any facts; and it is belied by the existing correspondence. Two members of the family, who especially exerted themselves to procure information for me, were greatly moved in Mill's favour by perusing the letters after these had been put into my hands by their cousin, the daughter of Mill's correspondent.

Returning now to the main story, we resume at the year

1808, and shall have no convenient break for eleven years. The narrative cannot be conducted onwards year by year; at least until a number of subjects that overlap and entangle have been viewed as preliminary.

And first of Mill's connection with Bentham. There is no record of how or when this began, but it was not later than 1808. The wonder is that Mill was six years in London before obtaining the introduction. Most of the incidents of the friendship are given in Bowring's *Life of Bentham*, and the extant correspondence between the two has been inserted there. Unfortunately, the narrative of facts as far as Mill is concerned is not always correct. In one place Bentham is reported as saying that Mill's family lived with him (in the country) half of every year from 1808 to 1817 inclusive; while, in a letter to Rammohun Roy, he says that for the half of each of five years "he and his family have been my guests". Neither is the exact truth. About 1807, Bentham had for his summer residence Barrow Green House, Oxted, in the Surrey hills. Here, by John Mill's account, his father and family must have spent parts of several summers; but probably no one whole summer. In 1859, this house became the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Grote, and I remember meeting John Mill there, and hearing his early recollections of the place and neighbourhood and of Bentham's walks and habits. In 1814, Bentham rented the still more magnificent residence, Ford Abbey in Devonshire, and there the Mill family lived with him in the four consecutive years from 1814 to 1817. Bentham was exceedingly attached to this residence, and gave it up with great reluctance. I find from his and from Mill's letters, that they left London in early spring, and did not return till after the new year, so that in point of fact their stay each year must have lasted nine or ten months.

The questionable part of the allusions to Mill in the *Life of Bentham* is contained in two passages (*Bentham's Works*, X. pp. 450, 482) professing to quote remarks made by Bentham in conversation. So inaccurate seemed the statement of facts, and so unfair the estimate of Mill's character, that, on the occasion of the passages being quoted in the *Edinburgh Review*, they were controverted by John Mill, in a letter to the Editor, published in the number for October, 1843. From that letter it would appear that the visits to Barrow Green were comparatively short; for although spread over several years they are said not to have exceeded six months in all.

Bentham was insatiable for Mill's company, and did everything he could to secure it. From the house at Pentonville, Mill frequently walked down to dine at Queen's Square, a

distance of nearly four miles. In 1810, Bentham gave Mill for a residence Milton's house, of which he was proprietor, and which was close to his own. Mill's family lived there a few months, but it was found unhealthy especially for Mrs. Mill, and it had, unfortunately, to be given up. To make matters worse, Mill seemed unable to find a house to his liking nearer than Newington Green, a mile and half farther off than Rodney street. It was the house, No. 45; and next to it is one much larger, 43, where lived the grandfather of Mr. Taylor, the first husband of Mrs. J. S. Mill. The family stayed here four years; John Mill's recollections of this period are given in the *Autobiography*. Mill still trudged down at short intervals to dine with Bentham. There is a tradition in the family that during the panic of the Williams murders (Dec., 1811) Mrs. Mill used to sit trembling for his return from Bentham's late in the evening. At last, in 1814, Bentham succeeded in obtaining Mill as a neighbour. He leased the house, No. 1 Queen's Square, now 40 Queen Anne's Gate, and let it to Mill (it is said) at the rent he had been paying for his previous houses, between £50 and £60 a year. It is a large commodious house, worth nearly double that money, and gave good accommodation to the growing family for sixteen years. It is, in fact, the residence principally identified with Mill's London career. It was in the same year that Bentham entered upon Ford Abbey.

The intimate and amicable relations with Bentham, and their intellectual communion, are already in print. Mill took a great deal from Bentham, and expended much of his strength in expounding Bentham's views; in which respect he was the foremost of Bentham's disciples. Latterly, when Bentham found many other associates, and some flatterers, he was less dependent on Mill, and allowed himself to use the expressions that John Mill commented on. Not unfrequently he spoke of Mill as 'cold,' 'selfish,' and 'ungrateful'. Even in the height of their familiarity, there is a curious letter written in 1814 under Bentham's roof in Ford Abbey (*Works*, Vol. X., p. 481), which deliberately assumes that they were too much together, and proposes that in future they should see less of each other, and in particular, that he should not come another season to Ford Abbey. The occasion of the letter was that Bentham was offended, because Mill had remitted walking with him for a short time; Joseph Hume having been on a visit and having given Mill the benefit of his horses to see the more distant country. The difference must have been patched up by Bentham's coming round, for no interruption of intercourse actually followed. At a much later time, an incident occurred that pained Mill, and operated somewhat towards their estrange-

ment. He had the full range of Bentham's library, and made free use of the privilege. One morning, he being absent at his official work in the India House, Bentham, without warning, sent across and removed all his own books from Mill's shelves. That Mill, on his return, should feel indignant, we do not wonder.

About the same time that he knew Bentham, he became acquainted with Ricardo; their friendship is amply stated in the *Autobiography*. On his death, Mill wrote an eulogy upon him in the *Morning Chronicle*; this, John Mill said to me, was the only newspaper article his father ever wrote; so completely was his early newspaper editorship discounted.

One other friendship must be mentioned. Probably it was through Bentham that Mill became acquainted with General Miranda, a native of Venezuela, who spent his life in endeavouring to emancipate his native province from Spanish rule. He had an eventful and chequered career; and at various times resided in England, being well received by the highest political personages. He was an admirer of Bentham, and was to have introduced into his own country a Benthamic code. His last residence in England seems to have included the years 1808, 1809, and 1810; he left for good on his last revolutionary attempt, in October, 1810. By an act of basest treachery, he was delivered, in 1812, into the hands of the Spanish Government, conveyed in chains to Madrid, and there immured under the Inquisition, till his death in 1816. In the last years of his stay in London, he was a frequent visitor to Mill. There has been preserved a record of one of his visits to Mill's house at Pentonville, on the 16th May, 1810. On that occasion he told an anecdote of Pitt so curious that Mill jotted it down at the time, and it remains among his papers.*

There is reason for supposing that his views on Religion took their final shape between 1808 and 1810. What little I am able to add to John Mill's explanations on this point (*Autobiography*, p. 38) I will state here. When he left Scotland, he was undoubtedly a believer in Christianity, although attached more to the 'moderate' than to the 'evangelical' school. His attitude to religion, during the years of the *Literary Journal*, we have already seen; he might then be on the way to scepticism, but he had not reached the goal. His mental history from 1806

* Count Woronzow, the Russian Ambassador in England, frequently complained to General Miranda of the vagueness and uncertainty of Mr. Pitt's communications. He said that, after a three hours' conversation, expressly carried on for the purpose of ascertaining the most important points, he had found himself totally at a loss to write to his Court to say what had been the result of the conversation.

to 1808 cannot be indicated. That his acquaintance with Bentham would have hastened his course towards infidelity, it is impossible to doubt. Bentham never in so many words publicly avowed himself an atheist, but he was so in substance. His destructive criticisms of religious doctrine, in the *Church of England Catechism reviewed*, and still more his anonymous book on *Natural Religion*, left no residue that could be of any value. As a legislator, he had to allow a place for Religion, but he made use of the Deity, as Napoleon wished to make use of the Pope, for sanctioning whatever he himself chose in the name of Utility, to prescribe. John Austin followed on the same tack; but the course was too disingenuous to suit either of the Mills. It is quite certain, however, that the whole tone of conversation in Bentham's more select circle was atheistic. In Mill's own family, there is a vague tradition that his breaking with the church and religion followed his introduction to Bentham. Strange to say, the most authentic fact that I have been able to procure, is that the instrument of his final transformation was General Miranda. Unfortunately, we have nothing but the bare fact; it was stated by himself to Walter Coulson, one of his intimate friends of later years, but the circumstances have been withheld. Neither Bentham nor Miranda, nor any one else, would have made him a sceptic, except by the force of reason; but they may have set his mind to work to sift the question more completely than he had ever done before. Miranda's biography gives us no assistance on this point; his patriotic struggles are described, but his phases of faith are not touched upon except in the incident of his ignominious burial by the Spanish priests. We can fall back upon the observation, often made, and repeated by Mill himself in his notes on Villers, that when a man threw off Catholicism, he had no available standing ground between that and atheism. Hence, the free-thinkers in Catholic countries have usually been atheists. Mill says, "the two most celebrated infidels we have had in this country, Hume and Gibbon, had spent a great part of their youth in France, and were intoxicated with the vanity of imitating Frenchmen".

If we knew less of the facts, we might easily suppose that a mind of Mill's cast, finding in the Edinburgh book-shops Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, would have been carried away by the style of reasoning there employed, and have taken in the seeds of his ultimate scepticism. But Mill, like his countrymen generally, was proof against Hume; and possibly had not read the book, or if he did, it would be for giving a refutation in his Latin discourse before the Presbytery.

John Mill tells us that his father's greatest difficulty in regard to Religion was the moral one; but he partly admits, and should have been still more express on the point, that, in the end, the whole question becomes intellectual. If there be a difficulty felt in reconciling the moral character of the Deity with human misery, ways of meeting it are pointed out; and, the process at last consists in weighing and balancing opposites, which is eminently an intellectual function.

For some time after his marriage, Mill himself went to church; and the children were all baptised there. The minister that baptised the eldest was Dr. Grant, probably rector of the parish, who used to dine at the house, and meet General Miranda. John as a little boy went to church; his maiden aunt remembered taking him, and hearing him say in his enthusiastic way that "that the two greatest books were Homer and the Bible". As regards father and son, the church-going did not last; but the other members of the family continued the practice.

Negation, pure and simple, *sans phrases*, as Mill held it, was a rare thing in the cultivated society of the time in England. It was more frequent a few years earlier; but the beginning of the century, says Godwin, witnessed a change of feeling on religion. Mill's doctrinal views were very strong meat even to the most liberal of the young men that became his disciples. I knew one distinguished man, who had been well accustomed to deism, but was considerably distressed on hearing Mill declare that we could know nothing whatever of the origin of the world.

On the subject of Christianity, Mill used in conversation to say that the history of the first centuries needed to be wholly rewritten: and I am not sure that he did not at one time think of doing this himself.

I must now advert to another connection that Mill kept up during the years that follow 1808. In the *Life of Macaulay*, Mr. Trevelyan adverts to the great services rendered to this country and to mankind by the Clapham brotherhood, which comprised Wilberforce, Zachary Macaulay, Babington, Thornton, and others. He remarks, that in their mode of carrying out their anti-slavery and other philanthropic enterprises, "they can be regarded as nothing short of the pioneers and fuglemen of that system of popular agitation which forms a leading feature in our external history during the past half-century". The services of these men are, indeed, great and undeniable. But justice demands an equal reference to another sect, and another set of names, who were in active co-operation with the Claphamites, and not inferior to them in self-sacrificing zeal—I mean the Society of Friends, whose foremost representative for a long time was

William Allen, the chemist of Plough Court. Rivalling Wilberforce in the intensity of his subjective piety, he was inferior to none in energy and devotion to every good work; and, besides being a philanthropist, he was very considerable as a man of science. Allen became acquainted with Mill, not later than 1810, and secured his active co-operation in a literary enterprise, a quarterly journal, called the *Philanthropist*, published for seven years at Allen's own risk. He also secured the advice and support of Mill in public gatherings for agitating his various schemes; and in fact, Mill was one of the philanthropic band of the time, and knew many of them intimately, and, among others, Zachary Macaulay. Allen was worthy of a biography; but the three volumes devoted to him, although bodying forth his piety, his energy, and his science, by the help of diaries and letters, are exceedingly out of proportion to the facts of his life. The *Philanthropist* was projected in the summer of 1810, and one page and a quarter are devoted to it. Again, in 1812, while it was going on, it receives mention in less than three lines; and in all the three volumes, I have not discovered another reference. Mill is mentioned only twice; once he and Ricardo accompany Allen (May 1811) to a meeting at the Freemason's Tavern, for a subscription to Lancaster; and, again (November 1813) he and Fox are taken to a Finance Committee on the Lancasterian School business. Now, although the *Philanthropist* was only an instrument of propagandism for the numerous schemes that Allen worked at, it occupied a very large share of his attention for seven years; and while he had many contributors, Mill and himself were the mainstay of the work: they were in constant communication, and many of his letters to Mill are preserved. The deep-seated divergence of their opinions on religion never interfered with their mutual esteem. Robert Owen's infidelity was a grief to Allen, and he made some vain attempts to combat it; but Mill's views were never obtruded in an unsuitable place. Different was the impression he made on Wilberforce, who, according to Sir James Stephen, was the most charitable of judges. (*Life of W.*, Vol. V., p. 315.)

Another intimacy of Mill's may be touched upon in advance, namely, with Brougham. That the two were acquainted in Edinburgh is highly probable; and from 1808, to the end of Mill's life, the intimacy was kept up. A number of Brougham's hasty notes to Mill happen to be preserved; pressing invitations to dine or to meet somewhere about some public matter, whether in parliament or in the schemes of the day. The younger Mill, from a very early date, conceived a repugnance to Brougham; and used to say that his father was carried away by Brougham's fascination of manner, in spite of

the numerous defects of his character. On one occasion, however, when Brougham, in his Chancellor days, gave public utterance to a panegyric upon the Christian religion, declaring that he had examined its evidences, and found them satisfactory, Mill vented his astonishment and indignation in two pages of foolscap. He says nothing of his private means of judging of Brougham's opinions, or want of opinions, but places him in a series of alternative positions:—either he had examined the evidences, or he had not; if he had, and was satisfied, his judgment in regard to evidences was so worthless, that no weight could be given to any opinion he might hold upon any subject, &c., &c.

In the *Philanthropist*, Mill was not only the leading contributor, but in part editor; yet though the letters show that Allen accounted to him at the rate of sixteen pounds a sheet for articles, I do not discover any traces of his being paid for editorial trouble.

Of his various writings from 1808 to 1819, over and above the *History of India*, our knowledge is limited to the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Philanthropist*, and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, to which last, however, his contributions did not begin till 1815. As regards the *Edinburgh*, we have a good many of Jeffrey's letters, and can see from them that he was a steady contributor, and always on the outlook for subjects that might prove acceptable.

After these preparatory surveys, I will now give, in the form of annals, the known facts of the eleven years.

For 1808, we have nothing special to record but the publication of an article in the *Edinburgh Review* (October) on Money and Exchange. The author reviewed is Thomas Smith, Mill following up his pamphlet on Spence of the year before, and evidently full of the subject, which was a pressing one at the time. He laments the prevailing ignorance of the doctrines of political economy, and quotes as evidence thereof—"the late Orders in Council, respecting the trade of neutrals; the popularity of Mr. Spence's doctrine in regard to commerce; our laws concerning the corn trade; a great part of our laws, in fact, respecting trade in general; the speeches which are commonly delivered, the books which are often published, and the conversations which are constantly held". The last third of the article is on the Bank of England question, and controverts Henry Thornton's doctrines, then much in vogue.

1809. In the January number of the *Edinburgh*, appeared a very full article on the Emancipation of Spanish America (35 pages). It recounts the entire public career of General Mir-

anda, and was no doubt inspired by him. A second article on the same subject is contained in the July number, where Miranda's 'coaching' is still more apparent; Mill could not of himself quote authorities in the Spanish language. The situation of Spanish South America was one of no little complication; it was in revolt against Spain, while we were assisting Spain at home. The fate of the mother country had first to be decided, either for independence or for subjection to Bonaparte. Under the first supposition, Mill enumerates five alternatives, under the second, three; the one most advantageous to this country, would be for us, having secured the independence of Spain, to secure next the independence of the colonies.

For this year, there is a great deal of interesting incident in the Memoirs of Bentham. First is a letter (July 25) on what was an anxious subject in the small Bentham circle, the publication of Bentham's *Elements of Packing*. Romilly had declared that a prosecution of both author and printer would be inevitable. Mill is anxious for publication, and urges Baldwin to undertake it; it was printed, but not sold for many years.

In the October number of the Review appeared one of Mill's important articles, a review of Bexon's *Code de la Législation Pénale*. The work itself he disposes of, as vague, confused, and vacillating, and substitutes a short abstract of his own doctrines instead; but does not go far into detail. A considerable stir followed the publication of the article, and the irritant was a sentence on Bentham, as being "the only author who has attempted this most difficult and most important analysis; and imperfect as his success has necessarily been, we have no hesitation in saying he has done more to elucidate the true grounds of legislative interference than all the jurists who had gone before him". On the Review coming out, Mill writes to Bentham—"Bexon sadly mangled. The mention of you struck out in all but one place, and there my words, every one of them, removed, and those of Jeffrey put in their place". Another long letter follows (X. p. 453), showing how entirely different had been his original; and saying, that he had fully in his eye Jeffrey's aversion to praise, especially of Bentham, and had, he thought, kept within limits, and so on. Brougham writes to Mill, calling "the praise of Bentham (as it remained) excessive, though perhaps less extravagant than in a passage in your first South America Article". This was the clue to the South American articles. The reference to Bentham is in the first, and is slightly stronger than the present one. This "Bexon" article is, so far as I know, the first of Mill's writings on Benthamic subjects; others are soon to follow.

1810. The year of Mill's abortive attempt to live in Milton's

house, and his migration to Newington Green. By this time, he had been at least three years engaged on India, and he would naturally endeavour to turn his researches to immediate account in the *Edinburgh*, Jeffrey permitting.

An article in April, 1810, is a slaying attack upon the Company's government, under the two heads—Commercial Monopoly, and Government. He first refutes all the pretences for granting the Company a monopoly of the trade; and next reviews in minute detail the vices of the Company's Government. The remedy for the mis-government is curious, and is only given as a hint:—"Instead of sending out a Governor-General, to be recalled in a few years, why should we not constitute one of our Royal Family, Emperor of Hindostan, with hereditary succession?"

There is an article in the August number on a Disturbance and Mutiny in the Madras Army, of which the style and the apportioning of merit and blame to those concerned are very much in his manner.

The August number contains an article on Religious Toleration, based on an anonymous French work bearing on the state of religious liberty in France. The article displays the author's usual energy on this question, and takes a wide scope, embracing among other things the Catholic disabilities.

In the November number, he has a paper of twenty-six pages, on the part of the Code Napoléon referring to Criminal Procedure. There is a full abstract given, and then a series of criticisms from the more advanced position attained through Bentham. The faults found with the Code are pretty numerous, and there is a sweeping remark as to the French way of doing things: "if an end can be attained by an easy but humble process, and by an operose but showy one, they are sure to prefer the latter."

In December, we find him corresponding with Brougham, on matters connected with the Admiralty. Brougham had been pressing the subject in Parliament, and Bentham is very much interested in it.

1811. There are two letters from Jeffrey, in January. The first expects an article, and wishes it before the 7th Feb.; it also encloses a bill for £100, a balance being still due. I do not know Jeffrey's scale of payment at this time, nor how many articles of the previous year (amounting to 95 pages, so far as I know them) it would cover; it is plain, however, that Mill did not press for his money. The second letter follows in two days; approves of a subject proposed by Mill, but urges him to be gentle, and something else that in Jeffrey's handwriting I cannot decipher. The two articles traceable for this year, are in

February and May. The February article is twenty pages in review of a French pamphlet *Sur la Souveraineté*, by M. J. Chas. The pamphlet is considered to be a manifesto authorised by Napoleon, as an apology for his despotism; and is handled accordingly. The pamphleteer carries the war into the enemy's country and attacks the British Constitution itself, the better to strengthen his case. This only exposes him the more to Mill's batteries.

There is a letter from Jeffrey in March, declining a proposal to write on the Nepaul Embassy; the subject already bespoken by some one that he could not refuse, albeit not auguring well of the execution. The letter then refers to a coming article on the Liberty of the Press, and gives advice—to make allowance for difference of times, to take a candid view of the dangers of calumny, &c., &c. The article is in the May number, twenty-five pages. Its strongest point is the exposure of the utter uncertainty of our law as to what is allowed, or what forbidden; it criticises very severely a saying of Burke's, "that the law would crush liberty, but juries save it". Mill follows Jeffrey's advice so far as to speak of the abuses of liberty; but the way of doing it is his own. "With regard to political subjects, the liberty of the press may be abused in two ways:—the one is, when good public measures, and good public men, are blamed; tho other is, when bad public measures, and bad public men, are praised. Of these two, *we should consider the last as infinitely the worst.*" Jeffrey referred him to the French Revolution. On this he says:—"It was not the abuse of a *free* press which was witnessed during the French Revolution; it was the abuse of an *enslaved* press."

It was in this year that the *Philanthropist* began. Allen is represented as planning it in the previous summer. The title is—"The Philanthropist; or Repository for hints and suggestions calculated to promote the Comfort and Happiness of man".

From the first volume, we have a sufficient idea of the drift of the work. There is an introduction by Allen, on the Duty and Pleasure of cultivating Benevolent Dispositions. The articles that follow are—On the most rational means of promoting Civilisation in Barbarous States; Some successful attempts to civilise the Hottentots; Account of a Society to promote the Civilisation of Africa, in connection with the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Two articles are decisively Mill's;—The Penal Law of England with respect to Capital Punishment, and as connected with the Transportation and Penitentiary Systems. A short article on Penitentiary Houses for Convicted Criminals, giving an account of Bentham's plan, is

also probably his; he was a thorough convert to the Benthamic "Panopticon". An article on the General Education of the Poor soon launches out into Lancaster's system, not exactly in Mill's manner, and gives notice that the subject would be followed up, which indeed it is. The writing on this matter soon waxes to a furnace heat. It was far more than a contest between the merits of two educational theorists—Bell and Lancaster. The remaining articles of the volume are—Penny Clubs for clothing Poor Children; Employment of Poor Women in winter; Refuge for the Destitute; Considerations on War; Sunday Schools.

A letter from Allen, on the 3rd of June, indicates the fervour on the Lancaster question. "We are much pleased with thy reply to the Bellites, it places the merits of the case upon strong grounds. We are now entrenched to the ears and shall fight with advantage—not with cannon balls, but with something far more powerful, when directed to those whose intellect has been cultivated: in such a warfare *even Quakers* will fight, and fight stoutly." I do not find anything in the numbers then published that answers to this outburst, although the matter in dispute had come up in several articles. What Allen must have been reading was part of the MS. of an article of fifty pages that appeared in January following.

For 1812, there are two short articles, in the *Edinburgh*, on Indian subjects, known through Jeffrey's letters that have been saved. One, in July, reviews Malcolm's *Sketch of the Political History of India*, and is chiefly on the constitutional question, as to the best form of government for India; no very distinct solution being advanced. The other, in November, attacks the Commercial Monopoly; and urges farther inquiry, by a Committee of Parliament, into the whole system of Indian policy. Jeffrey apologises for having made some retrenchments on this article.

In the *Philanthropist*, Vol. II., is the long article above mentioned on the Lancasterian dispute. The Church of England organs had been denouncing Lancaster: "it has even been broadly and unblushingly asserted, in a high church quarter,* that Mr. Lancaster, as being a Quaker, is *no Christian*". The cry "The Church is in danger!" had been raised. "Unfortunately," the article says, "the name of the Church has been converted into an engine of war against us. In the use which is thus made of it, we are in self-defence constrained to resist it." "While bishops and archbishops, and deans and rectors, and lords and gentlemen, looked on in apathy, this individual

* *Antijacobin Review*, Vol. XXIX. (Jan.-Apr., 1808), p. 292.

(Lancaster) performed two things: he first proved that the education of the poor might be rendered incredibly cheap; he next conceived the truly great and magnanimous idea of rousing by his own exertions a sufficient number of individuals in the nation to contribute the expense which the education of the whole body of the people would require.

While the Dr. Bells and the Dr. Marshes, the Bishop A's and the Bishop B's enjoyed their tranquillity and their ease, without an effort for the education of the poor, without a single school to which their exertions gave birth, Mr. Lancaster proved, &c., &c." Two main accusations had been brought against the system, and are dealt with in the article. First, "the teaching of the poor to read, and habituating them to read the Bible, without inculcating any particular creed, is the way to make them renounce Christianity". In reply, Mill at once puts his finger on the sore, pointing out with remorseless plainness that "the *not inculcating some religious creed* is the mainspring of this objection"; and he meets opponents with an argument that he justly regards "as perfectly conclusive and unanswerable". The second accusation is "that teaching children to read and write, without teaching them the Church of England creed, is the way to make them renounce the Church of England". No sooner has Mill stated this position of his enemies than he declares vigorously: "We believe that no sentence more condemnatory of the Church of England ever was pronounced, or can be pronounced, by her most declared enemies, than is thus pronounced by her professing votaries." He then proceeds to discuss the charge at considerable length, being careful to meet numerous minor arguments more or less closely connected with this principal accusation. Thus the larger part of the article deals with general objections; the remainder in specific replies. Dr. Herbert Marsh, afterwards Bishop Marsh, well known for his criticism of the Gospels, had just published a sermon attacking the Lancaster plans, and to this Mill replies with crushing effect. He then overhauls the *Quarterly* for "an elaborate and designing article against the Lancasterians".

Besides making this grand effort to fight the Church, Mill appears plainly, in the same volume, in two considerable Toleration articles, in which he had always the warmest sympathy from Allen.

A note from Brougham in July introduces a great friend of Indian questions, Mr. Bennet, son of Lord Tankerville, as having promised Mill the loan of his valuable journals and reports on India. In Bentham's Memoirs, there is a letter from Mill to Bentham, not specially important, and an account of his

unsuccessful endeavours to induce some publisher to bring out the *Rationale of Evidence*; the fear of prosecution for libel standing in the way. Mill called their hesitation "weakness"; but with no effect.

The only remaining scrap for this year is a letter from a warm friend of Mill's, the Rev. Dr. James Lindsay, an English Presbyterian minister, whose chapel was in Monkwell Street, in the east end of London.* He was a friend of Mill's next-door neighbour, old Mr. Taylor, and may thus have been introduced to Mill. They had many points of sympathy. The letter is of Dec. 4, and Lindsay is very excited over a trial just to come off, which we discover to be the trial of the Hunts for the libel on the Prince Regent. He has not been able to get accurate information about the names (of the jurymen?); but it grieves him to say that there is not a man among those in the eastern district that can be depended upon. Hunt has no chance except in the absence of special jurymen. The letter then passes to some point as to the signature of the Confession of Faith, which could not have arisen out of any part of the case between Leigh Hunt and the Prince Regent. Mill, apparently having forgotten the circumstances of his own signing the Confession, had desired information from Lindsay. Lindsay, however, had never signed it and could not tell what were the words, but he thought his friend Mr. Taylor might have a copy of the Confession.

1813. A note from Jeffrey, 5th Jan., declines a proposal for another Indian article; one was expected from Mackintosh, and it was well to change hands on so great a subject. An article on Lancaster is accepted, with the caution to adopt a conciliatory tone to the sceptical and misguided part of his opponents. The words "I shall be very glad to have your South Sea Speculators," indicates the opening of a new vein. The note is followed in

* All that I can trace of Dr. Lindsay is that he was minister of the Monkwell Street chapel from 1783 to 1821. He was a man of great liberality of mind both in politics and in religion. His only publication is a selection of his sermons, which the Evangelical critics of the day declared to be tinctured with Arianism. Several single sermons of his on special occasions were also published. His death was very sudden; to happened while he was at a meeting of the Ministers of the Three Denominations held for the purpose of opposing Brougham's Education Bill. Although he was a well known man, I do not find any obituary notice of him that gives detailed particulars of his life, and cannot tell where he came from. The *Congregational Magazine*, in a review of his sermons, speaks of him as accustomed for half a century to subjects admitting of mathematical demonstration; which made him suspicious and slow in his theological deductions. Bentham, in writing to Richard Carlile while in prison, quoted Lindsay as an instance of a theologian that strongly condemned such prosecutions as Carlile had suffered from.

two days with another. After apologising for retrenching the Indian article, Jeffrey asks "to hear for what other articles I am in your debt; for I have formed a magnanimous resolution to get fairly out of debt". He considers that this last number beats the *Quarterly* this time; and thanks Mill for remarks on the number, and invites his free criticism at all times. He then returns to the South Sea article, which "Brougham mentioned to me some time ago as engaging a share of your attention". He thinks that a very interesting article might be made, by bringing together all that has been made known of the South Sea Islands since Captain Cook. The letter finally hopes that Mill's health has been restored—probably from one of his periodic fits of gout, which frequently come up in the letters.

I cannot find that he ever wrote the South Sea article. In February appeared the account of the Lancasterian System of Education. The conciliatory tone is not very apparent. It is chiefly an attack upon the English Church for thwarting the education of the poor, with allusions to the progress effected by the Lancasterian schools: in fact very much a repetition of the great *Philanthropist* article. In July there is a short review of Malcolm's *Sketch of the Sikhs*. It is attested by a note from Jeffrey, but the handling of the religious creed of the Sikhs would be attestation enough; he is utterly impatient of calling any of the barbaric creeds "pure deism".

Strange to say, this is the last *Edinburgh Review* article that can be traced to Mill's hand.

In the volume of the *Philanthropist* (III.) for this year, there is an elaborate paper on the Formation of Character with a view to the improvement of mankind; which savours of his hand, but at present Psychology as a subject was in abeyance. A review of Owen's Schemes is probably his. An article on War is certainly not by an honest quaker. A long review of his friend Dr. Thomson's *Travels in Sweden* is sure to be his; and is continued into the next volume. Clarkson's *Memoirs of Penn* is reviewed in the first of three articles; Penn's views of toleration are quoted with strong approbation, and farther enforced by the writer.

A few interesting scraps for this year are presented. In autumn he is at Barrow Green. There is a pressing note from Allen, in September, about the Lancasterian Committee, for which he has secured the zeal of the two Royal Dukes—Kent and Sussex. In the end of October, Mill attends a meeting at Kensington, where the Dukes of Kent, Sussex, and Bedford were present.

On the 14th October, while still at Barrow Green with Benthams, Sir Samuel Romilly sends through Lady Romilly an

invitation to Bentham to visit him at Tanhurst, and to bring Mill, whom Romilly "has long wished to become acquainted with".

In December there is a letter from Dr. Lindsay replying to a solicitation on the part of Mill to use his influence with some East Indian proprietors in favour of Joseph Hume, then aspiring to become a Director. This seems to have been Hume's first object of ambition, on his return from India; and Mill would do everything to help his friend. Lindsay would like to see Hume appointed, but is reluctant to canvass. The letter also indicates that Lindsay had been got to work on the Lancaster Committee.

1814. The year of removal to Queen's Square. The fifth child, James, was born in his grandmother's house at Hackney, where the family stayed while the Queen's Square house was getting ready. This was the first year in Ford Abbey; the experiment of the long domestication with Bentham being, however, on the brink of failure. Bentham himself supplies a full account of Ford Abbey and its amusements (X. 479).

In the *Philanthropist*, Mill must have done a good deal. The second article on Penn is a long discussion of the evils of Unwritten Law. A review of Gilpin's *Lives of the Reformers* is Mill's without a doubt; the argument for toleration is in his strain. So is this sentence:—"All men are governed by motives, and motives arise out of interests; interests are the source from which all inferences from the actions of men of former times to the actions of those of the present may safely be drawn." An Appeal to the Allies and the English Nation, in behalf of Poland, has for its text the good of mankind as the purpose of government; "to behold a union of governments seriously concerning themselves with the happiness of the millions of human beings would be a new scene in the world!" The review of the Life of Penn is concluded in the strain of the previous articles. "How just and admirable are the ideas thus distinctly expressed—nothing in the acts of government, or in the acts of one man towards another, should have any regard to anything in religious opinions except their morality." A short article dictated by the conclusion of peace, is probably Mill's; it expounds the connection of war with barbaric passions, and urges the need of restraint upon the powers of a monarch. An article on Schools for All, opens up the theory of education as a preface to the report of a great meeting in Freemason's Hall. A Comparison of the Sixteenth Century with the Nineteenth, in regard to the Intellectual and Moral state of the public mind, is a review of the Memoirs of Sir James Melvil, and is shown to be Mill's by the terse and spirited remarks on human improvement.

1815. The volume of the *Philanthropist* for this year is wanting in the only copy that I have been able to procure access to, the one in the British Museum. Fortunately one of Allen's letters, the best of the set, reveals some interesting facts. A fragment of a letter from Allen, docketed March, contains the address "Ford Abbey," which shows a very early migration. The important letter of the year is also addressed to the country, date 18th September. The first allusion is to a terrific castigation by Mill of the mismanagement of the King's Bench Prison; the next, to the exhibition (not said who by) of the state of the colony at Sierra Leone. This article had "stirred up so much gall, that it would be delightful to some persons, if the authors could be made to pass through the gates of a prison". But, indeed, a year before, Brougham told Allen that he had been applied to, to say whether the magazine did not furnish grounds for a prosecution. Next Allen lays down very adroitly the maxim of prudence as to dealing with great abuses—to state the facts fully, and leave the reader to boil up of his own accord, and so forth. He then goes into the pecuniary position of the *Philanthropist*, and, with a view to making the magazine known, asks Mill to prepare a short and pithy advertisement, indicating what might be put in by way of detail. For the July number, the Sierra Leone article was to be specified. For the next number in October, the bill of fare to be—the Prisons article, an article on a flourishing religious community in America, called Harmony; an article on Wordsworth, forwarded by Clarkson from a Cambridge man (Wordsworth he thinks favourable to morality and virtue, though rather too sentimental); a notice of an attempt to civilise the North American Indians. Next is a request to know the state of the accounts between Mill and himself. Then follows an acknowledgement of a present of Bentham's new book (I suppose the *Chrestomathia*, the project of which he was now busy upon). Allen was on friendly intimacy with Bentham; but spoke of him with reservation:—"Before I can commit myself neck and crop in the concern, I must be assured that it contains nothing at variance with my religious feelings, and prejudices (if you please); but I feel with my dear friend the immense importance of imbuing the rising generation with right notions upon points in which the interest and happiness of every community is deeply concerned." Gratifying letters, also, had come respecting their schools in Paris (France now open). With all this budget, he has not got through half that he wished. Another scrap is full of anxiety for Mill's return to town for the Borough Road Committee; Allen has a new scheme of penny subscriptions among the poor themselves to assist their schools, and enable them to beat the "National with its £60,000".

A letter from Lindsay, on the 20th October, shows the party still at Ford Abbey (now nearly eight months). Lindsay has procured £200 for Brougham towards education. He rejoices that Brougham, whom he idolises, has taken up the law of libel, and the education of the poor. It would appear that Mill had informed him of their receiving at Ford Abbey the visit of a Bishop, on which Lindsay makes the appropriate jokes; wondering "whether you had the hardihood to put in a word occasionally for our guid auld kirk?"

To replace the (apparent) cessation of contributions to the *Edinburgh*, it was about this year that the well-known articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* may have begun. The publication of the edition extended from 1815 to 1824. Mill did his very best for these articles, and the seven entitled—Government, Jurisprudence, Liberty of the Press, Prisons and Prison Discipline, Colonies, Law of Nature, and Education—are classical and renowned. In addition, by assistance obtained in Messrs. Black's office, I have been enabled to identify four others—Banks for Saving, Beggar, Benefit Societies, and Economists. As it thus appears that he made a study of Savings Banks, we may attribute to him articles on the subject that came out in the *Philanthropist*. How far he was the contriver or chief promoter of this valuable institution, I am unable to say.

1816. On the 16th of "1st month," Allen writes anxiously, expecting Mill's return to London; he appears to have remained in Ford Abbey all the winter, which would be nearly a year on a stretch. Allen needs for his next number an article of a sheet on a pamphlet respecting the Registry of Slaves in the West Indies; the author is "Stephens," who gave up his seat in parliament because this was not made a government measure. There occurs in the first number an article with that heading. Again Allen urges upon Mill the settlement of the accounts.

A letter, dated January, is from Ricardo, and still addressed to Ford Abbey. It is but an end-fragment, and opens—"fill 8 pages in the Appendix, will that be too much"? John Mill tells us that it was through his father's urgency and encouragement that Ricardo brought out his great work on Political Economy; and to that work we must refer this request. A long letter in February, from that voluminous correspondent, Major Cartwright, is occupied with Westminster electioneering, on which Mill had always to be consulted.

Allen again, on the 3d of March (a fragment); Mill now in town. He asks Mill to a meeting with Wilberforce, about St. Domingo, and forwards a bundle of papers from Hayti. In a scrap of letter, dated June, this year, an Irish gentleman, Mr. Ensor, greatly attached to Mill, who sees much of him

when in London, and writes often from Ireland, seems to respond to Mill's Savings Bank hobby, as proposed by him for Ireland; the tone of the reply is grim incredulity. On the 20th September, there is a letter of Mill's own from Ford Abbey, to his old friend Dr. Thomson, who was at present unattached to any office, and was now for more than a year occupying rooms in Mill's house, by arrangement. He had just been married, and Mill writes a warm letter of congratulation, like a man that attached great value to the married state. From this letter it appears that Mill was now paying for his house, in rent and taxes, about 100 guineas a-year; which was full value. The only other item of interest is that John, now ten, had read that summer "with vast ardour" Thomson's *System of Chemistry*.

Turning to the volume of the *Philanthropist*, I find Savings Banks again; also the Registry of Slaves and St. Domingo—the response to Allen's bundle of papers. But for the indications of these subjects, I could not trace his hand in a marked way in this volume.

1817. This year, the *History of India* goes through the press. The *Philanthropist* is stopped, after the publication of two numbers. The first number is remarkable for a review of Dumont's edition of Bentham's *Treatise on Rewards and Punishments*. The article expounds and defends Bentham at some length, and is to be continued; but never was. In March, Allen sends notes of the Prison at Ghent, to be worked up by Mill into an article, which accordingly appears. In April, Allen writes to urge the publication of a paper on the Establishments for the Poor at Mannheim, and will "be glad to know how thou gets on with the Amsterdam article"; this also appears, headed *Charitable Institutions at Amsterdam*. The concluding article of the last number is on the Report of a Committee of the House of Commons on the Police of the Metropolis.

Thus, for six years and a half, Allen and Mill carried on a most energetic agitation in favour of a wide range of works of philanthropy and usefulness. They were at the same time, Allen especially, on all the Committees for putting their numerous schemes into operation. The extent of Mill's contributions may be judged from the fact, that at one settlement, Allen accounted to him for 8½ sheets.

The commencement of the printing of the *History* is marked by a letter, July 22, from the Secretary to the Post Office, Freeling, to Lord Auckland, conferring upon Mill the privilege of sending his proof-sheets through the Post Office free. I was not aware that such a privilege had ever been accorded. The letter shows that such applications were not always successful. Mill was at Ford Abbey the whole time of the printing.

Two letters to Dr. Thomson (Sept. 13 and Oct. 5) refer to his being appointed Professor of Chemistry in Glasgow. There are congratulations, and also regrets, at the breaking up of the Queen's Square connection, which seems to have been very harmonious; all the children lamented the departure. Both Mrs. Thomson and a maiden sister, Miss Colquhoun, were popular; and John had fulfilled a promise to write to Miss Colquhoun. No wonder, when his father styles her "dear Miss Colquhoun".

The letter intimates that the printing of the History would be finished in November. In point of fact, it was published about the new year. The family left Ford Abbey for the last time, in January. The correspondence shows that the residence there was as much as ten months in the third and fourth of the four years.

1818. Notwithstanding the cessation of the *Philanthropist*, Friend Allen is the first to salute the year. Opens (16th of 2d month) with a lament—"I have not heard a single line from thee since my return to England." Always doing business: Prison Discipline pressing now. *Inter alia*, "Owen has made a fool of himself". Hopes that the poor *Philanthropist* may be soon revived. To his great relief, Mill writes, and forthwith is pressed to dine at Plough Court—"a great deal to communicate".

A letter from Mill to Dr. Thomson on the 22d February, revives a forgotten episode of his life. In Hunt's *History of the Fourth Estate*, there is an anecdote to the effect, that Mill, from his singleness of devotion to the Philosophy of Mind, would have resigned his lucrative post in the India House, for the Moral Philosophy chair in Edinburgh; but was advised by his friends there that he had no chance. This anecdote is not discredited by the circumstance that his family knew nothing of the transaction; and it has a certain air of plausibility. The chair was vacated in 1820, when Mill had got his foot into the first step of the ladder of the India House (£800 a year, with the certainty of promotion). It was just possible, I should hardly say probable, that he would have surrendered his future for the chair. The present letter tells us the facts. His ever watchful friend, now the professor of chemistry in Glasgow, warned him of a vacancy in the Greek chair of that University, and set forth the temptations of the chair. Mill weighs the proposal on every side; is tempted by the emoluments and the rank; doubts his chances in a body made up of Tories, not that he is the servant of either aristocratic faction, but that, if Glasgow is like Edinburgh, both would conspire against him. As to influence, he could count upon his old friend Sir John Stuart, and Sir John's son-in-law, Sir W. Forbes. (The electors were the professors, but always under pressure from the gentry.) But now he

discloses to Thomson a secret, as yet to be kept very close. His History had not been out many weeks, and already some friends of his among the Indian Directors had views of getting him into the India Office. One thing more on the Glasgow chair: he fears he must sign the Confession of Faith—a thing he could not do, if signing meant a belief in the book.

The *History of India* was a great and speedy success. The appointment to the India House did not happen till next year. Nevertheless, his struggles may be considered as ended. It does not appear that he was entering on any new projects of work; the only thing on his table, so far as I know, was the series for the *Britannica*. From his tone in alluding to the *Edinburgh Review*, I should think he had given it up on principle. Probably, until the decision of the Indian appointment, he would not conceive any new literary plans.

It is now quite evident that John Mill overstated his father's exertions, wonderful as they were, in saying that he maintained his family by Review and Magazine writing, while himself their sole teacher, all the time of writing the History. I was very much staggered by this assertion, when I first heard it, many years ago, from John Mill in conversation. Two difficulties occurred to me at once, although I did not venture to press them. The one was the enormous quantity of his very compact writing that would be required to realise what was absolutely necessary. The still greater difficulty was to point to the articles. Ten or twelve considerable review articles a year for eleven years would be the least that would suffice; about three or four a year is, however, the utmost we can trace. Mill may have realised about £150 a year, but certainly not more, from his literary work, during those years: so that he must have had other ways of meeting his wants. The four years' residence at Ford Abbey, although more of Bentham's seeking than of his, must have been a great assistance. It appears, too, that his fast friend Sir John Stuart, who was always cognisant of Mill's circumstances, sent a silver cup to his god-son, with a present of £500 (according to family tradition). The cup has no date, but bears an inscription in terms of great respect for both father and son. It is said in the family that the money present was avowedly to send John to Cambridge, but the father set aside this proposal by the reply that John already knew more than he would get at Cambridge (somewhat of an *ignoratio elenchi*). I am fain to believe that the gift had in view Mill's own needs during the composition of the History. The sending of John to Cambridge was pressed upon his father some time after Sir John Stuart's death; and there may be a mixing up of different traditions in the story of

the cup. However this may be, I have heard from very good authority that Francis Place, who took charge of Mill's money affairs, made him advances while he was writing the History; these, of course, were all repaid; but Place would have cheerfully allowed the loan to lapse into a gift, had that been necessary.

It appears from two notes that have been preserved, that John Murray sought and obtained, through Ricardo, Mill's assistance in connection with some of his publications. The notes are civil and deferential in the extreme, and might have led to closer relations, had Mill been so disposed.

So rapid was the sale of the History, that in the beginning of 1819, "we are busy preparing for a second edition". It was in the early months of this year, that the canvass for the India House appointment was going on. There is luckily a letter to Thomson explaining the situation in the beginning of April. The letter touches first upon the History. Thomson had told him about the Edinburgh Reviewer, and he replies that he knows something of the spirit which reigns in that quarter. However, "the reputation of the book is higher than I had expected it to be for several years". He also accepts in good part some observations by Thomson as to his style. Then as to the India Office affair. There has occurred a vacancy in the Examiner's Office. He has been encouraged to apply, and his application is now before the Court of Directors. Several of them are his declared friends; and a good deal of influence of considerable weight has been made with others. The reputation of the History is even a strong recommendation. "You could do a great deal with Thornhill, and I could wish you to write both to him and to Col. Bosanquet, in as strong terms as your conscience will allow." Thornhill is a man to influence other votes. His friends in the Direction say to him—"Accept of anything, however small in the first instance; if once in, we shall be able to push you on".

Mill's friends spared no pains to secure this appointment; Hume and Ricardo made great exertions in the city. Mr. Grote remembered being asked by Ricardo (who had then recently introduced him to Mill) to use his influence with India proprietors. Both the Chairman (Pattison) and the Deputy Chairman were in his favour, solely on the ground of his ability and knowledge of India. There was of course a considerable mass of Tory opposition to be got over. I have heard that Canning, who was President of the India Board, took some part in the affair. One version of the story is that he was forward in urging the appointment; the other version is that he declared his approbation of it, on being appealed to by the Tory party in the Direction to oppose it.

It was on the 12th of May, 1819, that he was appointed "an Assistant to the Examiner of India Correspondence," salary £800. I give his subsequent steps of promotion. On the 10th April, 1821, he was appointed second Assistant to the Examiner, Edward Strachey being first Assistant; salary £1000. He was now fourth in the office. On the 9th April, 1823, he was put ahead of Strachey, and appointed Assistant Examiner, at £1200: he was now second. This rise made the vacancy that led to John's being taken in as a junior clerk. On the 1st Dec., 1830, he became Examiner, salary £1900. He was now chief. On the 17th Feb., 1836, his salary was fixed at £2000. This he enjoyed only four months.*

From the time of his entering the India House, till he became chief Examiner, in 1830, his occupation was the Revenue Department; which was, therefore, the only branch where he exercised direct control. It was his duty to draft all the despatches relating to that department. When he became Examiner, he superintended all the departments; he did not necessarily draft despatches in any one, but read those that were prepared by the Assistants.

John Mill speaks in general terms of the improvements introduced by his father into the Indian Administration, but unfortunately does not specify any precise heads. No one is now left that can speak of the details of his official career. There is no clue in the office to any of his despatches, except the presumption that from 1819 to 1830, he drafted those in the Revenue Department. One would like to have a specimen of his official style; this could have been easily supplied by his son, whose own despatches can all be identified.

Mill's immediate senior in the office, whose retirement placed him at the top, was William McCulloch, a Scotchman also, with whom Mill was on a very friendly footing. McCulloch's reputation as an administrator, is very high; his despatches

* John Stuart Mill was appointed junior clerk in the Examiner's Office, 21st May, 1823. The clerks in those days had no salary, but only a gratuity. For three years, Mill had £30 a year; at the end of that time, he received a salary of £100, with an annual rise of £10. It was, however, in 1828, that he was put over the heads of all the clerks, and made an Assistant, at £600 a year; being sixth in rank. In 1830, he stood fifth, his father being at the top. Early in 1836, he received a step, and, on his father's death, the same year, another; he was then third, but David Hill was made second over his head; Peacock was chief. His salary was now £1200 a year; to which in 1854, a special and personal addition was made of £200 a year. On 28th March, 1856, Peacock and Hill retiring together, he was made Examiner, salary £2000 a year. At Christmas, 1858, on the transfer of the Company's government to the crown, he retired on a pension of £1500 a year.

were regarded as perfect models, and by some held to be superior to Mill's.

One thing is certain, that Mill acquired a very great amount of influence and authority with the Court of Directors. It is doubted whether any one before or since obtained the same share of their confidence. It has been said that, Mill being dead when the Macaulay Commission brought over their new Code for India, the Directors could not trust their judgment so far as to put it in force.

In the Bentham Memoirs, there are scattered allusions as to what Mill might induce the Indian Government to do, in the way of Judicial Reforms; the subject was often mooted between Mill and Bentham. The wide influence that John Mill alludes to must have been apart from the routine of his office.

For the remaining seventeen years of Mill's life, the *Autobiography* is tolerably full, and is sure to be correct. The narrative of the connection with the *Westminster Review* is probably exhaustive. From a few remaining letters and indications, something may be added to bring out the lineaments of the picture.

For the year 1820, I have no traces except some notes from the irrepressible Brougham, then in the excitement of the Queen's trial. They only show his urgency in getting conversations with Mill, with or without special business.

In 1821, Allen writes, and wishes an interview, with a view to a new issue of the *Philanthropist*.

For June and July of this year, there are several letters from the Rev. William Mills, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, and Professor of Moral Philosophy, urging Mill to visit him at Oxford, in Commemoration week. Engagements prevented, but better things are hoped for next year. John had now come back from France, and was also pressingly invited.

In the end of the same year, there are two letters from Zachary Macaulay, with whom Mill had long been acquainted. The first of the two solicits his influence in some pending election, more especially with Townsend of Trinity, Cambridge, and Bickersteth. The other has a variety of topics. It first asks Mill to procure for him in the India House a document by the Court of Directors on the sugar trade of India. The next point is a desire for help for a friend to an intelligent Scotchman; and the conclusion is a warm eulogium on the *History of India*, with an exception to some economical doctrine. Mill pencils at the end of the letter, the name "Mr. Mudie," educated at Aberdeen, co-conductor of the *Dundee Advertiser*, &c.

It was in 1821 that he brought out the *Elements of Political Economy*.

The *Autobiography* tells us that 1822 was the year that Mill began to compose his *Analysis of the Human Mind*. He had taken a summer house at Dorking, where the family stayed six months in the year, he going down from Friday till Monday, and during his six weeks' holiday remaining there throughout. To the end of his life he kept up this arrangement, but for the last years his house was in the small rural village of Mickleham, on the Dorking road, not far from Leatherhead and Epsom. The *Analysis* cost him six of these holidays, being published in 1829.

For 1823, passing over Brougham's invitations as a thing of course, I come to two very interesting scraps from Professor Townsend of Cambridge, who had cultivated Mill's acquaintance with great assiduity, and is now bent upon procuring his consent to enter John at Trinity College. There is also an invitation to visit Cambridge, and see his theological library; it appears that Mill was then consulting certain theological works; Townsend had sent him Michaelis. I believe this was one of Mill's lasting friendships; his influence with Townsend has just been before us. The second letter (27th May) was too late for its purpose. On the 22nd, Mill had written to Thomson, intimating his promotion to be second in the office, next to McCulloch, at £1200 a year; and also that John had been appointed to the Examiner's Office: "He will be in the receipt of a larger income at an early age, than he would be in any profession, and as he still can keep his terms as a student of law, his way to the legal profession is not barred, if he should afterwards prefer it."

There is a letter of the 26th May from the indefatigable Major Cartwright, on the exciting topic of the Westminster electioneering, in which Mill was always one of the Radical leaders. They seemed to be at sea for a candidate; Bentham had suggested Ricardo; the major urges Mill to try if Sir Francis Burdett would take a leading part.

From a letter of Mill's own to Dr. Thomson, in December, we find that the second edition of the *History* was nearly sold, and the *Political Economy* volume all sold.

This was the year of the commencement of the *Westminster Review*.

For 1824, I have nothing new. The following year was marked by the starting of the London University (afterwards transformed into University College), in which Mill took a lead. The project of an Institution for unsectarian education was a very bold one, and certainly but for Mill and

and the people that he worked upon would never have been carried through. Mr. Grote often remarked that it was Mill's personal ascendancy with persons of means, and the trust they placed in his judgment, that more than anything else enabled the requisite funds to be raised. Brougham threw himself into it, and there are notes from him about meetings to consult on the progress of the scheme. Here is one :—"I wish you could look in on your way to the city, as I have a talk to hold with you, on our liberal ministers' having refused a charter as not daring to face Oxford bigotry, &c."

In 1826, the arrangements were so far advanced, that they began to look out for professors ; and, in October, Mill wrote to Dr. Thomson to accept the chemistry chair, supposing it could be made worth his while.

The appointment that gave the Council most trouble was to the Philosophy chair. Mill and his allies put forward a man of ability and liberality of mind, but his orthodoxy being doubtful, the Evangelical Dissenters took a hostile stand, and he could not be carried ; Brougham slunk away at the final push. Another candidate, a dissenting clergyman, conciliated Mill's support by professing to follow Hartley, and Mill took him up as a *pis aller*, and got him elected ; not without the opposition of Mr. Grote, who then, as afterwards, held strongly the incompatibility of clerical vows with the *libertas philosophandi*.

We know that by 1825 the *Encyclopædia* articles were all published. These articles are the final elaboration of all the subjects that he had been writing upon for periodicals during a number of years. He complained, however, in a letter to Constable, that they were hurriedly done at first ; and he revised them for the next edition. As short treatises on the several subjects, they were unmatched. The greatest notoriety came to attach to the one on government, from the Macaulay articles in the *Edinburgh Review*. In the *Autobiography*, John Mill enters into the merits of this controversy, and tells us that it was a turning point in his own views on Logic.

It is commonly represented that Macaulay owed his seat in Parliament to the attack on Mill. It appears from a passage in his *Life* that Lord Lansdowne "had been much struck by the articles". It is added, however, that Macaulay's "high moral and private character" had determined Lord Lansdowne to offer him the seat. Viewed from one side, the promotion has been regarded as a Whig tribute to his having vanquished obnoxious Radicalism. Notwithstanding, Lord Houghton, in the *Academy*, (April 29, 1876), gives another side of the affair. "His College intimacy with Charles Austin may not improbably have had something to do with this important change in his

destiny, for with Charles and John Austin, and Sarah the beautiful and accomplished translator of Ranke's *History*, Lord Lansdowne long held the most friendly relations". This brings the wheel completely round, for the Austins (including Sarah) were the closest of Mill's own friends.

That Mill warmly supported, with the Court of Directors, the appointment of Macaulay to India, and that Macaulay made handsome amends for his tone towards Mill, are facts that will always be quoted to their honour. Nevertheless, any one that reads the articles now will feel that there was a gain, rather than a loss, to Macaulay's reputation, in withholding them from his collected essays. The want of body in the political thinking leaves the mannerism of the style empty like buckram; and the personalities would tend, by lapse of time, to become more and more distasteful.

We have seen that Mill was a friend of Zachary Macaulay, and although the families did not come together, Mill's relationships were well known to the household. (*Life*, Vol. I., p. 186, 1st ed.) In the interval between the appointment to India and his setting out, Macaulay saw Mill at his house. John Mill remembered his father earnestly counselling him to keep to the line of an "honest politician".

The year 1830 was the culmination of Mill's prosperity. He is at the head of his office. He leaves the Queen Square house for a large villa in Church Street, Kensington, looking at that time across to the gardens. Here, in opulence and fame, he spends his last six years, varied by his summer retreat at Mickleham. His nine children were all about him, John, the eldest, being 24, and George, the youngest, 6. For twenty years the house had been a school, and it continued so while he lived. He was thoroughly habituated to the state of things, and lesson-hearing was a part of his daily work. True, he devolved upon John and the elder children the teaching of the younger, but he always took some part, and never lost interest in the work. After John, the next elder children seem to have disappointed him, and he never looked upon them with any complacency. James, the second son, was destined for the India Service abroad; he was an assiduous student, and appears to have given his father tolerable satisfaction; but there was nothing in his career to show that he had much intellectual gift. The next brother, Henry, was everybody's favourite; I have heard Mrs. Grote describe him as a "heavenly boy". Personal beauty and charms, great faculty not merely for study but for anything that he had to do, unselfishness in the extreme, were the traits that made his popularity. He died of consumption, in his 20th

year; aware that overstrain had crushed him. John watched his deathbed at Falmouth, and, in writing of the event, styled him "the noblest and worthiest of us all". The youngest son, George, I knew personally; he too possessed the family talent, but gave way to the same malady. It is apparent enough that while the father's fine quality of brain was not wanting in the children, John was single in possessing the physical endurance that was needed for maturing a first-class intellect.

The *Autobiography* expresses with sufficient frankness the defective side of Mill's demeanour to his children. Such a phrase as "the most impatient of men" speaks a volume, and we have only to turn the leaves to realise the particulars. He could exercise perfect self-control in his intercourse with the world, and his social and commanding qualities gained and kept friends, but at home he did not care to restrain the irritability of his temperament. In his advancing years, as often happens, he courted the affection of the younger children, but their love to him was never wholly unmingled with fear; for, even in his most amiable moods, he was not to be trifled with. His entering the room where the family was assembled, was observed by strangers to operate as an immediate damper. This was not the worst. The one really disagreeable trait in Mill's character, and the thing that has left the most painful memories, was the way that he allowed himself to speak and behave to his wife and children before visitors. When we read his letters to friends, we see him acting the family man with the utmost propriety, putting forward his wife and children into their due place; but he seemed unable to observe this part in daily intercourse.

I add a few remarks on his friends and associates during the later part of his life. Both at his house in Kensington, and at Mickleham in summer, he had a constant flow of select visitors. Hume, his schoolfellow, was never long absent. Brougham, even in his Chancellor days, would make a dash down to Mickleham on a Sunday. Neil Arnott was very congenial to him, and shared his confidence. Mr. and Mrs. Grote's society was always cherished. Cameron, who went to India as a colleague of Macaulay, was a visitor. He had as a neighbour at Mickleham, for some time, Sharp, well known as 'Conversation-Sharp'. Their walks and talks were frequent. John Mill, who had so many chances of hearing good conversation, considered himself as peculiarly favoured in accompanying his father and Sharp in their walks. Henry Bickersteth, who became Lord Langdale and Master of the Rolls, was attached to Mill in no ordinary degree. Besides being a frequent visitor, he used to take a

summer-house near Mickleham. The reader of the two volumes of his Biography, when informed of his being offered the Mastership of the Rolls, is startled to find that Mill, whose name had not occurred previously, is the man whose judgment he sought before he could bring himself to accept. On the other hand, Bickersteth was Mill's counsel in the composition and style of his last work, the *Fragment on Mackintosh*, and induced him to make many alterations in the way of softening its tone. Mr. Strutt (Lord Belper) and John Romilly were friends from a very early date, and were among the Mickleham visitors. Walter Coulson was his frequent Sunday companion in London. Mr. Roebuck was a very early friend both of father and son. Charles Buller and Molesworth used frequently to visit him together; Molesworth struck him greatly both for ability and for having the courage of his opinions. Mr. Charles Villiers was one of the band of youthful listeners. Of the Austins, and some others, ample mention is made by John Mill.

The Sunday walk was a regular institution of his life; his walks on other days were necessarily limited. He had cultivated the power of prolonged walking as necessary to his health, and John and the rest of the children were habituated in like manner. The Sunday excursions were often very long indeed; and some even of the younger men spoke afterwards of their fatigue as passing endurance.

From early years, Mill had been a sufferer from gout, and was subject to periodical fits. In advanced life, this turned to disease of the chest. For two or three years before his death, he had a winter cough; it was in the autumn of 1835 that he became seriously ill; all that winter he had to be at home, his strength steadily failing, but not his mind. His son James had gone to India, and he proposed to write him a monthly letter. The first was in March, 1836, and would be very interesting as a domestic picture if I had room for it. A month passed, and he wished to keep to his engagement. He wrote the following sentences, which may be given as being his last composition. "I would not let this opportunity pass without saying a word to you. But as the rest, I suppose, have told you all the incidents, and I am worn out writing to the Governor-General and Macaulay and Cameron, I shall reserve my contribution till the next time. My great complaint now is weakness, but that is extreme and most distressing. However, they say that needs but a little time and good weather, which has hitherto been wretched." This was the 4th of April. He sank gradually and died on the 23d of June, 1836. He is buried in Kensington church.

A. BAIN.

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Natural Law. An Essay in Ethics. By EDITH SIMCOX. London: Trübner & Co., 1877.

This thoughtful and able work is in many respects the most important contribution yet made to the Ethics of the Evolution-theory. It may be described generally as an attempt to show that the modern scientific conception of man and his relation to nature, so far from involving rejection of the moral element in humanity, is capable of yielding a solid basis for ethical system. Previous essays there have been in the same direction, notably by Mr. Darwin, and in a more general style by Strauss in his latest manifesto, while the question as to the possibility of applying the doctrine of Evolution to practice has been debated at various times in the pages of this journal. Miss Simcox's work, however, is more than a fragmentary discussion; it is a comprehensive, laborious, and thoroughly reasoned attempt to lay the foundations of a scientific theory of ethics.

It is of course evident that a thinker's ethical views must be entirely or almost entirely determined by his underlying metaphysical conceptions, his *Weltanschauung*, and, as a consequence, that criticism from a different point of view must be to a large extent merely formal. In the present work, the philosophical basis assumed throughout is that commonly and somewhat loosely called the Evolution-theory. Man is regarded as "the chief and most interesting among the many marvellous products of natural evolution"; "human ideas, feelings, and beliefs" are supposed "to have been evolved by a continuation of the same process which fixed the nature of the things thought, felt, or known about"; all thought is transformed sensation, and all sensation has a physical basis; in short, in man the forces of nature, or some of them, have become conscious. Man is a portion of nature, and all the filling-in of his consciousness has come from nature. The problem for theoretical ethics is to determine what in the nature of man and his environment has given rise to the peculiar filling-in which we call on the one hand 'consciousness of obligation,' on the other 'the moral law'. In this way one might not unfairly state the objects of Miss Simcox's essay. The answer briefly is:—that the orderly and constant pressure of the constitution of things induces in every organism a constant or normal tendency towards those courses of action suited to its own preservation and perfection; that in man the normal tendencies resulting from the nature of things take shape as Law, Morality, and Religion; and finally that the sense of being constrained, limited by objective reality, the volition of others included, is consciousness of obligation.

The work itself is divided into eight sections or chapters, the eighth being of the nature of an epilogue. In the first a definition of Law is put forward, intended to be sufficiently wide to cover laws of nature in the scientific sense, ethical law, and law in the juridical acceptance of the term. "Law is a statement of constant relations posited by the nature of things." The objection which occurs in

limine to any identification of physical and ethical law is scarcely met, and much ambiguity is caused by the terms 'constant' and 'nature'. Let it be granted that a certain course of action results from the pressure of objective facts upon human will; let it be granted further that reason, taking a view of circumstances, will uniformly direct to such modes of action as we now call ethically or legally good; and that consequently both law and morality may be said to have their foundation in nature, yet there is a wide difference between these uniformities and the uniformities of physical fact, which we call laws of nature. The qualification attached to these ethical laws by the author, that they must be felt by the conscious subject as affecting his will, removes them at once from the class of physical laws. Further, when it is said that law formulates a constant tendency, and that ethical laws formulate tendencies towards certain ends which we know by experience to be (so far) constant in human nature, there is an important difference between such uniformities and constant physical relations. These laws are consciously recognised by the subject, they become the content of his volition, but he may act in opposition to them. What the author puts forward, apparently in answer to some such objection,—“To say that man can disobey the laws of his nature is to deny that he *has* a nature,” seems really to depend for its force upon some ambiguous use of the term ‘nature’. Indeed throughout the work there is constant difficulty with regard to nature, natural inclination, and the like. The term is used in two senses, one much more comprehensive than the other. In the first sense, every action whatever, being the outcome of human volition, is natural; in the second, only the permanent, *rational* courses of action, or tendencies leading to action, are natural. It is when used in this second sense that we have the word ‘nature’ qualified by the adjective *true*; and as synonymous with it, we have the expression *normal*, normal order, normal tendency. The wide difference between a normal law and a natural law scarcely requires to be pointed out.

The second section, on Customary and Positive Law, is in the first instance devoted to statement and proof of the thesis that law is grounded upon and expresses certain tendencies—that laws, to use Hegel's words, “express what the individual is and does”. The argument, including the criticism of the opposed theory, that law is founded on command, is admirably conducted; the conclusion is substantially the well-known proposition that positive law is declaratory. “The substance and provisions of any law are necessarily limited by the nature of the subject, the real relations of which—natural, social, moral, or political—it is in fact the function of law to enumerate.” “Law is the organised liberty of all the members of a society, and obedience to law merely the *Wille zum Leben* of the social organism. From the last statement there follows at once an answer to the further question, What classes of acts are prescribed by law? The acts consecrated by law are in brief the external conditions for the realisation of self, for the development of one's own nature in society. This is so far identical with Kant's doctrine of Right,

though the foundation for it, and the grounds of its universality are stated differently.

Law then being the organised liberty of the community, we have next to inquire as to the binding force, the consciousness of constraint which accompanies the thought of law. The solution here presented we have some difficulty in grasping. "Sense of constraint" is defined to be "consciousness of causation". "Human life is determined by other conditions than human desire, and consciousness of these conditions is consciousness of constraint." Undoubtedly this is consciousness of constraint, but not of the constraint in question. The universe is not exactly constituted so as to satisfy every desire; we are checked and baffled on every hand; and this is in a sense consciousness of constraint. But the constraint to be explained is that pertaining to certain tendencies of our own nature, tendencies which we ourselves affirm. Why are these permanent tendencies, expressed in laws and observances, felt as obligations? The author states clearly enough when the feeling of constraint arises (pp. 75-6), though the terms employed are much too general. Why speak, *e.g.*, of "persistent forces," "permanent *outer* influence"? Action may be restrained by force or outer influence, but the will cannot be obliged by either. "It is necessary," the author says, "for the maintenance of society that men should make certain sacrifices of their own inclinations in their dealings with one another," and it is rightly pointed out, "men do not feel obliged to make the sacrifices because the law commands, the law commands because men feel obliged to make them". This is not a complete answer, but it comes near to what we conceive to be the true solution. The constraining force, or, rather, the natural fact from which constraint arises, is the necessity for individual sacrifice to the good of the community. Mere recognition of this necessity is not the sense of obligation; *this* is the consciousness of a permanent, natural tendency towards the preservation of the social organism, a rational tendency, with which my individual or particular will harmonises. It is this reasoned will by which the individual feels himself bound and in connection with which he has the sense of obligation. Further aspects of the same problem come before us when we pass to the third section, on Morality.

After pointing out that Duty or Obligation always involves reference to the subject who is bound, in fact, is a subjective necessity, the author puts the question,—What classes of actions are enjoined by the moral law? The answer is given by an analysis of the notion 'Good,' leading to a definite statement as to the final end of human activity. Natural good is the perfection of any thing after its kind, and the only things "found good always and under all circumstances are those which conduce to natural perfection, and not merely to the natural perfection of one individual or class, but to the perfection of classes or individuals in so far as their perfection harmonises with the perfect development of other kinds". Sensible good or pleasure is not co-extensive with natural good, and need not

in all cases harmonise with it. The arguments in this connection bearing upon Utilitarianism seem deserving of great attention. Moral good or virtue is the pursuit of natural good under difficulties which render the pursuit self-conscious. If the world were perfect, if our best tendencies could be realised without clashing with others, there would be no virtue, no moral good, no right. Only because obstacles are in the way of our strong tendency towards natural good do we become aware of this tendency, able deliberately to prefer it, and conscious of moral obligation. The obstacles are three-fold: those arising from the environment, which is not always favourable to our normal tendency; those arising from certain counter-tendencies in the organism itself; those resulting from the fact that the supreme excellence to be attained is not a fixed quantity,—the type or kind is progressive.

Putting aside for the moment the definition of Good, we have still to ask how does this conscious tendency towards natural excellence impress us as obligatory? Here, as in the case of legal obligation, there is some difficulty in seizing the author's meaning. "All our permanent tendencies are for things permanently and constitutionally good, good in themselves all through and in every relation, and to these we naturally think it 'right' or practically best that passing partial goods should be systematically sacrificed." That is to say, our strongest influences are towards natural good, and, if circumstances were propitious, the organism would instinctively follow them out. But when we become conscious of this tendency—conscious through its being opposed—how does it impress us as obligatory, as what ought to be carried out? What is the nature of this consent which is yielded by the mind? Why is the "normal preference" for virtue, felt as a law, superior in kind to the momentary impulses, and demanding obedience? It is exactly at this transition-point between instinctive action and conscious acceptance of a law for action that we find the author's theory unsatisfactory. The moral law, we are told, formulates the natural tendency of man towards virtue, and apparently it is thought that, when we become aware of this tendency through the presence of opposing forces, we feel ourselves under obligation, constraint. But as before, consciousness of constraint is not identical with sense of obligation. That a tendency towards virtue should come into collision with other impulses, makes us aware of constraint, but the constraint we desire to have explained is the obligation to follow this permanent tendency. That the tendency is natural no one disputes; but there is a wide difference between a natural tendency and a law received as binding on a free intelligence.

We may now look at the mode of expression adopted in stating the final end of activity. Natural good is the perfection of anything after its kind, and for man may be summed up in the word 'ability'. So far in agreement with the Aristotelian view, this definition differs in the use of, and stress laid upon, the conception of 'kind'. It must be acknowledged as a defect in the work that the central idea, that of the 'normal nature,' *das allgemein-Menschliche*, is left com-

paratively vague. When natural perfection, or, as Strauss puts it, conformity to the idea of Kind, is laid down as the final end of human effort, we require a careful analysis of what is involved in such an idea. It can scarcely be said that such analysis is here given, and the term 'kind' is inadequate for practical purposes. An "intelligent eclecticism" will carry us a very little way, and when we reflect upon the equivalents for 'kind,' *viz.*, 'type' or 'ideal-type,' we are as far from a satisfactory conclusion. The normal nature exists in each man, but the normal nature can only be the assemblage of powers capable of realising normal ends. Mere ability, the adaptation of faculty to purpose, cannot be regarded as a sufficing object, though, as the author grants, it satisfies the definition of perfection. There must be some objectively existing standard by which to estimate the value of human ability. Fresh difficulties start up when it is considered that the idea to which our nature has to conform is not the type as actually existing, but the type as it is going to be. On the whole it must be said that the content of this notion of natural perfection, even taking into account what is said in the later sections, is left in a rather vague state. We should have desired a more complete elucidation of the principle that the natural good of the individual, the realisation of his true being, cannot be attained apart from the natural good of the social organism of which he forms a part, his place in this organism being indeed an essential constituent of his nature. Conscious recognition of this dependence of one upon the whole is the basis of moral obligation; while the consent of the individual will to the legal and moral precepts in which the common ethical consciousness has expressed itself is the affirmation by reason that these precepts are the conditions requisite for the realisation of our true nature. The demand for a reasoned, organised system of ethical observance is never adequately met; morality is always ideal; but each stage of moral culture may be transcended by a truer perception of what makes for universal good.

The fourth section is devoted to Religion and, though closely connected with the author's ethical theory, contains little that bears directly upon its fundamental positions. It is an elaborate essay, worthy of more attention than can be here given. The general result follows at once from the philosophic premisses assumed throughout the work. If the whole content of consciousness is but the effect of impressions from the physical universe, it is clear that what corresponds to the specifically religious feeling must be some aspect or aspects of this universe. The germ of religious feeling is found in the "general apprehension" of a Not-ourselves, on which we are dependent. The perfected religious sentiment is the feeling consequent on recognition of the fact that the general tendencies of this Not-ourselves are for good, a feeling which leads to identification of our will with this moral order of things, to love and admiration for it.

The fifth and sixth sections, on the Natural History of Altruism and the Natural Sanctions of Morality, conclude the ethical theory. In the first, a very able account is given of the origin and nature of

disinterested action. It is well pointed out that the majority of natural tendencies are not motivated by desire for personal pleasure. "The largest part of his (man's) existence is actually and potentially determined by the tendencies of healthy life within and around him, and consists in more or less conscious service of co-operation with those tendencies, while only the lesser part is determined by a craving for the personal *sense* of healthy life which constitutes the good fortune of the happy."

The sanctions of morality are treated as the consequences of any breach of moral law, dislike for these effects operating as an additional motive in favour of the rule; *e.g.*, "the natural sanction of the natural law against murder is the impossibility of bringing the dead to life". The ultimate sanction by which any virtuous action is enforced is "the knowledge of the natural effects of the omission; the consciousness that every single failure to act as human justice and charity demand is irremediable in time or eternity; that by the act which we call wrong, we contribute in our measure to make the world other than seriously and deliberately we would have it to be—to mar creation out of wantonness and imbecility".

The seventh section, on Social and Individual Perfection, is an attempt to fill in the ideal of natural perfection which has been recognised as the final good. Such an endeavour, it is plain, is one of enormous difficulty. To sketch a perfect organisation of society in its several departments is certainly no slight task; still harder is it to reconcile the claims of society with the individual's right to full development. When we come to close quarters with the ultimate end 'perfection,' and have to ask, what is the most perfect form of political machinery? what is the best system of economy? we are embarrassed with all but insuperable difficulties. As to what is here said on the first of these problems, the ideal polity, we have some difficulty in discovering whether liberty or authority is advocated, whether it is thought best that the sphere of government should be widened or contracted, and, if either, on what principle. With regard to the second, the remarks on political economy seem to us largely erroneous. It is absurd to credit economists with such a doctrine of Supply and Demand as is stated at p. 311. We should be inclined to say that the orthodox doctrine may be summed up in the principle that cost determines natural value; the possibility of "unlimited depreciation" was never admitted by any economist; and the dishonest purchase of goods may be admitted in economical practice, but is unknown in economical theory. Much of the argument on 'over-production' and trade-unions is superfluous. What practical remedy is proposed for these evils we can hardly say; only one definite suggestion, abolition of hereditary property, being made.

Many of these concrete difficulties, bearing upon reforms and usages perhaps of old standing, bring to light a curious opposition between two portions of this ethical theory. The permanent or normal tendency is towards good; how are we to discover whether or not a

tendency, which seems permanent, is also normal? The instance of property acquired by descent seems in point. The tendency to admit this method of transmitting property seems permanent, if we judge by duration of time; and yet there can be no doubt that in some respects the custom gives rise to a most unequal distribution of wealth and to consequent economical difficulties. It would be necessary therefore to deny to it the epithet 'normal'. We would merely suggest that the words 'permanent' and 'normal' have by no means the same force and may easily denote facts quite opposed.

In a notice of a work so comprehensive as Miss Simcox's, it is of course impossible to do more than draw attention to a few of the salient doctrines. The book is unusually rich in suggestive remarks, and everywhere bears the impress of genuine hard thinking. It is matter for regret that the difficulty inseparable from so close and compact an argument is aggravated by the qualities of the author's style, which must be pronounced wanting in lucidity and precision.

R. ADAMSON.

Pessimism: A History and a Criticism. By JAMES SULLY, M.A. Henry S. King & Co., London. 1877.

This work proposes to supply what is undoubtedly one of the wants of the time. To give an account of the metaphysical and other theories of two remarkable German speculators is the author's starting-point, but to deal with the entire problem of human happiness is his goal. The text of the book is 'Pessimism'—the view that represents human life as utterly worthless, but the discussion comprises Optimism as well, and arbitrates between the two.

The work is both historical and critical. We have first a short review of Unreasoned Optimism and Pessimism, the stage anterior to formulas and theories. The healthy human being energises without inquiring whether the result compensates the toil; at this stage men are neither pessimists nor optimists. Yet the busiest life has its pauses of reflection—times of weariness, blows of disappointment—which, if dwelt upon, amount to a conscious pessimism; just as moments of new joy lead one to pronounce the world good and fair. The earliest literatures reflect both theories by turns; and Mr. Sully brings together, in a short survey, the expressions found in the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman poets, that show the alternate moods, with a leaning to the pessimistic. To these he adds illustrations from modern literature. "In modern literature the complaints of life's emptiness and instability thicken and grow still more bitter. In spite of the optimistic influences which belong to Christianity, we find individual writers entertaining the gloomiest conceptions of existence." He cites from Mandeville, Swift, Diderot, Voltaire, Shelley, Byron, Heine, Lenau, Leopardi, Lamartine, and Schelling.

The next chapter is on Reasoned Optimism and Pessimism. This

is the form that appeals to facts and gives arguments in favour of one or other of the two views. The reasoning, however, is not of a very high order, being one-sided for the most part, and disposed to take refuge in metaphysical or ontological assumptions, as well as in theology. Under this head the author reviews Hebrew theology, Indian philosophy, early Greek speculation, the Alexandrine philosophy, the Christian doctrine of life, the Fathers, the Schoolmen, Bruno, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, Hume, with the later French and German speculators. The question of Evil is ever the pressing subject, and the modes of solving the enigma are dwelt upon.

A chapter is then devoted to Schopenhauer, and another to his successors, of whom Hartmann, as being the most energetic and popular, is selected for a full exposition. I think Mr. Sully is remarkably successful both in analysing the characters of the two men, and in exposing their faulty psychology.

The author now proceeds to a nearer definition of the problem of Life's Worth. The standard of worth is in the last resort human feeling, that is, pleasure and pain, notwithstanding plausible and popular evasions of the test. The recommending of the world to our intelligence, to our æsthetic sense, or to our moral feelings, is not enough. Moreover, the test to be applied must be our actual experience, and not any metaphysical conceptions such as were introduced by Augustine, Leibnitz, and others to destroy the reality of evil. Nor must the results of experience be anticipated by means of metaphysical or theological deductions. Even the bearings of a future life must be subjected to the consideration of the life that now is.

These limitations being stated and vindicated, the author examines the Metaphysical Basis of Pessimism. Here he reviews more particularly the world-principle of Schopenhauer and Hartmann's modifications of it. Then follows the Scientific Basis of Pessimism; and first the Pessimists' Interpretation of Physical Nature. This brings forward the strange but not original doctrine that physical force is unconscious will. The Pessimists' Interpretation of Mind involves certain views of the relations of Will to Desire, and of both to pleasure and pain, which are carefully examined on their psychological merits. Finally, there is the Empirical Basis of Pessimism; or Hartmann's appeal to facts as showing that human life, as it now exists, is a preponderance of misery. The strictures on the looseness of the proceeding are severe but deserved.

In a long chapter, entitled Pleasure and Happiness, the author takes his own way with the question of the Worth of Life.

"We have now completed our examination of the pessimists' arguments, and may gather up the results as follows: First of all, the metaphysical portico, so to speak, of this dark and gloomy edifice was found, after a slight inspection, to contain numerous cracks and flaws, and to offer anything but a certain and safe approach to the pessimists' desired resting-place. Again, the physical groundwork of the structure has proved itself, on a close scrutiny, to be essentially unstable, being built of nothing but purely fanciful hypotheses, and what is more, of hypotheses which frequently run directly counter to experience, and

which involve incoherent and self-contradictory conceptions. Once more, the psychology of pessimism, when its tangle of unexamined ideas is unravelled, shows itself to be radically erroneous. Lastly, the attempt to prove pessimism directly by an appeal to observation, must be regarded as a signal failure, since the method of observation pursued is wanting in those conditions of completeness, impartiality, and precision, which can alone give to a method a scientific value.

"Such being the fruits of our investigation, we may, perhaps with safety, and even with profit, take our leave of pessimism as a system claiming by right of invincible arguments the adhesion of thoughtful minds. So far, it has certainly made out no such claim; and before it can substantiate its right a very great deal must be done in the way of a preliminary definition of the problem, and of a determination of the methods proper to such an inquiry.

"In taking leave of pessimism, moreover, we are really concluding our inquiry into the complete scientific constructions of life-value. As yet there exists, so far as I know, no systematic attempt to ground a favourable view of life on a solid scientific basis. What has been done is very valuable, no doubt, but cannot be said to provide an adequate foundation for optimism. It is neither complete nor scientifically exact.

"In order to illustrate this, let us glance for a moment at the quasi-scientific optimism of the last century. As we have seen, the English ethicists of this period agree for the most part in affirming the coincidence of the individual and the general happiness. Here, no doubt, is a proposition which, if true, supplies a basis for an optimistic view of social and moral relations. According to this, it would seem that everybody most certainly secures his own happiness when he helps on the happiness of others. Here, then, we seem to have a singularly happy illustration of 'a pre-established harmony,' by which an increase of the unit shall result in a more than proportionate increase of the aggregate. But do the facts support this cheering view? The affirmation cannot, I think, be accepted as true, except within certain limits. As I hope to show by-and-by, a wise pursuit of individual happiness will only take a man a certain distance along the road of benevolent effort. It may be, and I think it is true, that such a prudential line of conduct will make for others' good to some extent, but the converse proposition is certainly not true, namely, that to seek others' good is uniformly the best means of realising one's own happiness."

After some further criticisms on the attempts to rear an optimism on psychological theories of pleasure and pain, the author declares that what is wanted is a truly scientific attempt to define happiness and its conditions, and to determine whether the average external circumstances of human life realise these conditions. As Life is to be estimated solely by the standard of pleasure and pain, the discussion seems at once to take the form—Is there, or can there be, a Science of Hedonics? Mr. Sully fairly meets this question, and reviews the various theories as to the conditions, mental and bodily, of pleasure and pain. He points out clearly the defects of all existing theories, and shows very fully the difficulties attending any comparative estimates of pleasure and pain in the various regions of the mind. He certainly does not extenuate the uncertainties of hedonistic calculation, and yet endeavours to do what a scientific treatment ought to do, approaches the problem from well chosen points, so as to

diminish its difficulties. "Let the question be, for example, whether the various susceptibilities of the eye are fitted to bring more pleasure than pain. We suppose, in the first place, a normal and healthy organ. Further, we make abstraction of the relative frequency of the exciting causes, both external and internal, of the eye's pleasures and pains, simply assuming that one is liable to recur as frequently as another. I think that by reasoning in this way one could reach the conclusion that the pleasure which accompanies the various impressions of light and colour, vastly exceeds all the pain which may arise through unfavourable or excessive stimulation, &c. It is doubtful, indeed, whether any single retinal impression of moderate intensity is disagreeable merely as a sensation, and the pains of discordant combinations are not to be compared with those of musical dissonances. There remain, then, the pains of rapid flickering light, of excessive light, and of over-protracted retinal activity. Nobody, I imagine, would say that these would overbalance all the varied pleasures of light and colour of which the eye is susceptible. And if we include the pleasures and pains of ocular movement and of visual form, the superiority of the former class of feelings becomes still more apparent". He goes on to ask us to compare the number of pleasures derived from all the varieties of graceful, pretty, and beautiful forms, with the pains of their opposites; but, here, I think, he passes into a region of much greater uncertainty. Again:—"Take the group of social affections, including not only love, sympathy, and pity, but their opposites—dislike, hate, antipathy, anger, and revenge. Supposing we know nothing about the comparative frequency of the exciting causes in actual life, a consideration of the nature of the feelings themselves would appear to lead us to decide in favour of their pleasurable character." No doubt it might; but the consideration would carry us far into the depths of the philosophy of emotion. Then, on the other hand, there are regions, as for example, the organic sensations, where the pleasures are unworthy to be compared with the susceptibilities to pain from deranged functions. This, however, in my opinion, should be taken in a different aspect, namely, the possibilities of retaining the health of the system, which is an exceedingly tangible subject of inquiry, whether the result favour pessimism or otherwise. Farther, account has to be taken of the relative quantities of pleasure attendant on different orders of mental activity. "For example, one might conclude with sufficient certainty, that, given a fair amount of capacity both for the lower sensuous enjoyments and for the higher intellectual gratifications of science and art, the latter greatly exceed the former." Mr. Sully makes a good contribution to this exceedingly interesting question, which admits of much psychological clearing-up.

Still, these various tentatives, he thinks are, if not absolutely worthless, yet anything but satisfactory.

"There is no simple *a priori* method of approaching the question whether actual life contains more pleasure than pain. We know too little of the nature and the conditions of these opposite states of

feeling, and what we know cannot give us any clear results. It follows from this, moreover, that it is impossible to deal with the question before us by bringing under review all the principal sources and exciting causes of pleasure and pain in the average circumstances of life. The very statement of the question must, indeed, show its insolubility. First of all, it is by no means possible to determine what are the exact results of any given impression, object, or incident of life. Opinions differ immensely as to the relative value of single occasions of pleasure and pain. And, as we have just seen, there are as yet no scientific data for determining the precise intensity of single pleasures and pains, and so their relative values. But this is not all: even if these effects were uniform and ascertainable, the problem could hardly be solved by a consideration and calculation of all the single sources of pleasure and pain. Such a computation would, indeed, be out of the question, even in the case of a single individual. Nobody could reach a very satisfactory idea respecting the worth of his life by trying to get an algebraic sum of all the antecedents of his single pleasures and pains. To attempt to reckon these antecedents, even for a single day, could only lead to a very rough and unsatisfactory result. How much more futile, then, to seek to sum up all the immediate causes of pleasure and pain operating every day in the case of average mankind. Such a problem does not even seem to lend itself to the roughest kind of statistical investigation."

I cannot but admire the candour and generosity displayed alike by Mr. Sidgwick and by Mr. Sully in surrendering, with only a few faint reservations, the possibility of a Science of Hedonics. Basing, as they do, their standard of good on the surplus of pleasure over pain, they appear to convict themselves, in the face of the world, of aiming at the impossible. For my own part, I feel in the position of the Paris judge who, when Dumas modestly disclaimed the title of dramatist in the country of Corneille, is reported to have answered, "there are degrees". A science of Hedonics may not be comparable to Mathematics or Physiology, but it may be greatly better than nothing at all. I should wish to see a full vindication of the applicability of our ascertained psychological doctrines and analyses to diminish the vagueness of the common unreasoned theories of Happiness. Take up the best results attained without psychology, and then show the corresponding results with psychology, and we shall at least see whether science and philosophy count for anything in the guidance of life. Mr. Sully has another road, on which he marches to his goal. "If, as yet, we can derive no assistance from a scientific doctrine of pleasure and pain, and must regard as useless our vague and scanty knowledge respecting the number and comparative frequency of their exciting causes, may it not be possible to reach an approximate result by considering the facts of pleasure and pain themselves as observable both in the individual's own life and in that of others round about him?" Now I think I could show that there is no contrariety between this road and the scientific road. In abandoning a Science of Hedonics, he really carries with him some exceedingly precious beginnings of such a science; and anybody marching that road, without having first tried his hand at the hedonistic calculus, would not reach the desired goal.

The question "Does pleasure exceed pain?" is now to be translated into the other question, "Is happiness attainable?" The author here examines the idea of Happiness. Although resolvable into pleasures, it is not the same as single feelings of pleasure: it relates to permanent sources of pleasure. Under this idea, Mr. Sully rehearses the admitted constituents of happiness—wealth, family connections, and so on. He dwells, as is just, upon the venting of the active energies in pursuit, on the satisfaction of successful effort, on self-culture, the conduct of life on a scheme or plan, the volitional control of our life-material, and, finally, on a regard to the well-being of others. It is impossible to give any notion of the fulness and accuracy of the handling of these points, on which the author stakes the success of his whole endeavour. The conclusion and summing up of the chapter is this:—"It is no longer a question of a given number of susceptibilities with a wholly indefinite number of external stimuli; we have no longer to calculate the net value of an indeterminate series of imperfectly commensurable elements which occur, we know not with what frequency, or in what order; it is a question whether by voluntary endeavour we are able to transform our primitive world or the arrangement of things into the midst of which the accident of our birth has cast us, substituting for this unsolicited order a new order of circumstances and relations, external and internal, bearing the unmistakeable stamp of a positive value". Yet it is not enough to frame an intelligible idea of a life which involves happiness; we must inquire whether such a life is attainable in the existing conditions of the world.

The chapter entitled the Reality of Happiness is perhaps the most testing of the whole work; it must be read to be appreciated. It brings the inquiry to a point, by endeavouring to settle the kind and amount of evidence that there is for an approximate valuation of the worth of life. No one after reading the chapter will deny to the author a thoroughly judicial and impartial tone of mind; and if the reader also brings the same quality to bear upon the arguments, he will emerge a wiser, without necessarily being a sadder man. There is no attempt to under-rate the difficulties. Thus, as regards the hedonistic worth of the fixed circumstances of our environment, it would be foolish to expect an exact result. Yet, for one thing, we may, by surveying large groups of these factors, go some way to balance their favourable and unfavourable aspects. Take the whole influence of Nature on the mind; and it is possible for any one to strike a balance under given conditions, and then to say how often and how far these conditions are realised. Then, again, the influence of hostile forces, such as climatic severities, may be viewed with reference to the evoking of our energies, and we can pretty well determine at what degrees of latitude these show a balance in favour of enjoyment.

After vindicating the possibility of a solution to his problem, the author now gathers up the answers, in the shape of the testimonies rendered by mankind to the worth of life. "If any number of

intelligent and trustworthy persons agree, on a retrospective survey of life, that it has been on the whole more joyous than sad, this consensus of opinion must be regarded as an important piece of evidence in favour of the proposition that happiness in some appreciable measure is a reality." We must not, however, confine ourselves to valedictory estimates, we must take the judgments passed in life's course, making allowance for changing moods. Midway between extreme estimates either way, there is a judgment to which the mind gravitates, in its calmest moments, and in a large number of cases this judgment is a favourable one. Farther, the estimate may be checked by observation. Every observer can pronounce of a certain number of persons within his ken, whether, on the whole, their life has been tolerably happy. No doubt, the most serious part of the problem still remains—What is the proportion of the happy and the unhappy in the past and the existing state of the world? On this most delicate determination, the author's caution, coolness of judgment, and mastery of conflicting elements, are at their utmost stretch; and, whoever is dissatisfied with his estimate, will probably give an equal amount of dissatisfaction by any amended form of it. He thinks that, viewing simply the past and the present, life has a bare positive value.

But now comes the future; the elements of promise, and progress, and hope. To this the author devotes an interesting chapter, in which he surveys all the aspects of progress, not neglecting the losses and drawbacks that go along with the gains. To pick out a few points here and there would not answer any good purpose. Here is the sum of the whole matter.

"We have resolved to measure the value of the world by human feeling. According to this stand-point the world may be said to be good if the whole sum of human life throughout the total duration of the species is found to yield a large balance of happiness. Now I have tried to show that even if the average life of mankind in the past has been a surplus of misery, progress tends to reverse this result by indefinitely increasing the proportion of happy to unhappy beings. If, then, it could be made out as probable that the future duration of human existence is wholly incommensurable with its past duration, we should have some ground for hoping that in its totality it amounts to a positive good. We might then say that, after all, the emergence of our planet out of its ocean of diffused matter was no dire calamity, but rather a felicitous event.

"Yet from our present point of view we may well abandon such subtle reasonings to the purely speculative mind. For all practical purposes the relative value of past and future existence is an idle question. If, on the whole, the extinct generations of men have, along with their dumb companions, lived and laboured only to reap a dreary surplussage of suffering, their death-calm features betray no after-sense of their woful experience. The story is told and cannot now be altered. On the other hand the absolute value of the future is a matter of supreme moment for our practical instincts. The lives that have to be lived are still a reality, and even to us of the passing hour they seem from afar to send faint cries for apostolic help. It is enough, then, if when we peer into the darkness of the world to be, we can faintly

descrie the form of a good which triumphs over evil, and triumphs more and more. Such an inspiring view of the future has, I conceive, been justified by the foregoing argument."

"Now this conclusion appears to me to provide an adequate basis for practice. It presents to us a distinctly visible and attainable goal towards which our efforts may reasonably direct themselves. Even if it could be shown that it is vain as yet for the individual to aim at his own happiness, there remains the alternative of erecting the future good of mankind into an object of life-endeavour. That it is possible, when the appropriate emotional disposition is cultivated, to make this the crowning motive of life, few, if any, will deny. It may be repeated, too, that where there is this benevolent and far-reaching type of mind, the end aimed at is of a character to secure to the individual himself a certain, even though a moderate, quantity of happiness."

Accordingly, departing alike from optimism and from pessimism, the author rests finally in the watchword suggested to him by George Eliot—Meliorism. He thinks, however, that his task is incompletely fulfilled without adding a long and careful survey of the Sources of Pessimism. This chapter is full of delicate psychological discriminations on the subjects of pleasure and pain, and the influences of temperament upon our judgment of the great matter at issue. The conclusion is a very graphic portraiture of the individualities of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and also of the circumstances in the European situation that favour the reception of their creed.

A. BAIN.

VII.—REPORTS.

Evolution of Nerves and Nervo-systems.—Under this title Mr. G. J. Romanes has given in *Nature* (July 19, Aug. 2, Aug. 9) a very full abstract of a Friday evening discourse delivered at the Royal Institution in May, in which he first sought to give a connected interpretation of his Observations on the Locomotor System of Medusæ, communicated, in Nov., 1875, to the Royal Society (*Philosophical Transactions*, Vol. CLXVI., Pt. I.), and Nov., 1876 (*Proceedings*). Having first shown that the Jelly-fish possesses a system of nervous centres or ganglia disposed round the margin of the swimming-bell, in connection with which invisible or molecular waves of *stimulation* pass in the organism, distinct from the visible waves of *contraction* determined by the contractile or quasi-muscular tissue spread over the concave surface of the bell and the dependent polypite (mouth and stomach of the animal)—he details a variety of experiments on three species of Medusæ (*Aurelia*, *Tiaropsis indicans*, and *Sarsia*) which all tend to confirm the theory of the genesis of nerves propounded by Mr. Spencer in his *Principles of Psychology*, namely, that incipient conductile tissues or rudimentary nerve-fibres are differentiated from the surrounding contractile tissues, or homogeneous protoplasm, by a process of integration which is due simply to use.

In *Aurelia* it is shown that extremely severe forms of section may be resorted to, after total or partial removal of the nervous margin, without contractions ceasing to diffuse themselves everywhere from any point of stimulation; and the question that arises is whether these waves are due to the protoplasmic qualities of the primitive muscular tissue, which will of course survive the most varied section, or whether, in spite of modes of section that would be quite destructive of the functional continuity of higher nervous systems, there is not still involved here the conductile function of some primitive nervous net-work. The question is decided for the author by his finding that there are after all limits to the conduction: a spiral section from the margin towards the centre of the bell, if carried sufficiently far, will always come upon some point where the waves are blocked; what is more, the position of this point is extremely variable in different individuals; and, most striking fact of all, at whatever point in the spiral strip the blocking takes place, it is sure to take place completely and exclusively there. These facts are consistent only with the supposition that we have here to do with a more or less integrated nerve-plexus; and that there is present such a rudimentary nervous system is otherwise apparent, for it is found that the marginal ganglia can always be excited to reflex action by a stimulus applied at any point of the contractile surface, even though it be so feeble that there is obviously no wave of contraction started from the point. The whole contractile sheet of the bell presents thus not merely the protoplasmic qualities of excitability and contractility, but also the essentially nervous quality of conducting stimuli to a distance by "lines of discharge". These lines of discharge are extremely varied, and their vicarious action is most remarkable, so that they are to block; but this is only what should be expected, or, one theory, in an organism so simple and symmetrical. When a block does take place, as in the spiral strip, it generally is permanent; which means that some well-differentiated line of nervous action has been severed and cannot be replaced during the life-time of a mutilated *Medusa*, i.e., in the course of a few days. Sometimes, however, after a time that varies from a few minutes to a day or more, the obstruction is overcome; and then it may be supposed, in accordance with the theory, that there are other lines in the neighbourhood of the point of obstruction, which it needs only a conflict of molecular impulses from repeated stimuli to throw open. In such instances, the first waves that pass the barriers are, in fact, found to be very feeble, the next stronger, and so on, according as the new passage becomes more permeable by use, until at last the contractile waves pour over the original barrier without any perceptible diminution of their force. The whole process seems to the author a representation within hours and minutes of the immensely protracted history of *nervogenesis* on the earth.

Tiaropsis indicans can, with the utmost precision, apply its polarity to any part of the bell which is stimulated; and this localising power, as it implies a more highly differentiated nervous system, with

extremely definite lines of discharge, should naturally be attended with a less degree of vicarious action than appears in *Aurelia*. This is exactly what is found. A slit on the surface of the bell effectually prevents the polypite from localising any stimulus received at a point beyond it. At the same time the stimulus is not, of course, so cut off as to be prevented from reaching the polypite at all (by adjacent lines); accordingly this organ is seen to execute random movements in response to the conflicting messages brought by different lines as the wave of stimulation spreads over the bell. And yet, if only two or three such cuts are made, even these random movements are suppressed—so limited, by comparison with the case of *Aurelia*, is the extent of the vicarious action when the nervous system is sufficiently specialised for localisation of stimuli to be possible. The author further remarks that no trace of ganglionic structure can be microscopically detected in the polypite, though its ganglionic function is so marked. Nerve-cells (as in the polypite) are thus no less than nerve-fibres (in the bell) shown to have their first beginnings in differentiations of protoplasmic substance too refined for the microscope to detect.

Sarsia, a still higher species, is remarkable for showing the first visible traces of nerve-fibres; and therewith appears a corresponding advance of function. Stimuli travel more quickly along its fully evolved nerve-fibres; vicarious action is lessened; and there is the first unequivocal evidence of co-ordination among the marginal ganglia, enabling the animal to steer itself in any required direction.

The author in conclusion urges that, if the theory (specially to be connected with Mr. Spencer's name, though it occurred also to other thinkers) is valid in explaining the genesis of nerves in general, it can be no less valid in explaining the genesis of the highest product of evolution—those supreme ganglia in man whose functional operations are inseparably associated with, however to be distinguished from, thought and feeling. In the hypothesis of lines of discharge becoming more and more definite by use, thus far verified in the lowest grades of animal life, he maintains—

“We have a physical explanation, which is perhaps as full as as complete as such an explanation can ever be, of the genesis of mind. From the time that intelligence first dawned upon the scene of life, whenever a new relation had to be established in the region of mind, it could only be so established in virtue of some new line of discharge being excavated through the substance of the brain. The more often this relation had to be repeated in the mind, the more often would this discharge require to take place in the brain, and so the more easy would every repetition of the process become, until at last the line of discharge grows into a nerve-fibre, and becomes the inherited property of the race. Thus it is, according to the theory, that there is always a precise proportion between the constancy with which any relations have been joined together during the history of intelligence, and the difficulty which intelligence now experiences in trying to conceive of such relations as disjoined. Thus it is that, even during the history of an individual intelligence, ‘practice makes perfect,’ by frequently repeating the needful stimulation along the same lines of cerebral discharge—so

rendering the latter ever more and more permeable by use. Thus it is that a child learns its lessons by frequently repeating them; and thus it is that all our knowledge is accumulated."

Trance.—In the *Journal of Mental and Nervous Disease* (Chicago, Jan. 1877), Dr. G. M. Beard sets forth a comprehensive theory of Trance, and considers its bearings on human testimony. Trance is the general word he employs to include all the real phenomena represented or suggested by the loose designations—somnambulism artificial and spontaneous, mesmerism, animal magnetism, hypnotism, Braidism, catalepsy, ecstasy, &c. His theory is that Trance in all its forms is "a functional disease of the nervous system, in which the cerebral activity is concentrated in some limited region of the brain with suspension of the activity of the rest of the brain and consequent loss of volition". In some forms, nearly the entire brain may be active, but a large enough part is suspended in its activity to cause all the symptoms. Four main varieties are distinguished: (1) *spontaneous*, as natural somnambulism; (2) *self-induced*, as in trance-speakers, spiritualist performers, &c., who may gradually develop the habit; (3) *emotional* (chiefly under fear, reverence, wonder, expectation), as in the common subjects of so-called mesmeric operations; (4) *intellectual*, as 'absent-mindedness' in its extreme forms. The theory (or hypothesis, as Dr. Beard generally calls it, with a very accurate appreciation of what scientific hypothesis is) explains (*a*) the most distinctive feature of Trance, *viz.*, automatism or loss of voluntary power: "Will may be defined as the co-ordinated activity of all the faculties of the mind, including in general terms perception, the emotions and the intellect," and this is just what is broken up when the cerebral activity is concentrated in some limited region of the brain, instead of the different parts (so far as they subserve different faculties) being harmoniously active as in the normal state. It explains (*b*) why Trance is an abnormal state—a functional disturbance relating to circulation and innervation, without structural change. It explains (*c*) the difference between Trance and Sleep: "Sleep is a normal state, a partial cessation of the activity of all the faculties, a lowering of the activity in all the regions, but not a suspension of the activity of any except the will, which, as we have seen, is simply a co-ordinated action of the faculties"; Trance is a form of waking life. It explains (*d*) the phenomenon of dual consciousness in cases of Trance like those of Félicité X. (see MIND III., p. 414; IV., p. 552) and others, with oblivion of the trance-condition in the normal state: the conscious experience depending on heightened functional activity of part of the brain may not be recalled when the balanced, but lower, activity of the whole brain is restored; while yet, on the other hand, "in the trance-state that portion of the brain in which the activity is concentrated would be able to bring to consciousness the acts of the normal life in which that same portion must have participated." [What is here said is not without force, but hardly meets all the facts of the recorded cases of Félicité X. and others. The 'abnormal' conscious life in these is not a one-sided life, but is generally heightened—is altogether richer and

fuller than the common life. Nor does it otherwise conform to Dr. Beard's conception of Trance, for it involves no want of volitional power: Férida went about her business, and regularly performed all the duties of life, only doing it more efficiently and with fuller consciousness than in her so-called 'normal' state. Closer observation might perhaps have detected some want of co-ordination of faculties, bringing the case within the description of Trance proper. But it is safer to suppose that the so-called 'normal' state is itself a morbid one, and that the other, whether held to be morbid or not, is simply a better one so far as the brain-functions generally are concerned, but one liable to have the lower one alternating with it. Though doubtless related to the special morbid states classed by Dr. Beard under the common name of Trance, the 'abnormal' condition of Férida and the others mentioned by Dr. Beard can hardly be described as trance simply, and brought directly within his scientific theory.] The theory, as Dr. Beard proceeds to urge, farther explains (*e*) the difference between Trance and Death, with which it is sometimes confounded: in such a case "the only hold on life which the deeply-entranced person has, is through the activity of a limited region of the brain, through which feeble movements of the heart are sustained, the body being in other respects motionless". It explains (*f*) the exaltation of some of the physical and mental faculties in Trance, and depression of others: "some one or several of the senses, or some one or several of the mental faculties, or some one or several groups of muscles might be exalted in activity, with entire suspension of the other senses, faculties, and muscles, according to the region of the brain in which the concentration of activity takes place"—as in the cases that happen of mesmerised subjects lifting great weights, of somnambulists with exalted co-ordinating or balancing power, and all such exaltations of the normal senses as are "the bases of many of the popular and professional delusions relating to 'second sight,' 'clairvoyance,' 'thought-reading,' and the like". It explains (*g*) all the familiar physical symptoms of Trance, such as flushing of the face, fixity of position, sighing respiration, accelerated pulse, involuntary convulsive movements, and marvellous and numberless hysteroid sensations; also (*h*) the illusions and hallucinations of Trance. It explains (*i*) the relation of Trance to its admitted predisposing and exciting causes—which are both physical and psychical: "one is physically predisposed to trance, so far forth, who inherits or has acquired a nervous system generally sensitive and impressible; one is psychically predisposed to trance who is mentally unbalanced through excessive and disproportionate endowment of imagination and emotion; one who is powerfully developed in reasoning and thinking qualities and is badly deficient in observing and practical faculties, is so far forth predisposed to the intellectual form of trance; the best subjects are those who are predisposed, both physically and psychically, who have sensitive organisations and unbalanced ill-trained minds". Lastly it explains (*j*) the periodicity of Trance in certain cases: it is the nature of all functional nervous diseases—neuralgia, sick headache, hay fever,

inebriety, and some forms of insanity—to appear more or less periodically; and the majority of cases of spontaneous trance are, the writer believes, periodic.

On legal medicine, Trance as explained by the author has, according to him, a direct and most important bearing in four ways. (a) Testimony as to crimes committed under circumstances of great excitement may be of very slight value, through the witnesses being entranced by the emotion of fear. (b) Testimony relating to sudden accidents, attended with fatal or serious consequences, may likewise be rendered worthless as regards the fixing of responsibility, because both witnesses and actors in such circumstances are liable to trance.

“There is no doubt that persons in responsible positions sometimes become entranced as peril approaches, and thus they are likely to take precisely the wrong course and to do that which they especially wish to avoid, like a mesmerised subject. A few years since, while returning from Europe, our steamer collided with a sailing vessel, under these circumstances. It was a starlight night, and the sailing vessel was sighted at least fifteen minutes before the moment of collision and was not lost sight of during that time. The vessel was coming across our bows. Under right management on the part of the officer on deck, a collision would have been impossible. If we had stopped, if we had backed, if we had kept on our course, if we had turned to the port, all would have been well. There was but one way in which it was possible for us to run into the sailing vessel, and that was by turning to the starboard and chasing her. That course the officer of the deck took, and succeeded in running into and knocking the masts out of the vessel. There was no suspicion of intention; there could have been no motive. The officer in charge was not over-experienced, probably became entranced, and did just what he terribly wished to avoid doing. In cases of this kind, the responsibility, legal or moral, belongs to those who allow men of insufficient capacity or experience to take positions for which they are not adapted. In those who have the right capacity for a responsible station, and whose experience in that station has been large, the liability to become entranced through fear is reduced to a minimum.”

(c) Testimony relating to alleged crime or wrong deeds committed by entranced persons should be received with suspicion: the commission of crime requires usually the exercise of will (though as in some forms of insanity the will may be irresponsible), and will by the theory is in abeyance; the author, in a large number of cases, recollects no instance of evil doing, and the suggestion of such a thing in mesmeric trance, so far from being yielded to like other suggestions, has been found to be a sure way of bringing the subject back to full consciousness. (d) Testimony in the trial of those who, under pretence of going into trance, defraud the people, is absolutely valueless from any but experts who have made a special study of the physiology and pathology of the nervous system: the opinion of common people however cultivated and honest, or of scientific men however distinguished in other departments of science, is of no account at all as to what the signs of true trance are or as to what can be done in it, to say nothing of their own liability to fall into the state when they fancy themselves most on their guard against it. The author other-

wise exposes, at some length and with much force, the absurdity of popular and even common professional opinion as to what kind of evidence is admissible or sufficient for the proof or disproof of such alleged phenomena of trance as "clairvoyant or second-sight power or the existence of a sixth sense, by means of which the subject is able to see around and through the world and into other worlds, or to tell time through the back of the head, or to read with closed eyes, or to see through opaque objects, or to discover lost persons or property, or to reveal the past, or to prophecy with precision, to communicate with spirits of the departed, or to raise the dead". Such phenomena never have existed and never can exist in Trance, but the author's confidence in saying so is based upon no inductive disproof of this or that imposture (however useful this may sometimes be), but upon the deductive "application of this law of nature, devised from the experience of all authorities in physiology, namely, that no human being ever has any faculty different in *kind* from that conferred on the human race in general. None of the real phenomena of Trance differ from those that are common to the human family otherwise than in degree." The paper is very wholesome reading.

Sleep.—Dr. A. M. Langlois of Dijon has recently published there a short essay (pp. 61), under the title *Contributions à l'étude du Sommeil naturel et artificiel* (E. Jobard), which is of some interest to psychologists, though he professes to confine himself to the physical aspects of sleep. Physiologists have of late sought chiefly to determine whether in sleep the brain is in a state of hyperæmia or anæmia, and, without neglecting this part of the case, the author contends for the necessity of considering also the *quality* of the nutritive fluid, as affected by the lowered respiration, reduced action of the heart, and other circumstances characteristic of the state of slumber.

Natural sleep is described as a biological phenomenon, nocturnal and intermittent, and essentially restorative—promoting the nutrition of the organs by a decrease of the vital activity and processes of oxidation that go on in the bodily frame. It is characterised by muscular relaxation, obtusion of the senses, diminution of the respiratory movements, decrease in the number of heart beats, lowering of the bodily temperature, de-oxygenation of the blood, and a state of insensibility to pain that is in direct proportion to the intensity of the sleep. The author gives interesting particulars and makes suggestive observations on all the points here noted. The nocturnal recurrence of sleep he connects with the absence of light, not only as a physico-chemical agent in relation to the vegetable and animal worlds, but also as it afforded to the predatory ancestors whose bodily habits we inherit the conditions for procuring subsistence. The intermittence is shown to accord with the general character of organic manifestations (for example, the state of a muscle after exertion—in which by reason of insufficient elimination of the products of decomposition there takes place a formation of lactic acid, with loss of energy continuing until its naturally neutral or alkaline re-action is restored by repose or

otherwise); also with the formula that excludes perpetual motion in mechanics. The muscular relaxation (without prejudice to tonicity) so marked in man—fall of the eyelids and lower jaw, recumbent posture made necessary by naturally forward gravitation of the head, inability to hold anything in the hand, &c.—is much less complete in many of the lower animals, but this, according to the author, is in all cases explicable by the principle of Natural Selection: birds, for example, sleep in that erect and active attitude from which they can most easily take to wing, if necessary for their safety. The obtuseness of the senses begins with vision as shut off by closure of the eyelids; insensibility of the skin follows afterwards; smell is much enfeebled, for a sleeper who sets fire to his curtains is first awakened by the pain of burning or by the blaze; hearing is the least effected or the most easily excited, inasmuch that when we speak of a light sleeper we should rather say an acute hearer. The insensibility to pain, treated separately by the author (though he allows pain to be only an exaggeration of the normal skin-sensibility), is made dependent on three circumstances: (1) the lowered temperature both superficially and internally, (2) the depressed respiration, (3) the increase of carbonic acid in the blood. The anæsthetic effects of refrigeration are familiar; Moleschott and others are quoted to the effect that pain is abated by holding the breath or in the long expiration of cries, because less oxygen is then taken in, and there is reason to believe that the intensity of suffering is proportional to the oxygenation of the living tissues; and as for the third point, evidence is given of the distinctly anæsthetic influence of carbonic acid, while it has been proved experimentally that in states of pain the amount of this gas given off by exhalation is less and consequently the amount retained in solution in the blood is greater. The comparative de-oxygenation of the blood in sleep is, in the author's view, the true secret of its restorative action. In opposition to Mr. Spencer—who supposes that regeneration of tissue may really go on more rapidly by day, when the blood is richer in oxygen and the circulation is more active, though it seems otherwise, because by day, in comparison with night, the amount of regeneration is over-balanced by the amount of waste—he urges, with M. Claude Bernard, that the richness and full flow of the waking stream tell only in the direction of expenditure. Regeneration begins when the oxygen of the red globules does not suffice for the keeping up of active movements and maintaining at its height the animal heat. The regenerative effect of lowering of the general temperature which takes place in sleep, may be brought into relation with the condition of cold-blooded animals in which reparation of tissue goes on to so much greater an extent than in the warm-blooded; also with the fact that in the case of these last, when they hibernate, restorations are found to take place which never occur in the active state. Finally, as regards the *quantity* of the cerebral circulation, Dr. Langlois seeks to reconcile the discrepant views, each of which rests upon some evidence, by distinguishing three phases or stages in the duration of natural slumber:—first, a hyperæmic stage, with a certain amount of cerebral activity, but this

incoherent and not remembered ; then a period of *transition in which* the nerve-cells repair the best part of their losses, with *cerebral pause* ; last of all, a state of relative anæmia, with a more orderly cerebral activity, of which there may be memory in the waking condition which gradually supervenes.

Study of Types of Character.—In his presidential address to the Department of Anthropology in the Biological Section of the British Association, at the Plymouth meeting in August, Mr. Francis Galton made some suggestions as to methods for the study of those groups of men who are sufficiently similar in their mental characters or in their physiognomy, or in both, to admit of classification. Such types of character as those described by Theophrastus and La Bruyère might now, he thinks, be scientifically studied with great profit, if some one well-versed in literature were to compile a volume of extracts from plays and the higher works of fiction, whose authors are ever on the watch to discriminate varieties of character, and have the art of describing them. Another suggestion is that a comparison of the age, height, weight, colour of hair and eyes, and temperament (so far as this may admit of definition) should be made with the amount of personal equation in each observer in the various observatories at home and abroad : the magnitude of a man's personal equation indicates a very fundamental peculiarity of his constitution, and we should thus learn how far the more obvious physical characteristics may be correlated with certain mental ones, while obtaining, perhaps, at the same time a more precise scale of temperaments than we now have. Referring next to some of the recognised methods for measuring exactly the rate or compass of judgment in different individuals (including Prof. Jevons's plan of suddenly exhibiting an unknown number of beans in a box and requiring an estimate of their number to be immediately called out), Mr. Galton dwelt upon the use that might be made of photographs when, after having obtained by one or more methods a group of persons resembling one another in some mental quality, the external characteristics and features most commonly associated with it have to be determined. Photography can seize those subtle yet clearly visible peculiarities of outline which most elude measurement. The anthropologist ought to have the full face, profile, and view of the head from above, of the individual whose features he is studying ; which by a simple arrangement of mirrors might all be obtained to scale on the same plate with the ordinary photographic picture of the sitter. From such sets of representations of several persons alike in most respects but differing in minor details, the typical characteristics might then be extracted by superimposing the pictures optically and accepting the aggregate result. Either, as suggested by Mr. Spencer, the portraits reduced all to the same scale might be traced on separate pieces of transparent paper and secured one upon the other, and then be held between the eye and the light ; or, as occurred to Mr. Galton himself, faint images of the several portraits, in succession, might be thrown upon the same

sensitised plate. He is now engaged upon an inquiry into the physiognomic aspects of the criminal classes, on the basis of such photographs as he has been able to obtain from the prison authorities of the country—many thousands in number and so far affording a good ground for classification, but unfortunately needing to be supplemented by views of the profile and shape of head. The address is given in full in *Nature*, Aug. 23rd.

EDITOR.

VIII.—NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

Mr. Sully on 'Physiological Æsthetics'.—I propose to say a few words in answer to Mr. Sully's criticism of my *Physiological Æsthetics*, which appeared in the last number of *MIND*. I wish merely to deal with his strictures on my theory of pleasure and pain, because I think I can show him that the cases which he adduces as weighing against that theory are either only apparent difficulties, or else, when thoroughly sifted, strong arguments in its favour. I shall take his various points in the order of their occurrence.

Mr. Sully asks (p. 388) "Even if we allow that certain sensations, as bitter tastes, which are painful in all degrees of intensity, answer to injurious stimulation, . . . how are we to bring the pains of ungratified desire under Mr. Allen's principle? The omission to include these in his view of pains is all the more remarkable, since the writer to whom Mr. Allen owes most, Mr. Herbert Spencer, has given so great a prominence to them." Now the fact is, I purposely avoided all allusion to this subject, because I did not wish to drag in an unnecessary discussion: but as I am thus compelled to state my opinion, here it is. I believe such pains hardly exist at all; while the few which do exist are very vague, are confined to highly-developed animals, and form a portion of those complex emotional feelings whose physical antecedents are still involved in great obscurity. Much confusion has arisen from the ambiguous use of words like *craving*, *appetite*, *desire*, &c.; and I think there are three distinct classes of feelings liable to be confounded under these names. First, there are the positive pains of hunger and thirst, in their extreme forms, which obviously arise from insufficient nutrition or actual unbuilding of the tissues; and these fall readily enough under the general law. Secondly, there is that uneasy feeling produced by high efficiency of any organ, which seeks, successfully or otherwise, to perform its function. This is *not* a pain, but merely a *nus*, an impulse, a stimulus to action. As cases in point we may take the ordinary forms of hunger and thirst, which are neither pleasurable nor painful, but simply act as impellents. It is these feelings which Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "*cravings*," and to which he rightly attributes so great an importance, relatively to his own mode of treatment. But I doubt whether they should be classed at all in the same category with pleasures and pains, because they are in reality mere phenomena

of volition, though compounded or inextricably mixed up with emotional states. A good appetite, or a sexual impulse, or a tendency towards muscular action are each in themselves on the whole pleasurable, but are liable to be combined in concrete cases with positive hunger, or ideal disappointment, or painful restraint. Thirdly, there are a few instances where a gratification is suggested in the idea, while the actuality cannot be realised; as when I see or think of strawberries, but am prevented by circumstances from eating any. These are true cases of *discomfort* arising from ungratified desire, though they hardly deserve to be called by any stronger name. But they are too few in number and too slight in importance to be included in a general view of pains. They can only exist in nervous systems sufficiently complex to be capable of ideation and disappointment. Accordingly, they belong to that class of higher emotional feelings concerning whose mechanism we know as yet little or nothing; and Mr. Sully surely will not blame me for not having gone beyond my facts. As a rule I have confined myself to peripheral pains, about which something can be said with certainty, and have written very little, and that doubtfully, on the head of central pains, about which we can still only guess with more or less probability. But I have always allowed throughout for that blank and negative neutral feeling known as dullness or monotony, which results from the simple absence of pleasurable stimulation.

Again, Mr. Sully writes: "He hardly succeeds in including the effects of disagreeable combinations of colours under this law. He argues that discordant juxtapositions of colours produce their effect through a successive stimulation of the same class of optic fibres, which thus reaches the exhaustive and injurious point. It would follow from this, of course, that one and the same colour spread over a large surface would produce the pain of chromatic dissonance in its maximum degree. It need hardly be said that this consequence sufficiently illustrates the untenability of Mr. Allen's view of colour-discords." To this I would answer that a single field of colour *does* undoubtedly produce the maximum degree not of chromatic *dissonance** but of chromatic fatigue, as Mr. Sully may easily satisfy himself by the following simple experiment. Take a large sheet of white paper and cut in it a circular hole about ten inches in diameter; then place under the hole a piece of bright red or yellow paper: hold it at the average distance at which you read ordinary type, and look fixedly at the red spot for a few seconds. It will be found that the

* I must gently protest, in passing, against the employment of this word: my argument having been that all dissonance is fatigue, Mr. Sully treats it as though I had asserted that all fatigue is dissonance. I may add that the very same argument brought by Mr. Sully against my theory of colour-discord, which he rejects, might with equal force have been brought against Helmholtz's theory of note-discord, which he accepts. What would Mr. Sully say to a person who argued that on Helmholtz's principles "one and the same note, continued for a long time, would produce in the maximum degree the pain of musical dissonance"?

disagreeable effect, chromatic as well as muscular, is intense. Then remove the eye from the red spot, and let it wander with its usual freedom over the paper. It will be found that the vision is constantly shifting from the red to the white and back again, especially following the contour of the circle. It is these semi-automatic movements which ordinarily mask from us the unpleasant effects of a monochromatic field—or rather, practically prevent its occurrence. Wherever form is suggested, the eye keeps restlessly wandering to and from the boundary lines, and unconsciously shifting its forms from one shade or colour to the other. Hence, a considerable patch of one colour may cause us no perceptible annoyance, while two patches of discordant colour, each of half its size, may annoy us considerably: because in the first case we are constantly wandering off for relief to the limiting colours, and in the second we are constantly travelling to and fro over areas which alike fatigue the same perceptive elements. Hence, I believe, the common experience that a certain amount of concentration is required in order to perceive colour-discords, in proportion to the minuteness of their elements. It should be remembered that the extreme restlessness of the eye, and its continual practice of skirting round the figures represented to it, are seldom sufficiently recognised except by those accustomed to minute observation and subjective optical experimentation.

The passage, however, which seems to me most especially to demand a rejoinder is this: "What we miss is an adequate inductive basis for the generalisations put forth, and a due co-ordination of the different principles adopted. For example, the alleged correspondence between the amounts of pleasure and pain and the importance of the function certainly requires proof—and careful proof—in view of such patent facts as the torments attending an injury to the dental nerve, the comparative painlessness of many internal diseases, the slight amount of pleasure afforded by the process of digestion, and so on" (p. 339). The explanation of these seeming anomalies is so simple that I should hardly have thought them worth anticipating. First, let us take the case of toothache. All the higher animals are covered externally with a layer of non-sensitive tissue which we call the epidermis, and which undergoes many modifications for protective or other purposes. Evidently, it is highly desirable for them to be thus preserved from the action of destructive agencies in the environment. An animal which lost its hair or feathers would be exposed in a peculiarly defenceless state to enemies, weather, and rough bodies. Accordingly, natural selection has provided that these protective structures, themselves non-sensitive, should be embedded in a layer copiously supplied with nerves, so that acute pain follows the slightest attempt to remove or loosen a single one of them. More especially important are those instrumental modifications known as nails, claws, hoofs, talons, beaks, and horns, which aid the animal in walking, digging, scraping, seizing prey, attacking or repelling enemies, and other useful actions. Accordingly we find these structures embedded in unusually sensitive layers, so fully innervated that a very slight injury is productive of

deep and excruciating pain. But of all the tegumentary tissues, the most indispensable to the higher animals are those used for mastication, the teeth. Not only are they necessary for tearing the food, but they are also used to attack enemies, to catch and hold prey, to remove obstructions, to build, carry, cut, gnaw, and excavate, in short, to do all that hands, weapons, and tools do for human beings. Naturally, the loss of such organs is of the most fatal import to every animal, and we find them, as we might expect, supplied with nerves of such size and power that the slightest strain or crack, the most unimportant shock, the mere jar of a gritty substance between their surfaces, produces a most objectionable thrill; while their actual forcible removal is probably the most intense agony of which our nature is capable. Of course, in civilised man, whose hands and implements have superseded his teeth, the nerve is comparatively useless; and we are generally conscious of its existence only when decay affects it. As things stand with us at present, the sooner the dental nerves become obsolescent the better. But if Mr. Sully had only turned from modern man to his earlier progenitors, he would not have wondered that enormous care had been taken in supplying a means of protection for the teeth.

Next, as to the painlessness of internal diseases and the slight pleasure of digestion. This difficulty is illustrated by another question of Mr. Sully's, a little further on. He asks, "Are mastication and deglutition more essential than stomachic and intestinal digestion?" I had hoped that my position on this subject was quite clear, especially after my distinct statement on pages 11 and 12; but it seems that my view has been misunderstood. Let me explain myself more fully. Pleasure and pain, being stimulants or deterrents of voluntary action, are specially connected with our cerebro-spinal system. That part of any set of functions which is voluntary is correlated with pleasures and pains: the remaining part, being automatic, could derive no advantage from such concomitants. Both in nutrition and in reproduction the initial step is voluntary, because the conditions demand that it should be so, and pleasure acts accordingly as an inducement to the first process; but when once the food is swallowed or the act of impregnation affected, the remaining processes go on automatically, and no good end could be subserved by voluntary intervention. So, too, with internal diseases. They are practically out of the reach of voluntary action, except in the special case of man, whose intellect enables him to devise means for detecting symptoms and arresting disease. But no lower animal could be one whit the better for a pain in its heart, its lungs, or its liver. Almost the only internal organ which yields us any feeling under average circumstances is the alimentary canal, which is susceptible of pain but not of pleasure; and this is just the one organ where an internal warning can be utilised even by the lower animals.

There are many other points in Mr. Sully's criticism which similarly call for notice; but I trust the few remarks given above will serve to show that a little consideration would get rid of his objections to my

theory. I hope hereafter to elaborate one or two of the ideas suggested by his criticism into illustrative essays, which will appear elsewhere; and I will therefore ask at present for no more space in the pages of MIND than that which has been already accorded me.

GRANT ALLEN.

Lord Rayleigh on a Gambling Paradox.—In the last No. of MIND Lord Rayleigh has a note upon an explanation which I had offered of a certain gambling paradox, *viz.*, that called the Martingale or Double and Quits. As I agree with nearly all that he says, and at the same time do not see reason to alter my own opinion, I conclude that one of us must have missed the point of what the other had to say.

Take the following case:—There is a bank A which plays with a fixed average percentage of advantage in its favour. B and C engage with it on the condition that they may leave off at any point of the proceeding they please, and that until they desire to leave off no questions about their solvency will be raised. This condition is precisely the same for both.

B adopts the plan of playing for fixed stakes; the same every time, whether he has won or lost the time before. C doubles his stake after every time of losing. Is there any difference in their prospects? Obviously there is. B cannot ensure ever being left a winner, whilst C must sooner or later find himself in that position. The general reason, without going into details, is clear: B (after the first time) needs, in order to win, a succession or run of luck, and the longer succession the longer he has had to wait; whereas C only needs a single event in his favour.

I cannot but think that some appreciation of this fact is lurking in the minds of some gamblers when they so persistently advocate this plan; and recognising this, I did not for a time quite see my way to answering them. Of course no bank would ever dream of permitting such conditions, but we may postulate them for argument's sake.

I quite accept all that Lord Rayleigh says about the difference between two persons nominally playing on credit, when one has property really to stake and the other has not; but in the case in question, B and C are supposed to stand on precisely the same footing, the only difference between them consisting in the way in which they arrange their stakes. The answer therefore commonly given, or implied, that no arrangement of stakes can ever make any difference in the final result, is not in every case correct, however completely it may apply to the cases which actually occur in practice. To bring this out was the aim of the explanation which I offered in the *Logic of Chance*.

J. VENN.

IX.—NEW BOOKS.

Recent British Philosophy: A Review, with Criticisms; including some Comments on Mr. Mill's Answer to Sir William Hamilton. By DAVID MASSON. Third Edition with an Additional Chapter. London: Macmillan & Co., 1877. Pp. 297.

To this book, first published in 1865 and reprinted in 1867, Prof Masson has now added a considerable sketch (pp. 35) of the philosophical work done in the last twelve years, including a Bibliographical Conspectus drawn up with characteristic thoroughness. While noting a steady increase of attention to speculative philosophy within the period, the author finds that Philosophy has shown a marked tendency to pass into mere Cosmology, and he can best distinguish the prevailing philosophical conceptions according as they stand related "to that extensive and thorough Science of the Physical Universe which all hold to be desirable on its own account, whether it will by itself amount to a sufficient Philosophy or not". Five positions are signalised. A Correct Cosmology is found (1) accompanied by a Metaphysical Nihilism—at least as a possible view, if not very seriously maintained; (2) accompanied by Metaphysical Agnosticism—which either (*a*) declines the question whether there is an Absolute or not, or (*b*) affirms an Absolute but denies that it can be anyhow featured by human intelligence; (3) irradiated by Metaphysical Inferences from itself—the common view of theists and theologians of the *a posteriori* school, supported after a fashion of his own by J. S. Mill in his posthumous *Essays on Religion*; (4) irradiated by an *a priori* Metaphysic of Faith or Constitutional Postulation—in divers ways (theological or other) and to divers ends; (5) grasped and explained throughout by an *a priori* Metaphysic of Reason—in the footsteps of Hegel. Professor Masson thus concludes:—

"On the whole my impression is that the struggle in Systematic British Philosophy, apart from Didactic Theology, is not now any longer, as it was in 1865, between Hamilton's System of Transcendental Realism *plus* a Metaphysical Agnosticism relieved by strenuous Faith, and Mill's System of Empirical Idealism *plus* a Metaphysical Agnosticism relieved by a slight reserve of possibility for Paley after all, but between Mr. Spencer's Knowable Cosmical Evolution blocked off from an Unknowable Absolute, and some less organised Idealistic Philosophy describable as British Hegelianism. But, apart from these two camps, there cluster the Comtists by themselves; and between the two camps, looking into each and borrowing from each, but refusing to belong to either or to house with the Comtists, move those vagrant Agnostics who still choose to rely mainly on more or less of constitutional postulation."

Socrates and the Socratic Schools, newly translated from the third German edition of Dr. E. ZELLER, by Oswald J. R. Reichel, B.C.L., M.A. Second and entirely new Edition. London: Longmans & Co., 1877. Pp. 408.

"In order to avoid inaccuracies, the translator has once more carefully gone over the whole, so that what is now offered as a second edition is really a new translation from the third German edition."

De l'Imagination; Étude psychologique. Par N. MICHAUT. Paris: Germer Baillière. 1876. Pp. 323.

Perception is analysed into two factors, Sensation and Ideas. Ideas are defined as "any primitive element, other than Sensation, that analysis can discover in any intellectual phenomenon"; and are either (1) *a priori* or (2) copies of sensations. They are always associated in groups, which are capable of subsisting in the absence of the sensation around which they at first formed, and are then called Images. Hallucination is perception in which the factor of sensation has an entirely subjective origin, being supplied by the excitation of the sensory centres by a dominant idea (*idée fixe*). Dominant images have the power of altering weaker images, and subduing them to their own likeness; whence arises Illusion, which is a morbid grouping of abnormal associations round a sensation normally furnished by the senses from without (as a white cloud is taken for legions of angels). Association of Ideas is treated of at length. The conditions of Association are—subjectively, Simultaneity of Presentation, and, objectively, all possible sorts of Relation between the objects of ideas; the principal categories of these being Contiguity (in time and in space) and Resemblance. These laws are shown at work in the operations of Reverie, Reminiscence, and Memory. Images are classed according to their susceptibility of revival, in the following order:—visual, auditory, tactile, and lowest of all, gustatory, olfactory, and those of the systemic sensations. Memory is shown to consist of revival with recognition, the ground of recognition being the indissolubility of the order of arrangement of the factors of a revived image. The process is complete when we have discovered the 'attachments' of the image, *i.e.*, the associations between which it naturally stands, and which mark the point in time at which it first arose. Images are subject to disintegration. Their viability is as their susceptibility of revival. Images are further changed by the fusion of those that contain a common element, and new combinations are formed by the accretion of new ideas around old images. The essay closes with some chapters on *Æsthetics*.

Des Sociétés Animales; Étude de Psychologie Comparée. Par ALFRED ESPINAS. Paris: Germer Baillière. 1877. Pp. 389.

This is a very important study of the phenomena of social life in the animal world, to which we shall hope to return in a future number. The author is a young French thinker who, basing partly on original observations and partly on a critical survey of the best ascertained facts as recorded by other observers, aims ultimately at the solution of two chief problems which he thus expresses:—" (1) What is the relation between the individuals and the psychical centre

to which their activity binds them or the group within which they live each with a distinct body and consciousness of their own? How reconcile the individuality of the parts with that of the whole? And if the whole forms a true individual, how amongst animals is a collective consciousness possible? (2) What sort of thing is Society? Is it a being properly so called—a thing real and concrete, or is it only an abstraction, a conception without object, a word? Is Society a *living thing* like the individual, as real and even more real, or is it only a unity of collection, a verbal entity of which the individual forms the whole substance?" His prior object, while preparing the way for such solution as he gives of the problems, is to make manifest the presence of communal life throughout the animal kingdom from the lowest grades to the highest. Collective life is, he contends, no accidental occurrence here and there, but a normal, constant, universal fact. All animals are at some time of their existence involved in some society: the social medium is the necessary condition of the preservation and renewal of life.

Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen. Von Dr. PAUL RÉE.
Chemnitz: Schmeitzner, 1877. Pp. 142.

An attempt to give a strictly theoretic account of the origin of our moral feelings, on the express assumption that the higher animals have been evolved by natural selection from the lower and that man is no exception. In the author's view, all morally good action is altruistic and all morally bad action is egoistic. Moral distinctions are a product of custom and acquired by education. The reason why altruistic action grew to be commended, lay in the ill effects as between man and man of the selfish impulses of human nature; but the reason has been left out of view while the moral distinctions are passed on, and thus altruism instead of being seen to be only good for others, has come to be accounted absolutely good. It is under this impression, joined to the (mistaken) notion of the will being free, that remorse arises; also the feeling of retributive justice. A number of other feelings are explicable from a regard to the opinion of our fellows. The author is of opinion that men do not become better, that is to say, less egoistic with the lapse of time; for neither by natural selection is it exactly the non-egoistic individuals or nations that survive, nor is altruistic feeling so often indulged as to become strengthened by repetition; the utmost that can be said is that men tend to become more governable. In the actual conditions of life, more full as it is of pains than pleasures, the good man is by his sympathetic disposition least of all secure of happiness; but happiness generally depends less on moral or immoral qualities than on other things, such as health, temperament, reasonableness. The essay is marked by great lucidity of expression and no common boldness of thinking. It deserves attention both for the scientific value of some of its observations and as a rather striking specimen of the pessimistic vein of thought now prominent in Germany.

Dogmatismus und Skepticismus. Eine Abhandlung über das methodologische Problem in der vorkantischen Philosophie. Von Dr. PAUL KANNENGISSER. Elberfeld : Fassbender, 1877. Pp. 95.

The author of this little treatise has no ambition to throw one work more upon the pile of Kantian literature raised by so many hands in Germany at the present day; but taking the deeper meaning of the Kantian revival to be—that it springs from a determination to make the progress of philosophy (like that of science) continuous from the last position that all can agree in regarding as permanently won, he desires to aid farther advance by bringing clearly into view the real nature of Kant's lasting achievement. It was a solution of the problem of Method, and the author will exhibit this at length in a work on which he is now engaged. The present treatise is merely preparatory, dealing with the methods of Dogmatism and of so-called Scepticism or Empirism (as represented on the one hand by the Leibnitzo-Wolffians and by Hume on the other) which Kant had before him. The "assumptions and grounds" of each are set forth in separate chapters.

X.—NEWS.

Dr. E. Dühring, referred to above (p. 517) in his place amongst the philosophical thinkers of Germany, has, by a ministerial order dated the 7th July, been dismissed from the post of *privat-docent* in the University of Berlin, which he has held for the last fourteen years. The event has roused so much excitement amongst students and others in Germany that the Minister has allowed the Philosophical Faculty of the University to publish in a small pamphlet (pp. 36, Berlin: Reimer) the various documents that give the true history of it. From these it appears that already some two years ago Dr. Dühring narrowly escaped his present fate for having attacked in print one of the professors of the Faculty, and did not escape without an extremely severe official reprimand and the assurance that instant dismissal would ensue upon the least repetition of such conduct. Since then he has once and again offended, and as he would not, when summoned to account, recede from his positions, the dismissal has now followed. The documents set forth in detail his recent offences. Writing some months ago on the higher training of women, he made an onslaught upon the German Universities generally as nests of corruption and obscurantism; and in the new (second) edition of his *Critical History of the Principles of Mechanics*, besides reflecting on the mathematical professors at Berlin, he expressly charges Prof. Helmholtz with having appropriated to himself the credit that belonged to Mayer for the discovery of the principle of the Conservation of Energy. This latter charge is proved to be utterly groundless, and one is at a loss to understand either how it could have been made at all or made in such extravagant terms. The attack on the University-system is also

robbed of all gravity by its wildness. On the whole, it is not surprising that the Minister should have judged that Dr. Dühring could no longer labour usefully within a system which he reprobates so vehemently and in the company of colleagues whom he so lightly esteems. It is, however, matter of deep regret that a philosophic worker of his ability should thus have faltered in his career, and one learns with a sense of pain that he now suffers from blindness contracted in the midst of his unwearied literary labours. If, as has been reported, he is about to be placed, by those who sympathise with him, as instructor in a free scientific institute at Berlin, founded on better principles than the University, the good wishes of many will go with him in his new career. The Prussian capital offers a field quite large enough for an educational experiment, and if it should result in proving the deficiencies of the University, no Faculty or Minister will have the right to resent *such* an exposure.

Dr. R. Avenarius, editor of the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* and till now *privat-docent* in the University of Leipsic, has been called to the University of Zürich as Professor of Inductive Philosophy.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—2me Année. No. VII. E. Boutroux—'M. Zeller et l'Histoire de la Philosophie' (I.). Th. Ribot—'Philosophes contemporains: M. Taine et sa Psychologie'. Guyau—'La contingence dans la Nature et la liberté dans l'Homme selon Epicure'. Observations et Documents—'La Conscience du moi,' par Th. Galicier. Analyses et comptes-rendus. Rev. des Périodiques. No. VIII. E. Naville—'Les Principes directeurs des Hypothèses'. E. Boutroux—'M. Zeller et l'Histoire de la Philosophie' (fin). J. Delboeuf—'Pourquoi les Sensations visuelles sont-elles étendues?' Notes et Documents—'L'Espace d'après Clarke et Kant,' par M. Boirac. Analyses et comptes-rendus. Rev. des Périodiques. Correspondance—'Apropos d'une illusion interne optique'. No. IX. Ch. Bénard—'L'Esthétique du Laid'. E. Naville—'Les Principes directeurs des Hypothèses' (fin). L. Liard—'La Logique Algébrique de Boole'. Analyses et comptes-rendus. Rev. des Périodiques étrangers.

LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. VIme Année, Nos. 21-32. C. Renouvier—'Le Cours de Philosophie positive est-il encore au courant de la science?' (21, 27); 'Examen des Principes de la Psychologie de Herbert Spencer: La physique de la psychologie' (23), 'L'évolution générale mentale' (24), 'La formation de l'esprit par l'expérience héréditaire' (28). F. Pillon—'La critique de l'infini: L'infini actuel selon M. Wyrouboff' (31).

LA FILOSOFIA DELLE SCUOLE ITALIANE.—Vol. XV., Disp. 2. F. Bertinaria—'Ricerca se la separazione della Chiesa dallo Stato sia dialettica ovvero sofistica.' A. Paoli—'Le dottrine platoniche nel secolo XIX.' T. Mamiani—'Dei nuovi peripatetici in alcune scuole teleologiche odierne.' G. Jandelli—'Del sentimento.' T. Mamiani—'Sulla rappresentazione ideale.' C. Cantoni—'I precursori di Kant nella Filosofia critica.' Un Credente—'Filosofia della religione.' N. N.—

'Appunti sul Darwinismo.' Bibliografia, &c. Disp. 3. V.—'La storia delle idee morali in Malebranche.' T. Mamiani—'Della psicologia di Kant.' F. Bonatelli—'Intorno al problema delle idee.' N. N.—'Appunti sul Darwinismo.' A. Martinazzoli—'La psicologia e la scienza del linguaggio.' L. Ferri—'La questione dell' anima nel Pomponazzi.' T.—'Una riposta.' Bibliografia, &c. Vol. XVI., Disp. 1. G. Jandelli—'Del sentimento'. T. Mamiani—'Della psicologia di Kant' (II.). A. Tagliaferri—'Filosofia della religione'. T. Mamiani—'Positivismo, scienza e metafisica'. A. Macchia—'Della percezione'. Bibliografia, &c.

PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.—Bd. XIII. Heft 6. W. Gass—'Schleiermacher als Philosoph'. L. Wies—'Wigand u. der Darwinismus.' Recensionen u. Anzeigen. Bibliographie, &c. Hefte, 7, 8. A. Lasson—'Ueber den Begriff des Schönen'. Recensionen u. Anzeigen. Bibliographie, &c.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, &c.—Bd. LXXI. Heft 1. H. Ulrici—'Wie kommen wir zur Vorstellung der Verschiedenheit der Dinge?' J. H. Fichte—'Das Zeugniß eines grossen deutschen Naturforschers [K. E. v. Baer] für die teleologische Weltanschauung'. T. v. Varnbüler—'Analyse und Synthese'. Recensionen. Bibliographie.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VÖLKERPSYCHOLOGIE U. SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT.—Bd. IX. Heft 4. G. Glogau—'Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik und Ethik im Licht der neuern Psychologie'. Beurtheilungen.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.—I. Heft 4. R. Avenarius—'Ueber die Stellung der Psychologie zur Philosophie'. F. Paulsen—'Ueber den Begriff der Substantialität'. S. Günther—'Der philosophische und mathematische Begriff des Unendlichen'. C. Göring—'Ueber den Begriff der Erfahrung' (II.). A. Schäffle—'Ueber die Entstehung der Gesellschaft nach den Anschauungen einer sociologischen Zuchtwahltheorie'. R. Avenarius—'In Sachen der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie'. Recensionen. Selbstanzeigen, &c.

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